Class 
Book 



LETTERS 



MODERN HISTORY 



Political Aspect 



E U R O F Es 



EXHIBITING 

The Nature, Causes, and probable Consequences of the grand Contest 
between Great Britain and France, and the Political Circumstance* 
of the different Nations which compose the European System. 

WITH 

An Investigation of the Political and Commercial Importance of Egypt^ 
and the Consequences that might result from the Annexation of that 
Country to the Dominions of France. 

ILLUSTRATED WITH 

^HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL OBSERVATIONS. 



By JOHN BIGLAND, 

ArTHOR OF LETTERS ON THE STUDY AND USE OF HlF-TORY. 



SECOND EDITION, 
Revised and adapted to the present State of Europe. 



LONDON: 

PRINTED FOR LONGMAN, HURST, REUS, AND ORMEj 
JPATERNOSTER-ROW. 

1806. 



PREFACE. 



In my Letters on the Study of History, I cast 
only a transient glance on the history of our 
own times; of which the events are fresh in 
every one's memory, and detailed in a nmltipli- 
city of historical performances. I therefore 
contented myself with making some general 
observations on the most conspicuous circum- 
stances of the present age. As the tempest, 
which had so long agitated the political world, 
seemed for a time to have subsided, I was un- 
willing to enter into any investigations which 
might have the most remote tendency to cherish 
national animosity, and avoided as much as 
possible any remarks on those events which had 
so recently inflicted the most dreadful calamities 
on suffering humanity. It would, indeed, be 
well if those things could be. buried in perpetual 
oblivion ; at least, it would have been a happy 
circumstance, if a continuance of peace had 



vi 

prevented a repetition of those calamities, that 
so they might have stood in history v/ithout 
3m.itation, as they stand without precedent. 
This, hov/ever, the restless ambition of one do- 
mineering power forbids. The complexion of 
the times is now very different from what it ap- 
peared at the period alluded to ; and the present 
state of the political system, with the relative 
power and influence of its component parts, 
constitute, at this momentous crisis, an import- 
ant subject of inquiry. The performance here 
presented to the public is an attempt to investi- 
gate the nature, the causes, and probab'e con- 
sequences of the grand contest between Great 
Britain and France, as well as to exhibit, in a 
distinct and comparative view, the strength and 
resources of the diiferent European powers, in 
order to make a just estimate of existing cir- 
cumstances, and to form probable conjectures 
on the future consequences. 

The plan of the performance is, to consider 
the political system of Europe in tliree distinct 
points of view, as implicated in the vortices, 
and connected with the interests of the three 
predominating powers, Great Britain, France, 
and Russia. Historical and geographical illus- 
trations are occasionally introduced. These, it 
is presumed, will not be unentertaining to those 
who are conversant in history and geography, 
and are absolutely necessary to such as are un- 
4 



vii 

acquainted with those sciences. They are ne- 
cessary, in order to exhibit the subject in a 
clear and appropriate point of view. The cir- 
cumstances of the present age are the conse- 
quences of the events which took place in that 
immediately preceding, and their effects will be 
witnessed by the succeeding generation. 

A work of this kind would be defective, if 
Egypt were not introduced as an important ob- 
ject in the view of European politics, when we 
consider the design which France has so une- 
quivocally manifested of annexing that country 
to its doniinions, and which she seems not yet 
to have laid aside; and especially when we ex- 
amine the motive of that design, and contem- 
plate the commanding situation of Egypt, both 
as a com,merciai emporium and as a military 
station. 

Egypt has been pretty accurately described 
by many intelligent travellers, as Dr. Pocock, 
M. Savary, Captain Norden, Mr. Antes, Mr. 
Baldwin, Mr. Brown, M. Volney, M. DenoH;, 
and several others. It is, however, necessary 
to give a short sketch of that celebrated coun- 
try, in order to display its political importance ; 
and it is also to be considered, that every reader 
has not had the opportunity of perusing and 
comparing the different accounts of those tia- 
vellers. The substance of their descriptions, 
' so far as they arc interesting in a political view, 



Viii 

is here concisely given ; their real or apparent 
contradictions examined and compared, and the 
information selected from their different ac- 
counts, exhibited in a concentrated point of 
view. This, at least, has been the design of 
the author, who has not adopted the plan of 
multiplying words without necessity, and of 
putthig his readers to the expense of purchasing, 
aiid the trouble of reading, a large volume, in 
order to obtain that information which might 
be comprised within a few pages* 



ix 



AUTIIOR'S PREFACE 

TO THE 

SECOND EDITION. 



T HE general approbation of this concise 
Sketch of European Politics, testified in the ra- 
pid sale of a large ittiptession, has induced m6 
to offer to the public a second edition, revised 
and adapted to the present state of things. The 
changes which have taken place since tlie first 
edition went to the press, have been noticedj 
and their effects investigated. Every care has 
been taken to render it an exact, although a 
Concentrated, representation of the political 
world as it now stands, exhibiting a general 
view of present circumstances, and an interest^ 
ing discussion of probable consequerices* 

h 



ADDRESS OF THE EDITORS 

TO THE 

PUBLIC. 



The universal approbation with which this 
work has been honoured, and the rapidity of its 
circulation, have encouraged us to lay before 
the public a second edition, especially as the 
greatest part of the subjects which it involves 
are not of that temporary kind which usually 
fill the pages of political writers, but of a more 
permanent nature, and calculated to excite the 
public curiosity for a considerable length of 
time, whatever may be the actually existing 
state of affairs. The investigations being 
founded on extensive views of the circumstances 
and political relations of the different European 
states, will long be interesting, as no change of 
afiairs, whether of a belligerent or a pacific na- 



xi 

tare, can, within a short period of time, effect 
any hinterial alteration in the general a' d fun- 
darnental principles. It is, however, requisite 
to inform the public, tliat the increasing demand 
at the time when the whole impression was 
nearly sold off, obliged us to put the work im.- 
mediately again to the press, before the articles 
of peace between France and Austria, and the 
consequent alterations in the Germanic system 
were known. Such political changes, therefore, 
as have happened during the time of printing, 
and appear important, are annexed by way of 
Appendix, in order to adopt it, as much as pos- 
sible, to the state of affairs at the present mo- 
ment. 

Extract from the British Critic,. May, 1805. Speak- 
' ing of the first edition of this work — 

We have before met with Mr. Bigland, and have 
praised him both as a Christian and an historian. We are 
informed^ that he has long struggled with th^- difficulties 
attached to a confined situation. That in such circum- 
stances he should have acquired by study a competent 
knowledge of written history, ancient and moderti;, how- 
ever creditable to him, is much less extraordinary, than 
that he should have qualified himself to speculate, as he 
here does with great sagacity and information, on the po- 
litical situatioii of the principal states of Europe, Th<^ 

b2 



xii 



Letters in this volume are sixteen in number^ and they 
discuss in turn ahnost all the great questions which can 
be agitated by the politicians of the present hour. The 
principles of the author are every where sound and pa- 
triotic^ and his knowledge is surprisingly extensive." 

The singiilar merits of this worthy author have led 
some persons of discernment to encourage the publica- 
tion of two volumes of his Essays^ by subscription^ by 
which it is hoped that he will derive profit^ as well as ere- 
ditj from the meritorious efforts he has made." 



xiii 



CONTENTS. 



LETTER I. 

On the interesting nature of political knowledge, parti- 
cularly at the present important period. — Particular 
causes which render modern history more interesting 
than that of ancient times. — Individuals more interested 
in the affairs of nations than is generally imagined.—^ 
The destiny of individuals necessarily implicated with 
that of the nations of which they are members. — Poli- 
tical knowledge more interesting at this momentous 
crisis than at any former period_, especially to English- 
men. — The arduous situation in which Great Britain 
now stands.- — Uncertainty of political conjecture.- — Ob- 
vious reasons of that uncertainty. — The only sure 
grounds of political speculation. - - Page 1 

LETTER II. 

A continued series of causes_, operating under the direction 
of Divine Protidence, produces all the events which 
take place in the world. — General view of Europe, un- 
der the influence and control of the three predominant 
powers. Great Britain, France, and Russia. — Insepara- 
ble connexion of the affairs of Great Britain and 



France. — General sketch of the modern history of 
France. — Its exaltation a consequence of the decline of 
the Austrian power after the age of Charles V. — i^xor- 
bitant power of the French monarchy in the reign of 
Louis XIV. — Alarming to Europe^ receives a check 
from the successes of the allies.— Its st^ite since that 
period, especially a little before the revolution.— General 
prevalence of infidelity in France. — Nature of the revo- 
lution, and its unexpected consequences. — Proceedings 
of the revolutionists at the first apparently moderate. — 
Delusive appearance of the revolution in its commence- 
ment. — ^Remarks on the dangerous tendency of re^- :lu- 
tionaiy projects.- — Their fatality to the piojecio.t j as 
well as to those concerned m their execution. — Conse- 
quences of the French revolution very different from 
what could have been expected from visible appear- 
ances.- — Extraordinary exertions of the republic. — The 
calamities of the people overbalance the success of its 
arms.— Victoiy and conquest not ahvays a source of 
national felicity. — Reasons which justified the combined 
powers in the war against France.— Reasons which 
justified Great Britain in particular, and even imposed 
on her the necessity of taking arms. — General view of 
the grand contest between Great Britain and France. — 
The supposition formerly prevailing, that the French 
republic would adopt a pacific system. — Republican 
governments not less, but more addicted to a bellige- 
rent system than monarchies. — The fact proved from 
histor)\— -The pacific system of the American states not 
to be adduced as an argument in favour of the peace^ 
^ble tendency of republican governments. — The politi- 
cal, moral, and local circumstances of the American 
republic totally different from those of France. — The 
true cause of the aggrandizement of tb epublic owing 



XV 

to the temporary enthusiasm of the nation. — Remarks 
oil national enthusiasm. — Its duration often short. — 
Existing circumstances Avhich shew that this national 
enthusiasm of the French is declining, and will probably 
^ soon be extinguished. — France_, by the constitution of 
her g-overnment, more liable to revolutions and intestine 
commotions than the other European states,— Simila- 
rity of the government of France to the Imperial go- 
vernment of Rome. — Examination of the enthusiasm 
of France^ its origin^ and foundation. — The enthusiasm 
of the French founded on romantic expectations ; that 
of the English nation on a solid basis^ on a conscious- 
ness of the enjoyment of real blessings. — Causes vv^hich 
must produce the extinction of French enthusiasm, and 
consequently the diminution of the power of the Gallic 
empire. — Present ascendancy of France on the conti- 
nent formidable to England. — Necessity of the war. — 
Its principle and origin.' — Situation and importance of 
Malta.' — ^Tendency and nature of taxatidih. — The nation 
not impoverished by the payment of taxes_, as is gene- 
rally supposed. — The taxes in Great Britain, although 
nominally, not really high.— The English better able to 
pay their taxes than any other people,, and receiving 
greater compensations in political happiness. — -France a 
country favoured by nature ; her people might be happy 
if her politics were pacific. — Comparison between the 
conduct of Rome towards Carthage, and that of France 
towards Great Britain. — Thoughts on the projected in- 
vasion. — Desperate nature of the attempt.—Prudent vi- 
gilance of government in making timely and formidable 
preparations. — Patriotism of the countiy eminently 
displayed in seconding the benelicial views of govern- 
ment. — Military^ and naval strength of Great Britain 
unexampled. — Remarks on the volunteer s}'stem, equally 



xvi 

conducive to the security and glory of Great Britain. — 
Impossibility of the enemy succeeding in the project 
of invading and subduing this country^ demonstrated 
from the consideration of obvious circumstances. — 
Consequences of a conquest ruinous to the lower classes 
of the people. ----- page 1 3 

LETTER TIL 

Impolitic conduct of France in precipitating herself into 
a new war.' — The irreparable losses she must suffer by 
this conduct, — Estimation of the importance of S . Do- 
mingo. — Remarks on the establishment of the Negro 
government in that island. — Impossibility that France 
should procure any advantages by the war^ capable cf 
counterbalancing her losses. — View of the plans cf the 
French cabinet for annihilating the trade of Great 
Britain. — Their inefficacy.-— Prudence of the British go- 
vernment contrasted with the rashness of that of France, 
= — Embarrassments of the British trade can be no more 
than temporary. — Inability of France to rival Great 
Britain in manufactures and commerce. - Page 1 29 

LETTER IV. 

Retrospective view of the train of events which have 
raised Great Britain to her present commercial and na- 
val importance. — ^The effects of commerce exhibited in 
the general improvement of Europe^ and particularly in 
the present greatness of Britain. - Page 146 

LETTER V, 

Bemarks on the extensive commerce of Great Britain with 
the northern countries — with the American states — ^with 
Spain and Portugal ; and through their mediimi with 
Spanish and Portuguese America, with India. — Her ex- 
tensive territorial possessions in India. - P^ge 162 

4. 



' LETTER VL 

View of the political state of Germany. — Constitution of 
the empire. — Its origin and nature. — -The good effects 
it has had in maintaining internal tranquillity ; not cal- 
culated for effectually resisting foreign aggression.— 
View of t^e political state of the house of Austria.—- 
Different estimates of the population of its hereditary 
dominions. — Examination of the causes which give to 
France a superiority over Austria. — Military character 
of the Hungarians^ Bohemians^ Carinthians, Croats^ 
and other nations of the Austrian dominions.— Remarks 
on the finances of Austria^ and their susceptibility of 
improvement ; with some observations on the commerce 
and natural advantao;es of her territories — ^Observations 
on the imcertainty of the estimates generally made on 
the revenues of nations.— Austria^ although unsuccess- 
ful in the two late contests, may yet give a check to the 
aggrandizement of France^ - - Page 168 

LETTER VIL 
¥iew of the local position, finances, military strength^ 
and resources of Prussia. — Financial system of the grea 
Frederic II L — Mr. Reisbeck's opinion relative to the 
operation of taxes. — Effects of the peace concluded be- 
tween France and Prussia, on the affairs of the confe- 
derates in the late war. — A coalition of Austria and 
Prussia fully able to counterbalance, at all times, the 
power of the French empire.— I mprobabiUty of such a 
coalition. — Remarks on the partition of Poland. Pagei92 

LETT E R VUL 

View of the present state of Italy.— Its entire subjection 
to France. — Division of Italy into a number of petty 



xviii 



states^ the original, cause of its weakness.— ComparisoD 
of Italy and Germany. — Greater disadvantages to the 
former^, by division into small states^ than tp the lat- 
ter. — Causes of the unwarlike disposition of the mo- 
dern Italians.-— Their degeneracy from the martial 
spirit of their ancestors not owing to natural^ but to 
moral causes. _ - - _ Page 200 

LETTER IX. 

Observations on the political situation of Spain. — Causes 
of the decline of the Spanish power, once so formidable 
to all Europe.— Causes of the want of population in 
Spain. — National character and genius of the Spaniards. 
— Examination of the causes which have prevented 
Spain from making the same advancement in com- 
merce^ manufactures^ and other improvements^ as the 
rest of the European nations.— The probability that the 
European nations may^ at some favourable opportunity^ 
exert their national energies^ and humble the French 
empire, - - - _ » Page 206 

LETTER X. 

Viev/ of the political and commercial state of Portugal. — 
Interests of England and Portugal inseparable. — Enter- 
prizing spirit of the Portugueze in the latter part of the 
\5th, and the beginning of the 16th century. — Com- 
merce and colonies of Portugal at that period. — Causes 
of her decline.— Her subjection to Spain^ and her re- 
volt. — Consequences of those events. — Implacable hos- 
tility of Philip II. of Spain against Great Britain ex- 
tremely beneficial. — Wonderful conduct of Divine Pro- 
vidence. — Comparison of the conduct of Philip II. with 
that of the French emperor towards this country. — 



Productive of similar eiiects. — Reasons which mmi 
prevent France from making a conquest of PortugaL— 
Consequences which would ensue from such a measure. 
— Probable conjectures that the seat of the Portuguezc 
government may one day be removed to Brasil. — Prac- 
ticability of the measure. — Remarks on national migra- 
tions Many such migrations attended with greater 

difficulties than the removal of the seat of government 
from Portu2;al to Brasil. — Concise description of Brasih 

o ■ ■ ■ ■ - i. 

—•Its situation^ extent, productions, &c.— Its comaner- 
pial advaritages. — ^The fitness of Brasil for the seat of a 
flourishing empire. — Its ports, &c. — City of St. Salva- 
dor, its situation and local advantages, w4iich render it 
proper for the seat of royalty .—Disadvantages of its 
situation in a tropical climatec— Disadvantages resulting 
from the climate of Brasil in general,— -Those disadvan- 
tages more than counterbalanced by the advantages of 
a luxuriant soil, a commercial situation, and, above all^ 
by security and independence. — The climate of Brasil 
apparently not inimical to the iiuman constitution. — 
General obser\'ations on the influence of climate on the 
human frame. — The removal of the seat of the Portu- 
gueze government from Europe to America impracti- 
cable without the assistance of Great Britain.' — Com^ 
inercial advantages that Vv^ould result to this country 
from such an event. — -Spain and Portugal enjoy the pe^- 
culiar advantage of escaping foreign oppression, in be- 
ing able to remove the seats of government to America. 
' — Important change which such an event would pro* 
duce in the commercial system, - - Page 216 

3LETTER XL 

'The supposition of the removal of the Portugueze and 
Spanish governments, especially the former to America, 



XX 



not an improbable conjecture.— -The establishment of 
the American republics less" probable some time ago. — 
The independence of British America as improbable 
half a century ago as the events here supposed. — ^That 
event must at some period have necessarily happened. 
• — Colonies seldom remain long in subjection to the 
parent state after they become powerful. — Ancient and 
modern systems of establishing colonies. — British Ame- 
rica, without the protection of the motlier-country, 
must have been subjugated by France. — Reasons why 
the separation of the British colonies from the parent 
state must at some time have happened. — The same 
reasons equally applicable to the Spanish and Portugueze 
settlements. — Population of Spanish America. — The 
abolition of the colonial system the only sure means of 
preventing the separation of the Spanish and Portugueze 
colonies from the parent states. — Consequences of such 
an events in regard to the commerce of Great Britain. 
— Critical situation of Spain and Portugal embarrassing 
to the consular cabinet. - - - Page 246 

LETTER XIL 

General view of the political^ commercial_, and military 
state of Russia. — Improvements made bv Peter the 
Great and his succcssors_, particularly Catharine II. — 
The invulnerable nature of that empire. — Remarks on 
the naval strength of Russia. — On lier revenues and 
expenditure. — Her opportunities of making conquests 
in Asia. — Slate of the countries bordering on Russia. — 
Population of Russia. — Her weight in the scale of 
European politics.— Peace the best policy of Russia. — 
Similarity of Rassia, in this respect^ to the United 
States of America. — Conduct of Peter the Great seem- 



xxi. 



ingly contradictory to this mode of reasoning, — Neccs* 
sity of the wars undertaken by that monarch. Page 259 

LET T E R XliL 

PoUtical situation of Sweden and Denmark. — Their con- 
nexion and union of interests with Russia. — Their mi- 
litary state. — -ImprobabiUty that France should attempt 
to invade Denmark, and take possession of the Sounds 
— Consequences of such a measure. — Russia under the 
necessity of opposing such an attempt. — Concentrated 
view of European politics. - - P^ge 284 

LETTER XIV. 

Extensive influence of the political and commercial system 
of Europe. — Egypt, during the space of three centuries, 
almost totally unconnected with Europe, now impli- 
cated in the system of European politics. — Views of the 
Directorial government in the invasion of that country. 
— Geographical situation, and topography of Egypt. — 
Original formation of the Delta,, — Remarks on similar 
circumstances in other parts of the globe. — Observa- 
tions on the climate of Egypt. — Comparison of the dif- 
ferent, and often contradictory accounts, of travellers 
and writers on this subject.— -Effects of the Egyptian 
atmosphere on the human frame investigated from the 
observations of Mr. Antes, and other modern travellers, 
md from the experience of the French and English 
armies in that country. — Particular observations on the 
plague, from Mr. Antes. — Circumstances of climate an 
important object of political consideration, too little 
attended to in general. — Fertility of Eg)^pt. — Remarks 
on the mode of its agriculture.— Agricultural improve- 



xxil 

meilt a principal object of public a= well as private con- 
^•cni among 'the ancient Eg\^pLians, - Page 299 

LETTER XV. 

Strong probability that Eg\jjt will again be an important 
object of contest between France and England^ and 
eventually fall iiito the possesion of one or the other of 
tjiose powers.— Particular investigation of the views of 
the republic in taking possession of Egypt. — The prac- 
ticability of its supposed plan examined. — Various plans 
foniied^ and various attempts made^ to facilitate the 

■ coriimuniccition between the Levant and the Red Sea. — 
Circumstances v/hich render the conveyance of a fleet 
from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea next to impos- 
sible. — Diuiculty of constructing a fleet at Suez almost 
equally great. — Facility of blocking up the entrance of 
the Red Sea.- — Reasons why Great Britain could not_, 
consistently v/ith her own interests, leave Eg)^pt in the 
hands of the Republic. — Advantages of the central sitli- 
ation of Egypt^ whether that country be considered as 
a commercial or a military station, - Page 325 

LETTER XVL 

Short sketch of the commercial history of Egypt. — Esta- 
blishment and subversion of the Mamaluke government^ 
— Power and opulence of the Venetians and Genoese^ 
acquire(l by the Oriental trade carried on through Egypt. 
— Annihilation of that commerce in consequence of the 
discovery of the passage round the Cape of Good Hope, 
and the concurrence of other causes. — Expeditious 
communication between Europe and India, by way of 
Egypt. — Particular circumstances relative to that com- 
i^muicatibn,— -Political and moral state of Eg}'pt at pre- 



xxiii 



sent unfavourable to its commerce. — Remark- on the 
judicious conduct of the British government in expeiHng 
the French from Egypt^ and taking seasonable measures 
for preventing them from again taking possession of 
that country. — Revolt of Ali bey. — His designs of ren- 
dering Egypt once move the centre of commerce. — His 
death.— Civil v^ar among the Beys. — Investigation of 
the causes why Russia did not support Ali Bey. — Pro- 
bability of important revolutions in the Eastern coun- 
tries of Europe_, or the Western countries of Asia. — 
Egypt likely to be of great future importance in the 
system of French and British politics » - Page 339 



APPENDIX, = - - - . Page 367 



LETTERS 

ON 

MODERN HISTORY^ 



LETTER L 

PEAR SIR, 

The subject you propose for our present cor- 
respondence is at all times of great importance ; 
but it is particularly interesting at this moment- 
pus crisis. 

The scenes successively displayed on the poli-^ 
tical theatre, have in every age attracted the 
attention of the philosophical observer of men 
and things ; and indeed the inquisitive mind 
can scarcely jfind a more curious and interest- 
ing subject of investigation. The vicissitudes 
exhibited on that great theatre of human 
action, have, from age to age, fixed, in dis- 
tinguishable manner, the cqnditi^n of mati- 



2 



kind. The consequences of some great politi- 
cal events have been suddenly interrupted, and 
their vestiges obliterated, by succeeding revo- 
lutions, while the effects of others have been 
extensive and permanent. Hosvever, it is not 
difficult to perceive that an uninterrupted chain 
of causes and effects has existed from the begin- 
ning, and will not be broken to the end of 
time. This consideration naturally impels us 
to looii forward to the effects of such causes as 
we see operating, especially when we consider 
them as affecting ourselves, and our dearest in- 
terests. And tlirs is one reason that tends to 
render the history of our own times m.ore inte- 
resting than that of former ages. 

While the projects of cabinets and the ope- 
rations of armies are heard of at a distance, they 
serve only as subjects of ingenious speculation, 
affording amusement to the mind, and tending 
to the 2:ratiiicatioa of curiositv. Distance of 
place and lapse of time have in this case tl^ 
same effect. When seas and centuries separate 
tis from the scene of action and of danger, we 
^re biit slightly affected by narratives of dis- 
tant calamities and great events. The rise and 
fall of empires, and tlie vicissitudes of human 
affairs, although they afford oKitter of observa- 
tion and reflection to the contemplative and 
philosophical mind, appear but little interesting 
to the bulk of mankind, so long as they seen* 



3 



unconnected with the affairs of the present 
generation, and the circumstances of private 
life. The case, however, is aUered ; when in- 
dividuals see, or expect to see, their personal 
interests involved in those political convulsions, 
that so frequently agitate the world. 

This is not, however, the only reason that 
renders modern history more immediately and 
more generally interesting than the records of 
antiquity. The effects of the greatest part of 
the important events recorded in ancient history 
are now exhausted; or, at least, the conse- 
quences resulting from them are so ramified and 
blended together, as not to be easily distin- 
guished and justly estimated by superficial ob- 
servers. How much soever the condition of 
the present generation may be fixed by the re- 
volutions of the ancient world, custom has 
rendered their influence imperceptible to the 
bulk of mankind. The general condition of 
human hfe in this age, was in a g^reat measure 
determined by events which took place before the 
present generation existed : habit has rendered 
it familiar, and we are therefore less solicitous 
concerning its origin ; while our eyes are natu- 
rally turned towards the scenes which pass in 
review before us, and our attention is irresisti- 
bly drawn towards the events which happen, 
or likely to happen, in our own days. Only a 
few persons of a speculative and observing turn 

B 2 



of mind, and possessing . the means of exten- 
sive information, find a pleasure in tracing the 
lonor and unbroken chain of causes and conse- 

o 

quences that runs through the successive ages 
of human existence; but the events of our own 
times are universally interesting. 

How little soever the state of nations, the 
rise and fall of empires, and the exaltation or 
depression of those persons y*'ho govern the 
world, may seem to concern the bulk of man- 
kind, whose attention is generally called to ob- 
jects of a difterent nature, and whose time and 
talents are employed in pursuits of a different 
tendency, it is nevertheless certain, that the ge- 
neral state of collective bodies influences the par- 
ticular condition of individuals in a more deter- 
minate manner titan is commonly apprehended, 
or can be immediately perceived by a super- 
ficial observer. The political circumstances of 
every nation are influenced by those of the 
nations which surround it, or with which it» is, 
by any political or commercial connexions, 
brought uito contact. Thus the affairs of dif- 
ferent nations have a reciprocal and unavoid- 
able influence on one another, and the public 
affairs of every nation must, in a greater or less 
degree, affect the particular circumstances of 
the individuals of whom it is composed. The 
least attention to history, and the slightest re- 
flection cn the events it records, will suffice to 



sstatflisli the truth 6f this remark; nor is an 
acquaintance with history necessary for that 
purpose. Our own observations, although per- 
haps confined within a narrow sphere, will be 
sufficient to shevv^ us, that the conduct of a 
single nian, placed in certain circumstances, 
may throw a great part of tlie world into con- 
fusion, and that the good or bad fortune of one 
individual will often decide the fate of millions. 

The events w^hich have happened in our own 
times place this matter in the most conspicuous 
and striking point of view. The machinations 
of a few factious persons at Paris, which ter- 
minated in the subversion of the French mo- 
narchy, and the unfortunate catastrophe of the 
monarch, have in our days convulsed all Eu- 
rope ; and effected the most important and un- 
expected alteration in its political system, as 
well as in the moral circumstances of an incal- 
culable number of its inhabitants. Not only 
the political and religious establishments of se- 
veral countries have undergone a considerable 
alteration, but thousands of private individuals, 
husbandmen, mechanics, and manufacturers, 
have been drawn from their peaceful homes and 
industrious employments to perish in the field of 
battle ; and scarcely a family or private person 
can be found in France, Holland, England, 
Italy, Spain, or the dominions of Austria^ who 
has not. seen the destiny of gome friend, ac- 



6 

qoamtance, or relative, determined by the 
transactions which have taken place at Paris. 
To these observations mio^ht be added a number 
of Others respecting thousands, we rcight, in- 
deed, say, millions of persons in different parts 
of Europe, ATitbout mentioning Egypt or His- 
paniola, who, attending only to their own pri- 
vate concerns, without taking any part either 
in political or military afiairs, have, notwith- 
standing found their circumstances materially 
affected by the convulsions which have agitated 
their respective countries. From these consi- 
derations it is evident, that how private soever 
our situations iu life may be, or however re- 
mote from any immediate and visible connexion 
virith national concerns, we are all whirled about 
in the political vortex, and dragged along by the 
current of public affairs. 

These observations, which will on exami- 
nati n be found strictly just, exhibit public afr 
fairs in a more interesting point of view than 
that in which they are commonly seen, and af- 
ford a demonstrative proof, that the circum- 
stances of individuals are more immediately 
connected with the general condition of com- 
munities than is commonly apprehended ; and 
that pohtical science, considered in this hght, 
both merits and commands the attention of the 
moral philosopher. Human curiosity, indeed, 
can hardly find a more interesting or a more 



7 

Entertaining subject for the exercise of its spe- 
culative powers. 

, Circumstances of a private nature, which 
materially aifect the interests of a very small 
number of our friends, our relatives, or neigh- 
bours, are always considered as an interesting- 
subject of inquiry; and every source of infor- 
mation is ransacked in order to investigate the 
causes and consequences of events, on which 
the fate of a few individuals, perhaps only of a 
single family, seem to be suspended. How 
much more then must our attention be attracted 
by affairs, which determine the fate, or at least 
affect the interests of whole nations. It is 
hardly possible to behold, with cold indiffer- 
ence, the train of events, in which so great a 
part of the human species is interested, which 
decides the lot of millions, and is productive of 
effects so powerful and extensive, that our 
friends, our families, our neighbours, and our- 
selves, may be involved in them hj various 
modes of implication. 

If there can be found in the revolution of 
ages a period in which political knowledge 
jnust be deemed an important subject of human 
inquiry, it is certainly the present. Such it 
cannot fail of being considered by the people 
of Europe in general, and such it must in par- 
ticular appear to Englishmen. At this mo- 
mentous crisis, when Great Britain is threatened 



tdth invasion by ^ powerfal and enterprising 

enen y, uhose daring attempts and successful 
progress nothing has vet been able to check; 
"it hen her fruitfiil fields, improved by agricul- 
ture, and her wealth, accumulated by industry 
and commerce, are marked out as objects of 
devastation and plunder; vLen every prepara- 
tion i making, or is rather already made, to 
cany the menace into execution, which nothing, 
under divine Providence, but the prudent mea- 
sures of the British government, the valour of 
British subjects, and the superiority of the Bri-!- 
ti>h na y, can prevent ; when the fate of Eu- 
rope is suspended on the issue of the important 
contest, scarcely a single individual in this quar- 
ter of the globe, can think himself uninterested 
in the consequences, or restrain his curiosity 
from inquiring into the state of the political 
world. To a native and inhabitant of Britain 
this inquiry is peculiarly interesting. He sees 
the count IV, ot which lie is an inhabitant, the 
nation, of w hich he is a member, eugag**d in a 
most important contest, on the issue of which 
depends the extinction or preservation of the 
rights and privileges of Enghshroen and their 
descendants to the latest posterity. He sees his 
ovTD rghts and privileges as a m^ em her of so- 
ciety, as weil as the commerce, the wealth, and 
inc ependence of his country, laid at stake, and 
threatened with aDnihiiatioB. He caccot con« 



9 

template the political mirror without perceiving 
himself, his family, and his connections, em- 
barked in one common cause with the nation, 
and implicated in its consequences ; and he must 
also plainly see that those consequences involve 
the destiny both of the present and of future 
generations. While so interesting a prospect 
obtrudes itself on the view of the British politi- 
cian, who sees placed before liis eyes the im- 
portant alternative of national security or nati- 
onal subjugation, he cannot but feel himself 
irresistibly prnmpted to examine the weight of 
opposite probabilities, and to contemplate the 
vast assemblage of existing circumstances, in 
order to examine with accuracy the grounds of 
his apprehensions or his confidence. He will 
naturally seek to anticipate the result of the 
events which successively pass in review before 
him, and to develop the effects of those causes, 
of which he perceives the operation. 

The scenes of the political drama, which dur- 
ing so many ages has been acting on the great 
theatre of the world, and of which the conclu- 
sion will be only at the end of time, are perpe- 
tually changing, and the aspect of human af- 
fairs is in every century materially different from 
■what it was in the age immediately preceding; 
sometimes, indeed, a much shorter period suf- 
fices for the production of new and extraordi- 
nary scenes, and of the most important and un- 



expected revolutions. The causes which pro- 
duce these chanoes are as various as the combi-- 
nations of human circumstances. Sometimes 
one or more great and conspicuous causes so- 
visibiy preponderate, that there is no difficulty 
in discovering- the force and extent of their 
agency. More frequently, however, the chain 
is so complex, that it is extremely difficult to 
unravel it, to distinguish the ditieient operate 
ing causes, or to discover the preponderancy of 
any particular one in the general combination. 
This being often the case, even after conse-^ 
quences are visible, it is no wonder that it 
bhould sometim.es be extremely difficuh, or evenr 
impossible, to estimate eifects before their pro- 
duction, or foresee the events of a future pe- 
riod. Political conjectures must, therefore, be 
often very uncertain ; and it ought not to asto- 
nish us, if the most skilful statesmen, as well as. 
the most ingenious speculators, be frequently 
disappointed in their views, and deceived in their 
calculations. 

When we peruse the annals of the world, or 
call to our remembrance the events which his- 
tory has transmitted to us, and consider how 
the founders or conquerors of empires sacrificed 
the tranquillit}^ of their lives, exposed themselves 
to a thousiind perils, suffered a thousand hard- 
sliips, and often waded through seas of blood,* 
to establish monarchies which were so soon sub- 



11 



verted, or to achieve conquests which were so 
soon lost, we must deplore the blindness of hu- 
man speculation in regard to future contingen- 
cies. When we contemplate the actions, and 
investigate the designs of many of those great 
politicians and conquerors, and see that the ag- 
grandizement of tl.eir power was sometimes im- 
mediately succeeded by its annihilation ; and 
that the extraordinary efforts which they made 
in order to establish their posterity in the most 
exalted station of human greatness, were often, 
in a very short time, followed by the extinction 
of their families, we cannot but make melan» 
choly reflections on the uncertainty of all earthly 
things, and the shortness of all human foresight. 
Many of these disastrous events were, however, 
brought about by causes which did not exist at 
the time when they formed their designs, and 
consequently their effects could not be foreseen 
by any efforts of political conjecture, which is 
not, and indeed cannot, be founded on circum- 
stances which do not yet exist, and of which 
the future existence is fortuitous. It is not 
within the reach of human penetration to fore- 
see what changes may be effected by a thousand 
contingencies, which may instantaneously and 
unexpectedly happen. These are the mysteri- 
ous dispensations of Providence, by which the 
great disposer of all confounds the wisdom of 



32 

the wise, and compels mankind to acknowledge 
his universal and unlimited control. 

Political science, founded on rational princi- 
ples, consists in making a just estimation of 
the force and tendency of such causes as 
actually exist, and of which the operation is 
visible. This estimation will direct our judg- 
ment in forming an opinion of the immediate 
or remote eifects which their operation is likely 
to produce. Sometimes these political views 
may he extremely just, especially if no unknown 
cause impede the operation of such as are known. 
Sometimes, however, new circumstances arise, 
and new scenes open, contrary to all expecta- 
tions, and beyond the reach of all human fore- 
sight. The combinations are often so various, 
and causes of a different nature often act in such 
opposite directions, that it is difficult, or indeed 
absolutely impossible, to say which will ulti- 
mately predominate. All that can be done is Co 
contemplate the existing circumstances of na- 
tions^ to examine and consider their interests 
and their resources, and to estimate their rela- 
tive weight in the political balance. 

I am, Sir, &c. 

Your^s. 



13 



LEITER IL 

SIR, 

In my Letters on the Study of History, I had 
delineated only the principal outhnes and most 
prominent features of Modei n Plistory, and but 
slightly mentioned a few of the distinguishing 
characteristics of that period of time which has 
elapsed since the middle of the sixteenth cen- 
tury. That remarkable period may not impro- 
perly be considered as the termination of that 
portion of time denominated the Middle Ages, 
and the epoch of the commencement of what we 
ought at this day to call Modern History, as the 
present order of things was then established, and 
had not until of late undergone any material 
alteration. At the time of writing the Letters 
alluded to, the tempest, which had so long and 
in so tremendous a manner agitated Europe, had 
subsided ; and for a short space of time the po- 
litical workl had a more pleasing appearance, 
and seemed to display blighter prospects, than 
it had done during the space of more than ten 
years. The British government had done as 
much as could be done, in order to restore tran- 
quillity to Europe, and to alleviate the miseries^ 



14 



of suffering humanity. If those benevolent in- 
tentions have been frustrated, Great Britain has, 
however, not only the honour of having repel- 
led the dangers which threatened her, but also 
the satisfaction of having testified to the world 
her disinterested moderation and pacific politics. 
The pleasing prospects which the moderation of 
the British government had produced, soon be- 
gan to be overclouded with a gloom, which 
evidently shewed that the storm was not wholly 
dispelled. On the contrary, the hostile aspect 
of the republic towards this country, its manu- 
factures, and commerce, as well as the continu- 
ance of its aggrandizing spirit on the continent, 
too plainly shewed that the tempest was gather- 
ing afresh in the political horizon. This could 
not escape the penetration of government. It 
soon became too apparent even to elude the 
observations of individuals. For some time, the 
alternative of peace or war seemed doubtful; 
and in such a case it would be criminal in 
a private person to excite national enmity. 
At present, the die is cast, and Great Britain 
is imperiously called upon to assert her inde- 
pendence. 

Such being the situation of afi^airs, the poli- 
tical state of Europe becomes peculiarly inte- 
resting to every European, but more especially 
to an Englishman. A loyal subject of this coun- 
try can hardly refrain, at this momentous crisis, 



15 



'from casting liis eyes around, and contemplat- 
ing the existing circumstances of the diiferent 
states which compose the pohtical system, in 
order to investigate the consequences which may 
be expected to result from the present com-" 
plexion of affairs, and to ascertain the ground 
of his apprehensions or his hopes. Whether 
despondency or confidence ought, at this criti- 
cal moment, to preponderate, must be an inte- 
resting subject of inquiry, and the result will be 
found satisfactory. 

In order to delineate a justly-proportioned 
picture of the aspect of the political world; to 
exhibit in the most luminous point of view the 
situations and relative importance of the nations 
which constitute the great European system ; to 
examine their present existing circumstances, 
and make a rational estimate of the probable ef~ 
fects of visible causes, it will be requisite to 
trace, in a general and concise manner, the 
origin and progressive formation of the present 
system of European politics. In consulting the 
annals of the world, vs^e clearly discover that a 
continued series of causes and effects, under the 
direction of divine Providence, incessantly and 
uninterruptedly operating, has, in all ages, de- 
termined the condition 'of mankind ; and, by 
taking a retrospective view of the principal out- 
lines of Modern History, we shall perceive the 
train of events which has produced the pre-cnt 



16 



order of things, and placed the different nations 
of Europe in the situation they now hold in the 
general system. From the assemblage of past 
and present circumstances, accurately exaiuined 
and com[)ared, we may, by reasoning accord- 
ing to the analogies of political and moral expe- 
rience, form rational conjectures on the result 
of the critical combination, and perhaps deli- 
neate a tolerably just political perspective. 

Europe may at this time be considered as un- 
der the control of three potent empires, Eng- 
land, France, and Russia. In the scheme of 
their politics all the other states are involved, 
and most of them act only a subordinate part. 
Those three predominant powers draw all the 
others into their immense vortices ; and as they 
give the impulse, the whole political machine 
must move. 

In entering on a view of the present state of 
the political world, it is requisite to begin by 
contemplating the situation ot Great Britain and 
France, the two commanding powers which go- 
vern the destiny of the western, as Russia does 
that of the eastern parts of Europe. Their irre- 
sistible sway determines the part which most of 
the other European states must act iu the im- 
portant drama. It will, therefore, in order to 
form a comprehensive view of the subject, be 
necessary to consider their situation relative to 
each other^ and to the oth^C states of Europe. 



17 

To exhibit in the most kiminous point of view 
the important scenes which now occupy the at- 
tention, affect the interests, and amuse the ex- 
pectation of a very considerable portion of man- 
kind, we ought to begin with France, in order 
to ilhistrate and render more distinct, as well 
as more comprehensive, our view of the pohti- 
cal state of Great Britain, which is so decidedly 
affected by the events which have taken place 
in the former country, and by its present exist- 
ing circumstances. The affairs of those two 
nations are so interwoven, their interests so 
mixed, and the destiny of each so closely con^ 
nected with that of the other, that the modern 
history of one necessarily involves the history 
of both, and indeed of most of the western 
countries of Europe. 

Of ail the different kingdoms which the Nor- 
thern nations founded on the ruins of the 
lloman empire, France was the first which be- 
gan to make a conspicuous figure, being esta- 
blished by Clovis, about A. D. 500. That 
prince, by the conquest of the Gothic king- 
dom of Thoulouse, and other important acqui- 
sitions, .gave a considerable extension to the 
monarchy of the Franks, which, although 
sometimes divided, and sometimes united, un- 
der the immediate successors of Clovis, flou- 
rished about 270 years under the princes of that 
race. It would not be here to any purpose to 

e 



IB 



trace the histoiy of France through the different 
dynasties of the Merovingiap, CarioTingian, 
and Capetine kings, and through the various 
revolutions which have happened to that king- 
dom in common ^th almost every other state 
that has been of any considerable duration, and 
of which no one is ignorant who is acquainted 
with the history of the modem nations. It is. 
however, absolutely necessary to carry our re- 
trospect to the age of Cliarles Y, a period in 
which the house of Austria had attained to the 
zenith of its gr^tness^ and Francis 1. king of 
France, undertook the task of opposing its ex- 
orbitant power. 

The reign of Charles V. constitutes the sera 
from which the present political, religious, and 
commercial system of mode r L—'-^t must 
date its origin . Ir_ : :: : fmarkabie and import- 
ant reign, t 7 ; " iL which has effected 
gres^ a 'r.ous matters, had 
its con. : . r : : . 3. was newly disco- 
vered ; its : - :o be opened, and the 
commerce of Europe to be proportionably in- 
creased and extended. At that period, the 
house of Austria, which, ever since the acces- 
sion of Rhodolph of Hapsburg to the imperial 
dignity, A. D. 1 273, had been in a progressive 
state of aggrandizement, was arrived at the me- 
ridian of its power and greatness. The Belgic 
provinces, which, like ail other countries, bad 



been originally divided into a number of petty 
states, had been united under the sovereignty 
of MaximiHan of Austria, who, having es- 
poused the daughter of Ferdinand, king of 
Spain, sole heiress of that kingdom, his son 
Charles V. united under his dominion, not only 
Spain and the Netherlands, but also a consi- 
derable part of Italy, being at the same time 
emperor of Germany; and Mexico and Peru 
being conquered in his reign, together with 
Manilla in the east, he became master of a 
more extensive empire than any monarch had 
ever before possessed, and was the first prince 
who could say that tlie sun never set upon his 
dominions. The house of Austria, in this com 
man ding point of its elevation, was the arbiter 
of Europe, and France was the only power 
which could undertake to check its aggrandize- 
ment. Francis I. was the declared enemy and 
aspiring rival of Charles, and provided him suf- 
ficient employment for the greatest part of his 
reign. Charles having abdicated in favour of 
his son Philip, and his brother Ferdinand being 
elected emperoi*, the house of Austria became 
divided into two branches, the Spanish and the 
German. Philip II. having, by his arbitrary 
measures, excited the revolt of the Nether- 
lands, and wasted the wealth which Mexico and 
Peru poured into his coifers, in a useless at- 
tempt to reduce them to obedience, and in the 

e 3 



still more vain and disastrous enterprise of con^ 
quering England, by sending against it his in- 
vincible Armada, the house of Austria began 
rapidly to fall from its enormous elevation ; 
and Philip having exhausted the vrealth of 
his dominions in those unsuccessful 'efforts, the 
Spanish branch of that family continued to de- 
cline, until the period of its extinction at the 
death of Charles II. when the kingdom of 
Spain, with all its American possessions, was, 
b}' the arms and the intrigues of Louis XIV., 
translated to the house of Bourbon, and the 
crown placed on the head of the duke of 
Anjou. 

Tlie period which was marked by the depres- 
sion of the house of Austria, formed the asra 
of the exaltation of the French monarchy, 
which flourished in proportion as the other de- 
clined. Francis 1. o'ave to the kino-dom of 
France a degree of splendour and influence, 
w^hich it had never possessed since the extinc- 
tion of the posterity of Charlemagne. The 
civil wars, occasioned by religious differences, 
fomented by pohtical faction, ^nd by the in- 
terested views of many vrho had in reality no 
religion, soon after following, desolated sevejal 
of its finest provinces, eclipsed its splendour, 
and curtailed its power; and it was not until 
the reign of Henry IV. that France regained 
her former rank and influence in the political 



system. The vigorous and sanguinaiy mea- 
sures ct the celebrated caTdiasl Richeiiea, by' 
annihilating the ^tions which had so long agi- 
tated the kingdom, and by overbearing all op- 
position, liad paved the way for the splendid 
and despotic reign of Louis XIV. The admi- 
iiistration of cardinal Mazarin wis modelled on 
the principles of his predecessor Richelieu, and 
completed the sysreia of internal despotism and 
external aggrandizement, which that minister 
had so successfully begun ; and the great Col- 
bert, by his attention to commerce and manu- 
factures, brought the kingdom into an exceed- 
in o^ly flourishina: state. In the reiscn of Louis 
XIV. the French monarchy attained to the 
highest pitch of grandeur, and that prince 
seemed to aim at little less than universal empire. 
His ambitious projects were, however, discoik- 
certed by the triple aUiance formed between the 
empire. Great Britain, and the L'aited Pro- 
vinces ; and the repeated victories of the allies, 
under the command of the duke of Marlbo- 
rough and prince Eugene of Savoy, rendered 
the latter end of his reign as unfortunate as the 
former part of it had been glorious and success- 
ful Since that time, although France has made 
a brilliant figure among the nations of Europe, 
she has not been in such a sicuadon Sts to en- 
danger their independence. 

While France was apparently ia the most 



22 

tranquil state of political secarity, a revolation 
has taken place, the most unexpected, the 
most singular in its origin, the most extraordi- 
nary in its nature, the most wonderful in its 
progress, the most dangerous in its tendency, 
and the most destructive in its consequences, 
that has happened in Europe since the subver- 
sion of the Roman empire by the Northern 
nations. A httle while previous to this great 
political convulsion, France had obtained some 
very great advantages. By separating America 
from Great Britain, she had cut oif a laro-e and 
rapidly improving part of the Briti^>h empire. 
She had, by this dismemberment, apparently 
diminished the commerce and resources of her 
great preponderating rival, and had nothing 
to fear from anv of her continental neio-hbours. 
In this state of tranquillity and security in re- 
gard to her external politics, she seemed equally 
secure in her external concerns. It was, indeed, 
not difficult to perceive an almost general disaf- 
fection to tlie church establishment, and it 
appeared evident, that some important altera- 
tions would take place in the state of religion 
in that country. The spirit of infidelity had 
been vrorking in France during not less than 
half a century, and was incessantly fomented 
and strengthened by the writings and efforts 
of deistical philosophers and literati, among 
whom Voltaire, Rousseau, D'AIembert, Diderot, 



2^ 

and Condorcet, may be reckoned to hold the 
principal rank, although they were seconded by 
a number of infidels of inferior celebrity. The 
almost universal approbation with which the 
compositions of those writers were received, 
and the eagerness with which they were readj 
evidently prognosticated something dangerous 
to religion, and some convulsion in the church 
might consequently be expected. It was, how» 
ev^er, impossible to conjecture in wdiat manner^ 
and to what extent, this might affect the state. 
The utmost stretch of human sagacity could 
not pretend to such a degree of foresight 
Those who were accustomed to observe the ope- 
ration of moral causes, might, indeed, with- 
out much difficulty, perceive that something of 
momentous import was in embryo ; but the 
most profound politicians were not able 
to calculate the consequences : these did not 
begin to develop themselves until some time 
after the explosion had taken place. After that 
period, they became every day more apparent, 
and our great British senator, Mr. Burke, began 
to make a just estimate of their import and ex- 
tent. The revolution was, indeed, so different 
in its origin and its principles from every other 
' national revolution, which history records, and 
its consequences so contrary to every appear- 
ance on which human expectation is usually 
formed, that it may be considered \i\ evjery jpe- 



24 



spect a.s an event entirely n-orel iind nnprece- 
dmtei The regal autboiitj in Fmnce seemed 
to fee fixed on a basis tiiat conld not be moved* 
Deip»tis8ia, saappoited b}' a powerful stand- 
aniiy, and stieogtbened hj the possession 
csf at member €31 fortified towns, liad pervaded 
evexj pait of the connnyj and seemed ri vetted 
in eveiy comer of the ktogdom ; and m ad- 
dition to these cinoim^taiaces, we consider the 
piediiecdon wiaich rise French had always shewn 
iSmt mmsM^Mcsl gt^vemment, and the attach- 
nacift they had ever testified to their monarchs, 
France certainlv, of all the countries of 

Enrope, that in idaich the establishment of a 
i^^aaMcan gOTcmme&t wss least to be expected. 
Hie |»iocee£ng;s of the revolutionists seemed 
at tSic £sst to be modoate an d rational, and met 
vith tlac appmlation of the friends of hberty 
m every paat of EuK)pe, aad of none more 
tkm of ^i«ral loyal subjects of Great Britain, 
sincci£ w^-vislaos to iht government and con« 
stitntaoii of tlaeir c»nntiy. But the poison, 
wiaid Imktd na^er llae most imposing coloui'Si, 
-was imperceived. France, at that important 
disss^ ofifered to tiae contemplation of the moral 
j^aik^s^^plxer sl plaenonaaiasD as illusive, as it was 
Holland extraordinaiT- Tlie friends of liberty 
imagiiacd th&t they beheld the singular and in- 
tcaertiaai? spcctade of twenty-six millions of 
people "idtli an imanimity unexampled, and a 



25 



perseverance that was irresistible^ deinandiiig 
and recovering their long lost rights; a patriotic 
and virtuous king, willing in every thing to ac- 
commodate the system of government to the 
wishes, and adapt it to the happiness oF his 
subjects; and a great nation desirous of exalt- 
ing its monarch above all his predecessors, by 
making him the sovereign of a free people. 
But the pleasing prospect soon vanished, the 
glossy colouring disappeared, and the picture 
beo'an at last to shew itself with all its distorted 
lineaments. It is evident, that many of those 
who were the most active promoters of the re- 
volution, were very far from foreseeing its bale- 
ful consequences. There is, however, no reason 
to doubt that a party existed, who from the 
first aimed at tlie subversion of the m.onarch}''. 
In this particular, as in many others, the 
Frencli revolution holds out to all nations an 
awful example of the uncertainty and danger of 
revolutionary projects; and shews, that what- 
ever may be the views of those who commence 
innovations, they are ignorant of the designs 
of others, who enter into the business ; and. 
that, upon whatever principles revolutions may 
be commenced, it is impossible to foresee upon 
what principles they will be carried on. New 
actors are brought upon the stage, new measures 
are adopted, original principles and original 
views are changed, and the first movers an4 



26 



most active agents in the. business are set aside. 
This is especially the case in revolutions origi- 
nating from democratic principles. The men 
who begin the business are scarcely ever the 
men who finish it. If we trace the French re- 
volution through all its stages, and observe the 
successive changes of men and measures ; if we 
contemplate the havoc the revolutionists have 
made of one another, and consider how many of 
them have fallen the victims of faction, and 
terminated their career in exile, or on the guil- 
lotine, we must perceive how awful a warning 
it affords us of the dangers attending revolu- 
tions. An impartial view of the consequences 
of this great political event must operate power- 
fully on the minds of those in other nations, 
whose principles have been contaminated by the 
artful insinuations of designing persons. This 
consideration ought especially to have its due 
weight in Great Britain, where so few things 
can be made better, but so many might be made 
worse. 

The French revolution may be ranked among 
those phaenomena of the moral world, of which 
the consequences bailfle every effort of political 
speculation. Those, we have already wi .nessed, 
have happened contrary to all human expecta- 
tion, and to all visible appearances. Had any 
person, seventeen years ago, ventured to pre- 
dict the establishment of a repubhcan govern- 



27 

inent in France ; had any one, no longer than 
twelve years ago, foretold its consequences to 
be such as we have seen, he would, by the most 
sagacious and intelligent persons, and the most 
skilful politicians, have been esteemed httle 
better than a maniac; and, indeed, the impro- 
babihtv of such an issue would in some measure 
have justified the suspicion of intellectual de- 
rangement in the person who could have formed 
such conjuctures. At the commencement of 
the revolution, it was easy to perceive that it 
was pregnant with consequences of great im- 
portance in a moral point of view ; and it grew 
every day more evident, that these conse- 
quences would affect in an extraordinary man- 
ner the political system of Europe; but, during 
some time, appearances seemed to prognosticate 
events quite different, and even diametrically op- 
posite to those which have happened. 

If we contemplate the political situation of 
France and that of the allies after the confe- 
deracy of Piinitz was formed, and the armies 
of the combined powers began to enter the ter- 
ritories of the Republic, imagination itself can 
hardly conceive a more striking contrast 
France exhibited the unpromising spectacle of 
a nation disunited, split into a number of dis- 
cordant factions, its military force in a disor- 
ganized state, without an army capable of look- 
ing the enemy in the face^ and without any ge- 



28 



iierals in T^' bom the nation could place its con- 
fidence. The armies of the confederates at the 
same time were numerous and well-disciplined, 
flushed with expectation, encouraged by the 
most probable appearance of success, and com- 
manded by generals of the most approved abili- 
ties and courage. Reasoning from those ap- 
pearances, a political speculator Vv ould certainly 
haye imagined, that the republican government 
must have eventually been subverted, and mo- 
narchy restored, or else, that the kingdom, 
rent with factions and convulsed with intestine 
divisions, as well as oppressed 'by foreign ene- 
mies, must finally have been dismembered and 
partitioned among the different European powers* 
Such w^as the alternative which the affairs of 
France presented at.that time to the eye of poli- 
tical conjecture. History does not record a con- 
test which has exhibited in a more conspicuous 
and striking point of view the uncertain suc- 
cess of pohtical projects and mihtary enter- 
prises, the fluctuating state of mundane afl^airs, 
and the illusory nature of all human expecta- 
tion. 

Impartiality must confess, that the exertions 
of France have in our days surpassed those of 
Kome, in her most splendid periods of success, 
and her most brilliant career of conquest. Tiie 
^va^s which the Romans carried on at diflferent 
times against the Gauls, the Cimbri. the Car- 



29 

thaginians, !Mithrida tes, ^c. will not bear a 
comparison with that in which r ranee was latcly 
cnga2:^ci wiih the combii^ed po\vers. In this 
ardaoris contest the Repnhlic, setting aside all 
common maxims, and despising all common 
ineans, adopted the most vigorous measures, 
and forming plans unprecedented m their na- 
ture, and unparalleled in die energy with whicli 
they were carried jnto execution, not only re- 
pulsed its powerful invaders, but entered upon 
an unexampled and gigantic career of con- 
quest, persuaded some, and compelled others, 
to conclude a peace, and so weakened, dis- 
united, and dissolved that powerful confede- 
racy, that of all the combined powers, Eng- 
land and Austria, and at last England alone, 
was left to maintain tlie iniportant contest. 
Thus the most potent confederacy the world has 
ever seen, terminated in defeat and disaster; 
and Great Britain alone, after having exhibited 
herself the bulwark of Europe, and the sup^ 
porter of its independence, signalized herself at 
that momentous crisis as the ouly nation able to 
withstand the arms, and check the exorbitant 
power of France, and secured those grand ob- 
jects, her national indei>cndence, her commer- 
ctal importance, and her excellent constitution. 

Humanitv must shudder in retlectins: on the 
ti umber of viclims sacrificed at the shrine of 
Ambition, in those gigantic exertions which 



30 



have placed France in that commanding post 
Tvhich she now occupies on the continent of 
Europe. The lamentations of her widows 
and orphans are drowned in the exultation of 
victory, and tlieir sufferinsrs are overlooked in 
the dazzlino^ ^lare of national orlorv: but the 
feeling mind must recoil at reflecting on the 
rivers of blood that have been spilt in Italy, in 
Egypt, and on the banks of the Sombre, the 
Maese, and the Rhine. Regarding France as 
an cnem}', we cannot but commiserate the suf- 
ferings of her people ; we must deplore the ca- 
lamities she has inflicted on herself and other 
nations, and we cannot but lament that the 
same belhgerent system of politics still con- 
tinues to prevail in her councils, to the bane of 
her ow^n happiness and of the tranquillity of 
Europe. Like ancient Rome, imperial France 
seems to aim at nothing short of universal em- 
pire, and takes the same methods to attain tliat 
object, as did formerly that domineering com* 
monwealth. In the ' pursuit of universal con- 
quest, Rome watered the greatest part of the 
then known world with the blood of her citi- 
zens. 

Brilliant victories, splendid triumphs, and 
extensive conquests, may flatter the vanity, but 
cannot constitute the happiness of a people. 
It would certainly have been more conducive to 
the happiness of her citizens, if Rome, con- 



SI 



tented with the limits which nature seemed to 
have prescribed to her dominions, had never 
carried her amis beyond the confines of Italy. 
The possession of the whole of that country 
might, indeed, have been necessary to the se- 
curity and peace of tlie Roman Kepublic, and 
its union in one pohtical system might be fa- 
vourable to the interests of humanity, by ex=- 
tinguishing those multiplied contentions and 
unceasing hostilities almost always subsisting in a 
country divided into a number of small principa- 
lities and states, at least wlien political science is 
in its infancy. But when Rome liad attained 
that object, when she had iinited Italy under 
her dominion, she possessed all the extent of 
territory requisite for her security. Italy seems 
to have been formed by nature for the seat of 
one government, and the abode of one united 
people. When Rome had effected this organi- 
zation, she might, if ambition had not excited 
her to aim at universal empire, have been secure, 
opulent, and happy. Sufficiently powerful to 
bid defiance to foreign aggression, she might 
have enjoyed a splendid tranquillity without 
being harrassed by a state of continual warfare, 
and shedding her best blood in the acquisition 
of more extensive conquests, which procured 
honours and emoluments to a few overgrown 
individuals, while the mass of the citizens of 
that boasted republic scarcely knew any inter- 



vals of traiiquilliry, and were made use of only 
as tools in the bauds of theix^ tyrants, while their 
minds were amused and their eyes dazzled with 
the splendour of military triumphs. The Roman 
generals were crowned with laurels in their tri- 
iimplial processions ; but those laurels, honorary 
emblems of victory, were perchased with the 
t(v;]s and tlie bl(;od of ihe citizens. 

The dominions of France at the time of the 
esta]>lisliment of the republican government, 
like the Italian territories of Rome, were suf- 
ficiently extensive, not orily lor every purpose 
of national security, but also for the support 
of her political importance and respectability, 
without sacrificing the lives cf nearly two mil- 
iioos of her bravest citizens in romantic schemes 
of conquest. Military triumphs do not consti-r 
tute national feUcity, nor even national glory, 
unless obtained in tlie just defence of national 
rights. On the contrary, when they are ac- 
quired by ambitious projects and unjust ag^ 
gression, they are often found to be no more 
than a judicial exaltation iatroductory to a con- 
spicuous fall. Th.c lamentations of widows and 
orphans, if they could be distinctly heard, 
Yvould considerably diminisl) the felicity of 
tli.ose who derive honours and emoluments, and 
expett to derive glory and fame from their suf- 
ferings. These, however, are only a part of the 
cviis of war; the \arious calainities it produces 



33 

are innumerable, and of a magnitude which 
exceeds all the powers of calculation. 

It has been very much debated among politi- 
cians, from the highest to the lowest circles, whe- 
ther the calamities brought upon Europe by the 
important contest between France and the com- 
bined powers, ought to be attributed to the ambi- 
tious views of the repubhc, or to the aggression 
of the confederates. This problem, if it be not 
capable of an exact solution, is attended by cir- 
cumstances, a due attention to which will en- 
able us to form our conclusions without much 
danger of mistake. It is hardly probable that 
any historian, who shall undertake to write the 
history of that war, will ever be able to investi- 
gate the fundamental principles, the original 
motives and impulsive springs of that moment- 
ous contest, with such a degree of accuracy as 
may enable him to give the solution, and to ex- 
hibit a clear and just view of the affair. This 
is often the case in regard to political transac- 
tions : even in the affairs of private life, it is 
oftener so than is generally imagined. To form 
a light judgment, and exhibit a just representa- 
tion of the motives of human conduct, it is re- 
quisite to be acquainted with every circumstance 
of the case, and to examine the weight and im- 
portance of every consideration which could in- 
fluence the minds of the persons whose actions 
are the subjects of investigation. The historian, 



3^ 

who pretends to delineate the motives of human 
actions, ought to have the same views of things 
as the actors themselves, and the same opportu- 
nity of observing the whole complicated tissue 
of existing circumstances, with all their combi- 
nations and connexions. It happens, however, 
very seldom, that the inspector is placed in such 
a situation as can afford him so distinct, and at 
the same time so comprehensive a view. It is 
seldom that he is in possession of such informa- 
tion as can enable him to form a right judgment. 
There is little need of aro-uments to prove the 
difficulty of making a just estimation of the pro- 
priety of the measures adopted b}' persons who 
stand in an arduous situation, and who have the 
direction of public concerns in turbulent and 
unsettled times; especially such as we have latelr 
seen, in which the aspect of European affairs 
was totally novel and unprecedented. 

In regard to the w^ar undertaken by the com- 
bined poAvers against France, it is evident that it 
cannot be properly attributed to the aggression 
of that confederacy. Almost from the moment 
of the revolution, France had assumed the rigl.t 
of dictating, in the most imperious manner, to all 
£urope. A it erthe subversion of the monarchv, 
lier dictatorial language was more distinctly and 
unequivocally uttered, and more clearly under- 
stood. The memorable decree of the 19th 
November, 179-3, was equivalent to a declara- 



$5 

ti©n of war against all nations ; and intimatedj, 
in the clearest manner, a design of overturning 
all the political and religious establishments of 
Europe, After a declaration so explicit and un- 
equivocal, an impartial and experienced observer 
of human affairs cannot wonder that the neigh- 
bouring nations took the alarm. The constituted 
authorities of Europe could not misunderstand 
the express denunciation of the republic ; and 
no existing appearances authorized them to 
doubt of its execution being attempted. It was, 
therefore, consistent with prudence and sound 
policy, to prepare in time for a contest, which 
the circumstances of the times, as well as the 
political maxims, and the express declarations 
of the republic, warned them to expect. It was 
evident, that the revolutionists of France con- 
sidered the dissemination of their principles 
conducive to the aggrandizement of their power; 
and in this they certainly were not mistakenc 
They knew that the most successful method of 
subjugating mankind^ is to prepossess their 
minds in favour of the yoke intended to be \mr 
posed upon them. When the minds (>f men are 
once subdued, their bodies, as well as their pro- 
perty, become an easy prey. The French revo« 
lutionists were not ignorant of this fundamental 
principle of the art of ruHng mankind; and they 
accordingly adopted a system of proselytism, as 
an essential part of their grand pohtical scheme. 



36 



Scarcely any propagators of a new system liave 
ever been more active in the dissemination of 
their doctrines, than the apostles of infidehty 
and republicanism which France sent out at that 
period into the different countries of Europe ; 
and for some tune their success was equal to their 
exertions. In every part of the continent, revo- 
lutionary principles Avere rapidly disseminated 
by the emissaries of France and their pupils, and 
visibly gained ground, not only among the lower 
classes of the people, but even among some who, 
by their rank and education, were distinguished 
above the vulgar, and whose minds were either 
deluded by visionary theories, or corrupted by 
the expectation of advancing their private in- 
terests in the bustle of innovation, and amidst 
the vicissitudes of political confusion. It was 
not difficult to perceive, that these revolutionary 
and deistical principles would continue to spread 
with increased rapidity, unless some effectual 
measure could be adopted v, hich might put a 
stop to their further dissemination. Xothing 
but the absolute breaking off of all intercourse 
with France could effect this salutary purpose ; 
and as it was evident, from the express decla- 
rations and denunciations of the republic, that 
a rupture must eventually take place, it was 
certainly consistent with prudence and sound 
policy to enter on the arduous contest, before its 
revolutionary principles had too far contaminated 



57 

the minds of the people in the neighbouring 
countries. 

The system of proselytism, or, as the French 
called it, of fraternization, was as well calculated 
for an extensive dissemination as any plan of the 
kind which has been projected since the days of 
Mahomet, and perhaps as well adapted to the 
genius of the present age, as the system of that 
sagacious impostor was to the circumstances of 
the times in which he lived. The reign of super- 
stition was past. Mankind was no longer to be 
lured with the promisesand expectation of a para- 
dise of sensual delights ; but if men had cast off 
the trammels of superstition, they had run into 
the contrary extreme. Infidelity was triumphant 
in France, and was rapidly gaining ground in 
most countries of Europe. The appeal was 
therefore made, or at least pretended to be 
made, to reason. Under the specious titles of 
philosophy and philanthropy, the revolutionists 
assumed the character of instructors of mankind ; 
and, under the plausible pretext of asserting the 
rights of man, promised to the inconsiderate 
multitude the emancipation of their minds from 
the influence of religion, and of their bodies 
from the control of political government; at 
once aiming at the extinction of the voice of 
conscience, and the relaxation of all the bonds 
of civil society. A doctrine so dangerous cer- 
ttiinly authorised the apprehensions of the con- 



3S 

stftnted 'sadiorities of £urop€; aad boweyrr 
possible it may be that the ambition of France 
flugbt hare suf^ied flie tranquillity of Europ€ to 
i€iBam ttnintemipted, there is the strongest pro- 
fehility, that if the general combination of the 
European powers not put a stop to the ex* 
tension of her leiFofaitioniziBg system^ and the 
propagaticm of her infidel doctrines, the extirpa- 
tion €i Chiistiamtj, and the subjection of 
Eim^ to lepnhlican usurpation^ would have 
heen the ineritable consequences. 

That an all^wise Providence over-rules the 
actions of men, marks out the destiny of empires, 
and disposes, with an absolute control, all mun- 
dane affairs, is a pnth suggested by reason, 
confirmed by revelation, and exemplified by ex- 
perience. May not then the awful drama, wbich 
has in our days been acted on the great political 
theatre, be considered as an important and grand 
display of Ae agencj of that divine Providence, 
which permits the machinations of men to go 
forward to a certain point, and no farther, and 
suffers them not to proceed beyond the limits 
as^gned by an irrerocable decree. A plan for 
the abolition of Christianity had been concerted 
with all the abihties and exertions of human 
sagacity; and it was expected, that religion 
should involve, in its ruin, the downlal of all 
the political estabhshments of Europe. The 
success of infidehty and rebeUion was for a while 



59 



permitted, and afterwards received a check, in 
order to convince mankind, that he who stills 
the storm, and calms the tempestuous ocean, has 
the same absolute command over the commo- 
tions which arise in the moral world, as over the 
convulsions of nature. 

Notwithstanding the variety of opinions which 
have been formed relative to the political propriety 
of the general combination against France, the 
necessity of the part which Great Britain took 
in that confederacy seems evident to every im- 
partial inquirer, who considers the relative 
situation of the two countries during more than 
a century, but especially at that momentous 
crisis. Separated only by a narrow channel, 
and both of them progressively increasing in 
power, one on the continent, and the other on 
the ocean, constantly endeavouring to rival each 
other in commerce, in power, in mihtary and 
naval strength^ neither of them could, consists 
ently with any principle of political reasoning, 
view, without jealousy and apprehension, the 
exorbitant aggrandizement of the other. The 
proximity of their situation, the equiponderancy 
of their power, and the rivalship which had long- 
subsisted between them, powerfully concurred 
to excite this political jealousy, and these appre- 
hensions. At all times, and on every occasion, 
when France had made any extraordinary pre- 
parations, or any considerable augmentation of 



40 

her military and naval force, England bad be- 
lieved it necessary to arm, in order to be pre- 
pared for every emergency; and in this respect 
had seldom been mistaken. Ever since tbe ac- 
cession of William III. tbis nation bas been 
imder tbe necessity of opposing tbe too great 
aggrandizement of France, of watching her 
motions, and of being prepared for her aggres- 
sion. It bas ever been a. fundamental maxim of 
political science, that it is requisite to maintain 
as much as possible an equipoise of power with 
a formidable rival, and to suppose him ready to 
take every advantage which any eventual supe- 
lierity may put into bis bands. The truth of 
tbis theory bas been confirmed by invariable 
experience, and exempUfied in a thousand in- 
stances ; and perhaps there never was a juncture 
in which it m">re imperiously called upon the 
attention of the British government, than at tbe 
momentous period of which we are now speak- 
ing. To have a just and conipi ehensive view of 
the subject, it is necessary to cast a retrospective 
glance on tbe nature and cause, the origin and 
progress, of the great national contest between 
England and France, which, assuming a variety 
of shapes, and carried on through re-iterated 
wars, internipted by several considerable in- 
tervals of pence, has been of longer duration, 
and has implicated -a greater part of tlie world 
in its operations and effects, than any other 



41 



contest of a similar nature recorded in the annals 
of nations Spain has of late been generaly 
drawn into the quarrel ; and Portugal, Hol« 
land, and Germany, have frequently been in- 
volved. The contest between those two great 
rivals has, at different times, not only convulsed 
Europe, but all the other quarters of the globe 
have been the theatre of the hostilities it has 
produced. Asia, Africa, and America, have 
been implicated in its effects, and exhibited 
scenes of carnage and desolation introduced 
into their borders from the remotest part of the 
globe, while Great Britain and France have car- 
ried their arms into countries unknown to the 
Babylonian, Persian, Greek, and Roman con- 
querors, and situated far beyond the limits of 
ancient geopraphy. 

The Norman conquest was the original cause 
which gave rise to the commencement of hos- 
tilities between England and France. Before 
that important period of English history, no 
war had taken place between the two na- 
tions. No cause of quarrel, indeed, existed. 
So circumscribed were their connections, their 
commerce, and their influence, that a pretext 
for dispute could hardly have been found. Con- 
fining their views to tlieir own narrow precincts, 
the sea, which nature liad interposed between 
their borders, formed a political as well as a 
geographical line of separation. After the con- 



42 



quest, tlie relative situation of the two coun- 
tries was totally chano^ed. The kinirs of Ensr- 
land, after that period, possessing extensive 
territories in France, the accession of those 
continental dominions brought the two king- 
doms into political contact; and before the ex- 
piration of the Conqueror's reign, they were 
engaged in hostihties. The claims of Edward 
III. to the crown of France were afterwards a 
fertile source of national enmity ; and the ware 
of competition on that subject, in the reign of 
that prince, and in those of Henry Y. and Henry 
VI. were of longer duration, productive of more 
brilliant and memorable achievements, and at- 
tended with greater effusion of blood, than any 
contest for the succession to a disputed crown 
recorded in ancient or modern history. The 
memorable victories of Cressy, Poictiers, and 
Agin court, were splendid exhibitions of Eng- 
lish valour, rather than real national advan- 
tages. Such only the}' must have been consi- 
dered, and such they would eventually have 
proved, had they even been followed by the 
most decisive and the most favourable conse- 
quences that could have been expected, or were 
at that time desired; for if the conquest of 
France had been fully completed, and the suc- 
cession to its crown permanently estabhshed in 
the family of the Plantagenets, the existing 
circumstances of the times place it beyond a 



4S 

possiblity of doubt, that Paris, not Londoii, 
Would have been the metropolis of the united 
monarchy, and that England would have be- 
come a province of France, rather than France a 
province of England ; a circumstance most cer- 
tainly far from being desirable to this country. 

This contest for the succession to the crown of 
France seemed, at the demise of Henry V. and 
the accession of Henry VL, to be finally decided 
in favour of the EngUsh branch of the royal 
family descended by the female hne from the 
kings of France. By this decision, and the 
union of the two kingdoms under one sovereign, 
hostilities between England and France seemed 
finally terminated, and their interests for ever 
united. The party of the dauphin, afterwards 
Charles VH., was so weak and inconsiderable^ 
that it seemed to be on the verge of extinction, 
and must have been crushed by the slenderest 
efforts of the English power, had not that won- 
derful historical phsenomenon, the maid of Or- 
leans, appeared, who first turned the scale, and 
operated an extraordinary and unexpected 
change in the political affairs of the two con- 
tending parties. This singular event was suc- 
ceeded by another, equally or rather more de- 
cidedly fatal to the English interest on tlie con- 
tinent. The two rival houses of York and 
Lancaster;deluged with blood the plains of Eng- 
land, in disputing the possession of its crow n, 



44 



as their ancestors had those of France in the 
same kind of contest. Those two great and 
remarkable events operated so decisively in fa- 
vour of Charles, as to enable him to expel the 
English from every part of France, except 
Calais, which alone remained of all the con- 
quests they had made on the continent, and ex- 
isted the single insulated monument of their 
brilliant achievements. 

After these wars of succession, which had so 
dreadfully convulsed both England and France, 
and drenched both countries w^ith the blood of 
their inhabitants, the two kingdoms resumed 
their ancient boundaries, and England was again 
reduced v/ithin her msular limits, as before the 
Norman conquest, retaining Calais alone, the 
solitary remnant of her continental possessions. 

During the space of about a century and an 
half, England and France were not in such a 
state of political or commercial prosperity, as 
to excite the jealousy of each other, or the ap- 
prehensions of their neighbours ; and the wars, 
which sometimes happened "between them, were 
not productive of any considerable eifects. It 
v/as not until the reign of Louis XIV., that the 
exorbitant power of France grew formidable to 
all Europe, and particularly alarming to all Eng- 
land. The aspiring views of that monarch, 
however, received a check from the successes 
of the allies in the reign of queen Anne; but 



45 



ever since that period the aggrandizement of 
]f ranee has been attentively watched by Eng- 
land ; and experience has indeed taught this 
country to be on its guard against so dangerous 
and so powerful a neighbour. This kingdom 
owes its present existence, as an independent 
and flourishing nation, to the prudent vigi- 
lance of its government; and in no period has 
this vigilance been more necessary than at the 
present important crisis, when the French go- 
vernment seems to have determined on the con- 
quest of this country, as the Romans did on 
the annihilation of Carthage. 

Since the reign of Louis XIV., this great and 
long continued contest between the two nations 
has totally changed its nature and its object. 
It is no longer a war of disputed succession, as 
in the reigns of the Plantagenets, nor a con. 
test, which sha for its object the decision of 
territorial claims, but a principle of hostility 
fixed in the vitals of the two nations, inter- 
woven with their political systems, and incor- 
porated with their very essence. Such it has, 
in a great measure, been during the whole of 
the last century, but especially since the revo- 
lution, which has been so disastrous to France, 
and to those countries with whom she corner 
into political contact. 

It is not here to be understood, that by re- 
presenting this important and unhappy contest 



46 



between Great Britain and France as a fixed 
principle of hostility in the moral circumstances 
and political structure of the two nations, any- 
personal allusion to the individuals who compose 
them is intended. It is not to be supposed, that 
the inhabitants of either country are, in their 
individual capacity, enemies to those of the 
other. On the contrary', it is to be hoped, that 
the opposition of political interests will never 
destroy Christian charity, nor extinguish those 
sentiments of universal benevolence, which all 
men, as children of one common father, owe to 
one another. Individuals are involved in the 
great vortex of the communit}' of which they 
are members ; and on a due consideration it will 
be seen, that this great contest between the two 
most powerful nations of Europe, arises not 
from malevolence, but from a peculiar train of 
circumstances. 

In the reigns of our Norman kings, the wars 
between England and France were disputes be- 
tween the two crowns ; the interests of the 
people w^re in a great measure out of the ques- 
tion. At this time the contest is national ; and 
however desirable such an event must be, neither 
reason nor historical experience authorise us to 
indulge a hope of seeing its final termination, 
until some considerable change shall have taken 
place in the circumstances anil political views 
of the two conteoding powers. Whenever two 



47 



neigKbouring nations grow exceedingly power- 
ful, a rivalship naturally arises between themj 
and increases as they increase iu power and 
opulence. This has ever been, and ever will be, 
the case in the political world. The cause ex- 
ists in the nature of things. It is inseparable 
from the constitution of nations ; *^ it grows 
with their growth, and strengthens with their 
strenMh." Between two nations circumstanced 
like Great Britain and France, innumerable con- 
tingencies may occur, that can scarcely fail of 
calhng this spirit of rivalship into action. 
Scarcely any step can be taken by the one, 
without attracting the vigilant attention of the 
otlier, and stirring up that watchful jealousVj 
which, although it may for a time be smothered, 
cannot be extinguished. 

Those contests which arise between princes, 
in cases of disputed succession, and those which 
take place between dilferent nationSj on the 
subject of doubtful claims to territorial posses-^ 
sions, are adventitious circumstances. The wars 
which originate from those disputes are casual 
evils, and the breaches proceeding from them, 
are not irreparable. A war of competition be- 
tween two poMcrful and rival nations, in close 
vicinity, and meeting in a number of points of 
political and commercial contact, may admit of 
intervals of peace, but cannot be finally termi- 
nated, until some important change takes place 



4B 

in their circumstances. . This is precisely tiic 
case between England and France. The grand 
contest between those two powers, assuming the 
difrerent shapes of a territoiial dispute under the 
first Norman kings, of a war of succession in 
the reign of the Plantaganets, and of a contest 
of national rivalship in later times, has conti- 
nued, with various intervals of peace, the space 
of almost seven centuries and a half. In those 
wars between England and France, a greater 
quantity of blood has been spilt than in any na- 
tional contest to be met with in historical re- 
cord ; and it was far from being in any degree 
consistent with probability that this grand com- 
petition would be extinguished by the abolition 
of monarchy in France, and the establishment of 
so dangerous a system of government as that of 
a military republi'". 

In order to appreciate the conduct of the Bri- 
tish government at that critical juncture, after 
considering what the relative situation of Great 
Britain and France had been previous to the re- 
volution, and what it actually was at the time 
when the former engaged in the gi*and confede- 
racy, it is necessary above all to consider what 
it might, and vejy probabh' would have been, 
if this country had adopted a neutral system, 
and remained an unconcerned spectator of the 
^cTO'iandizement of its o:reat rival. 

At the time when England resolved on taking 



49 



an active part against the new republic, the lat- 
ter had already assumed a military form, and 
was on the point of commencing a war with the 
continental powers. From the whole assemblage 
of existing circumstances, no other conclusion 
could at that time be drawn, than that a war 
between the repubhc and the combined powers 
of the continent would infallibly take place, 
whether Great Britain should take an active 
part, or remain neutral In the supposition of 
her neutrality, the consequences are obvious^ 
In this respect, two directly opposite cases may 
be supposed, and imagination may form two 
distinct and totally different views. Reason 
tind historical experience must determine on 
their comparative justness and propriety. On 
the one hand^ an ideal speculator may suppose, 
that the neutrality of Great Britain would al- 
ways have been respected by France ; and that 
the former, tranquil and undisturbed, in the 
midst of the political tempest which agitated 
Europe, would have had nothing to engross her 
attention but her own commercial concerns^ 
the extension of her trade, and the acquisition 
of wealth. On the other hand, if we reverse 
the medal, it will present to the eye of specula- 
tion a picture far less pleasing. We may ima- 
gine the republic, after having subjugated the 
greatest part of Europe, v/ith a naval and mili- 
tary force at her disposal unprecedented in the 



50 



annals of history, turning all her strength against 
this country, and pouring her conquering ar- 
mies into the heart of Great Britain, before the 
latter had prepared the means of resistance. 
This is no exaggerated representation of the 
probabiHty of the case, if the provident vigi- 
lance of the British government iiad not, by 
exerting itself at the favourable moment^ obvi- 
ated tliose formidable evils. 

If we consider what France has done, not- 
withstanding the accession of Great Britain to 
the general confederacy, it is not difficult to 
form a tolerably just conjecture in reg-ard to 
what slie might have performed, if the active 
interference of this country had not damped 
her efforts, and disconcerted her projects, in a 
greater degree than is generally imagined. 
However differently it may appear to a superfi- 
cial and thoughtless observer, a little reflection 
will convince an impartial inquirer, that the ill 
success of the war on the part of the confede- 
rates, is one of the strongest proofs of the ne- 
cessity this country was under of joining in the 
confederacy, ancl of tlie provident sagacity of 
tlie British ministry. 

Had Great Britain remained neutral, wliile 
France was carrying on the war against the 
combined powers, the naval exertions of the 
latter would undoubtedly have equalled those 
slie displayed in the military department. A 



51 



powerful navy would not have been less useful 
in the war she was engaged in against Spain, 
Portugal, and Holland, than numerous armies in 
that which she was at the same time carrying on 
against Prussia, Austria, and the German em- 
pire. The efforts of all the combined powers 
would not, in all probability, have been able to 
prevent the augmentation of her naval force to 
whatever point she might have thought requi- 
site. By the conquest of the maritime coun- 
tries, the repubhc would have obtained posses- 
sion of their shipping as well as their ports. 
From what did actually happen, it is more than 
probable, that we should, long before the pre- 
sent period, have seen the whole maritime force 
of all Europe, that of Russia alone excepted, en- 
tirely at the disposal of France ; Egypt, and all 
the maritime parts of Turkey, in her possession; 
and it would have been no miracle, if vv^ had 
se the lepublican banners displayed on the 
ramparts of Constantinople. 

The issue of the v/ar between France snd the 
combined powers, authorises us to consiaer the 
aggrandizement of the republic, such as it is 
htie delineated, not only as the probable, but 
almost as the certain consequence which must 
have resulted from the neutrality of Gri at Bri- 
tain ; and this consideration alone is sufhcient 
to convince us of the propriety and sagacity of 

E 2! 



52 



the measures of adminhtratioa at that momen- 
tous crisis. 

If this be considered as a just representation 
of the case, which the extreme of poHtical scep- 
ticism can scarcely call in question, it is evident 
that something of importance ^. as to be done ; 
that some decisive measures v/ere to be taken. 
No other alternative existed than either a war 
or an armed neutrality. Some have imagined 
the latter measure would have been preferable 
to hostilities; hut an accurate investigation of 
existing circumstances will shew, that it would 
have been at that juncture both unsafe and im- 
practicable. If Great Britain, decHning to en- 
gage in the war, had kept herself in a continual 
state of preparation, a measure which she could 
not consistently with her own safety have neg- 
lected, her naval and mihtary preparations must 
necessarily^ have kept pace with the augmenta- 
tion of those of her great rival; and as the ar- 
maments of the republic must have been tre- 
mendously formidable, especially since its naval 
power could not have received any check from 
the efforts of its continental enemies, this coun- 
try must have incurred greater expense from 
such an armed neutrality as could have insured 
its safety, than from the belligerent measures 
which it adopted. 
When we consider that it was almost entirely 



55 

owing to the efforts of England that the niari'- 
time force of France was, in the very commence- 
ment of the war, so far broken as never more 
to become formidable ; and when we reflect on 
the fatal blows given, at different times, to her 
marine during the continuance of hostilities, wc 
must ]>e convinced, that such a neutrality as 
would have secured the independency and peace 
of this country, would have required more for- 
midable aimaments, and consequently greater 
expences, than the war itself. In such' a situa- 
tion. Great Britain must have been always in a 
state of preparation adequate to the unbroken 
and daily augmented force of the republic^ 
v/hich, had it not been checked b}' the naval 
exertions of the former, must have been in- 
creased to an extraordinary and formidable mag' 
nitude. 

Another circumstance of no less importance 
merits the attention of this nation, and w^hen 
duly considered, will excite the gratitude of 
Britons towards that government, whose provi- 
dent counsels and prudent measures averted 
from the people of this country the most formid- 
able evils, and secured to them the possession 
of their excellent consitution, the benefits of 
equitable laws, and the enjoyment of internal 
tranquillity, the greatest of civil and pohtical 
blessings. No one in this country is ignorant, 
tliat at rlie time when hostilities commenced. 



54 ' - ^ 

revolutionary principles were making a rapid 
progress among certain classes of people ; and 
there is no doubt that these peniKious doctrines 
would have been more and more disseminated, 
if the intercourse with France had not been 
broken off. If a peaceable and friendly com- 
munication had continued to subsist betweea 
the two countries, the emissaries of France, 
apostles of sedition and infidehty, would have 
industriously propagated their doctrines, . i.til 
they had perhaps accomplished their grand ob- 
ject of contaminating the minds of the people. 
Had they once been able to gain this point, 
the example of other countries may teach us to 
estimate the consequences. 

It is evident, that the intercourse with France 
was at that juncture so dangerous to this coun- 
try, as to render it absolutely necessary to break 
it off, which could not be done but by the com- 
mencement of hostilities. This was clearly per- 
ceived by those whose office it was to watch over 
the safety of the country, and the interests of 
the people. Decisive measures were accordingly 
adopted, and their effects have been beneficial. 
The loyalty of the nation, which then appt nred 
wavering, is now fixed and steady. Those, who 
had adopted revolutionary principles, have nad 
the opportunity of seeing and reflecting on their 
'pernicious tendency. The phantom, which had 
like to have led them astray, is vanished, anct 



55 



Britons arc now united, as one man, in loyalty 
to their sovereign, and attachment to the con- 
stitution of their country. 

It might perhaps be imagined by some per- 
sons, who have not studied the history of man- 
kind, nor explored the intricate mazes of politi- 
cal science, that the apprehensions of an attack 
from France were groundless, since no appear- 
ance of misunderstanding, no visible cause of 
dispute, existed between that country and Great 
Britain, at the period alluded to ; and that, in 
consequence of the harmony which appeared to 
subsist between them, this armed neutrality, and 
tliose expensive preparations, here supposed re- 
quisite for the security of this country, would 
have been unnecessary. Those, however, v/ho 
have considered the hinges on which the 
political manoeuvres of nations move, will be 
of a different opinion. They will readily per- 
ceive how easily an ambitious and conquering 
nation, armed at every point, can iind a pretext 
for attacking an unprepared and defenceless 
neighbour. They will discover, that in political 
science it has ever been an established rule to 
be always in a state of preparation proportioned 
to the magnitude of the danger apprehended, 
and to take timely measures, in order to check 
the exorbitant power and aggrandizement of a 
dangerous and potent rival. 

Had Great Britain neglected this important 



56 



point ^ had she neither given a timely check to 
the augmentation of the naval power of France, 
hy taking an active part in the war ; nor kept 
herself in a state of formidable preparation, by 
a naval and military estabhshment of an enor- 
mous magnitude, and more expensive than a 
state of warfare ; she would in that case have 
had nothing to rely on for her safeguard, but the 
generosity and good faith of the republic ; and 
what kind of dependence that must have been, 
Switzerland and I gypt can witness. 

If the republic could, without the least sha- 
dow of a pretext, and without the most trivial 
cause of complaint, violate the neutrality of the 
Ottoman empire, with which it was at peace, 
and which had on every occasion shev/ed itself 
favourable to France, no other arguments are 
necessary to prove how little confidence was to 
be placed in the justice and good faith of the 
Directorial government. The Ottoman empire 
had preserved the strictest neutrality ; Great 
Britain could not have remained more strictly 
neutral. The former was not only at peace with 
France, but had in almost every respect shewn 
itself favourable to her cause, and appeared in 
the highest degree desirous of cultivating the 
good understanding and harmony which sub- 
sisted between them ; Great Britain could not 
have acted in a more friendly manner. The 
commercial intei course between France and the 



57 



Turkish empire had long subsisted uninterrupted 
anu -flourishing, their political connections had 
alw iys been managed to their mutual satisfac- 
tion, and all affairs conducted with the greatest 
hariuony. In that empire the French had al- 
ways been considered and treated as the most 
favoured nation; and they were upon the same 
footing, when the republican government, wn'th- 
out any previous provocation, without any 
ground of complaint, adopted the measure of 
inviding the Ottoman dominions, and seizing 
on Egypt, one of the most valuable provinces 
of rhe whole empire. 

The proceedings of France in regard to Egypt, 
omitting all other instances of a nearly similar 
nature, afford an ample proof of the little respect 
paid by the republic to the rights of neutral na- 
tions, and justify the conduct of Great Britain 
in obviating the extent and growth of the evil 
by timely and prudently striting at its root. 
It cannot be imagined, that the republican go- 
vernment would have respected the neutrality of 
this nation,, when it made so little scruple of 
violating that of others. When France had sub- 
dued the continent, or forced the nations with 
whom she was at war to conclude a peace on 
the terms that she might have been pleased to 
dictate, she would not long have been at a loss 
for a pretext to attack Great Britain. Some 
trifling commercial dispute, or some pretended 



58 



insult, would have been industriously sought to 
answer that purpose ; or it might have been 
done without any pretext, as in the case of 
Egypt. In her uiipriucipled attack of the Otto- 
man ^dominions, France had no ground of com- 
plaint on account of the capture of merchant 
vessels, undue restrictions of her trade, or the 
infraction of treaties. She carried the horrors 
of war into a peaceable and friendly country on 
the sole ground of expediency, and had she not 
been timely prevented by the decisive measures 
of the British government, she might in all pro- 
bability have thought it as expedient to conquer 
England as to take possession of Egypt. 

In the first period of the French revolution, 
it was a prevalent opinion, that it w^as an event 
favourable to the future tranquillity of Europe. 
After the subversion of the monarchy, a very 
great number of persons supposed that the re- 
public would adopt a pacific system of politics. 
These pleasing speculations, however, did not 
prove well ground fd ; and as some, who had 
formed such conjectures, were men whose con- 
summate abilities and eminent virtues were an 
ornament to human nature, the failure of tlieir 
hopes only serves to shew the uncertainty of fu- 
ture events, and the illusory nature of conjec- 
tural viev. s respecting afltairs of so complex and 
unprecedented a nature as the French revolu- 
tion, of which the consequences have happened 



59 

contrary to all rational expectation. It is in- 
deed no wonder, that in a combination of cir- 
cumstances which has no precedent in the his- 
tory of mankind, all conjecture should fail, and 
the result baffle all human foresight. Affairs of 
so singular and so complicated a nature elude 
all human penetration : that Being alone, to 
whom all futurity is present, can foresee the 
consequences. 

The general supposition at that time seemed 
to be, that, the am bition of the French monarchs 
being extinguished with tlieir power, the wars, 
which that ambition had formerly excited in 
Europe, would no more take place. It is, how- 
ever, a very erroneous principle of reasoning, to 
suppose that wars are caused only by the ambi- 
tion of kings. On the contrary, it v/ill upon an 
accurate examination, appear, that they more 
frequently proceed from the jarring interests of 
subjects; and modern history affords many in- 
stall ces of the averseness of sovereia'ns to en2:a<re 
in war, although loudly called upon by their 
people for that purpose. The annais of nation^ 
afford sufiicient proof, that republican govern- 
ments are not essentially of a more pacific nature 
than monarchies ; but, on the contrary, in ge- 
neral more unsettled, more tumulti o is, more 
prone to hostilities, more frequently engaged in 
foreign wars, as well as oftener agitated by in- 
testine commotions. History docs not afford 



Co 



a single instance of a powerful republic that has 
been remarkable for a pacific system of politics. 
As an instance of this historical and political 
truth, we might, without mentioning the Greek 
republics, which were almost continually en- 
gaged in hostilities one against another, call to 
our remembrance that of Carthage, which was 
not less intent on multiplying its conquests, 
than on extending its commerce ; but more 
especially that of Rome, which employed the 
whole time of its duration in subjugatmg and 
plundering the world, and in carrying the hor- 
rors of war into every country that was acces- 
sible to its armed legions, until the extinction 
of the republican government, v. hen the Roman 
world, after almost five hundred vears of war 
and bloodshed, assumed a monarchical form, 
and found repose under the mild and pacific ad- 
ministration of x'^ugustus Caesar. Under his 
single reign, Rome enjoyed a longer period of 
tranquillity than she h.ad ever done during the 
whole time of her existence as a republic. The 
same remark may be made on the reigns of se- 
^ eral of the succeeding emperors. 

If, from the records of antiquity, vre turn 
our attention to the history of more modern 
times, we shall find that Venice and Genoa, 
once the most powerful as well as the most com- 
mercial republics in the world, were almost 
continually engaged in hostilities, either against 



6i 

each other, or against some of then' neighbours. 
Venice, in particular, extended her conquests 
over the IMorea, and almost all the isles of the 
Archipelago and the Levant. It v/as only when 
those repubhcs became weak, and unable to 
maintain a contest with their more powerful 
neighbours, that they adopted a pacific system. 
Venice, unable to contend with iVustria or the 
Ottoman empire, soon discovered that her true 
interests consisted in peace, and that her happi- 
ness, her commerce, and even her existence, de- 
pended on a strict adherence to pacific measures. 
Genoa stood in the same predicament in regard 
to France, Spain, and Austria, and, in conse- 
quence of the superiority of those her pov/erful 
neighbours, carefully avoided every occasion of 
being engaged in hostilities. The small repub- 
lics of Geneva, St. Marino, Ragusa, kc. have 
at all times invariably endeavoured to cultivate 
a pacific system, and to live in friendship v/itli 
their neighbours ; and the reason is obvious. 
Their weakness convinced them of their true 
interests ; and their total inability to contend 
with the surrounding states, compelled them to 
avoid any contest. The history of the Sevea 
United Provinces displays . the same political 
picture as Venice, and several other debilitated 
repubhcs. Holland, while pov/erful, wis very 
frequently engaged in wars with France, Spain, 
or England ; but since she has been compelled 



62 



to acknowledge tlie superiority of England and 
France, her politics have changed with her for- 
tune. Of late she has heen as careful to aroid, 
as she was formerly eager to commence hostili- 
ties, and has invariably adhered to a strict neu- 
trality, except when unavoidably implicated in 
the contests between her neisrhbours. To all 
those instances we may add the couduct of the 
republic of England after the civil war, and 
the unfortunate catastrophe of Charles I. No 
sooner was the commonwealth established, than 
a war was commenced with the United Pro- 
vinces; and the English and Dutch republics 
maintained the contest against each other, with 
a degree of animosity little inferior to that which 
was formerly manifested by the two rival repub- 
lics of Rome and Carthage. The history of 
the world furnishes abundance of incontestable 
proof*, that although small republics, like small 
monarchies, have been obliged to cultivate a 
pacific system, in consequence of being over- 
awed by powerful neighbours, yet potent re- 
publics have even surpassed monarchies in their 
predilection for v» ar, and in their disposition for 
hostile aggression and conquest. Indeed, no 
argument can be adduced in political reasoning 
to make it appear, that a republican should be 
essentially more peaceable than a monarchical 
government. In the former as great a number 
of persons may have an interest in war as in the 



63 

latter ; and by reason of the popular form of 
the system, the candidates for military, as well 
as for civil honours and emoluments, are not 
only in greater number, but their expectations 
are also more sanguine, as the road to popularity 
is equally open to every one. The Anglo-Ame- 
rican republic may, in the opinion of some, 
be considered in this case as an exception ; and 
the pacific system which it has adopted, to 
which it yet strictly adheres, and is still likely 
to adhere, seemed to authorize an expectation 
that the same measures would be adopted in 
France. That country, however, and the United 
States of America, exhibit a visible contrast. 
Their circumstances are marked, with the most 
striking difference. Anglo-America is by its 
local and political situation eminently contra- 
distinguished, not only from France, but from 
every other European country. In the latter 
every station is filled, and almost every road to 
honour and emolument crowded with candi* 
dates, and blocked up to those aspiring minds 
which are found among persons of small tor- 
tune. In all European countries, ecclesiastical 
or military promotion are almost the only ob- 
jects which present themselves to the hopes of 
persons in that predicament. These were al- 
ways, in France, the grand resources of the 
collateral branches of great and opulent fami- 
lies. The church is, since the revolution, 



64 



placed on so disadvantageous a footing, that it 
no longer holds out those promising expecta- 
tions, and those incentives to ecclesiastical pur- 
suits which it did formeiiy, and which if still 
aixord^ in other Catholic as well as in some Pro- 
testant countries. It is also well knowTi, that 
the genius of the French is not so commercial 
as that of some other nations, and that com- 
merce was never held in very high estimation 
among them. The higher ranks in general 
looked upon trade with a sort of contempt ; and 
persons of a genteel, but not opulent class 
among the people, as it is generally the case, 
had imbibed the notions and prejudices of the 
great. To such persons military preferment \% as 
the principal object of pursuit, as that which 
held out the fairest expectations of promotion', 
honour, and pubhc consideration, accompanied 
T»ith the least restraint. In a countiy so cir- 
cumstanced, it is evident that a very great iiuin- 
ber of individuals must always find an interest 
in w^ar ; and it is consequently no w aider that 
a military taste should prevail. 

The American states and their inhabitants are 
in a predicament diametrically opposite aln. Jat 
in every point of view. Those who first esta- 
blished themselves in the British colonies, and 
those, who from time to time had ^o..e to settle 
there, were for the most part men who had been 
accustomed to habits of peaceful intiusiry, and 



65 



crossed the Atlantic with the view of bettering 
their fortune, and acquiring a more comfortable 
subsistence by their exertions in their respective 
employjuents as mechanics or husbandmen. The 
colonists bad been accustomed to a homely, and 
most of them to a rural life ; and when the re- 
volt against the mother-country excited them 
to arms, their v/ish was to return to their former 
habits as soon as the contest should be ended. 
They had but one object in view, and when 
that was obtained, they gladly laid down their 
arms, and returned to their former agricultural 
and commercial pursuits. Their genius was 
not turned to a military life, and Consequently 
they had no inclination to make war their em« 
ployment. The advantages to be expected from 
agriculture and commerce, justly appeared to 
them far greater than any they had to expect 
from the sv/ord. No moral or physical circum- 
stances whatever existed, which could excite 
them to a lust of conquest. Except Mexico/ 
Canada, or the West-India islands, no country 
worth conquering was neaf them; and those 
they could not attack without involving them- 
selves in a naval war with the European powers, 
to whom those settlements belong, and in w^hich 
they could not hope to be successful. From 
these considerations, it evidently appears that 
the United States of America could have no in- 
ducement to a belligerent system of politics; 

F 



66 

and It is also evident, tliat the circumstances of 
their situation, so far distant from the old Con- 
tinent, secure them from hostile aooression. In 
such a situation, it would be the height of ab- 
surdity in the American republic to interfere 
with European pohtics. 

Habits are gradually formed through the in- 
fluence of local circumstances. In all the coun- 
tries of the old Continent, a system of militar}^ 
power and complicated politics has almost, from 
time immemorial, been established. So many 
powerful and populous kingdoms and states 
bordering upon one another, is a circumstance 
which has a very natural tendency to excite 
jealousies, to stimulate ambition, and to pro- 
duce jarring interests and rivalship. If we trace 
the histories of the nations of this Continent 
from the earliest ages of society down to the 
present period, we shall easily discover, that 
proximity of situation has had a decided influ- 
ence on their policical measures, and also on 
the::' moral circumstances. The physical and 
moral circumstances of the nations of the old 
Cc::':inent having, through a long succession of 
agC3, had this tendency to establish a complex 
and belligerent system of politics, the minds of 
indiVidit^Lls have become reconciled to scenes of 
bloodshed, habituated to martial enterprises, 
and accustomed to the pursuit of military ho- 
nours and promotion. In nations so circum- 



67 

stanced, the necessary consequence must be, 
that a very considerable number of individuals 
may be found who build their hopes on political 
intrigues and miUtary enterprises. And it must 
be observed, that although the disputes which 
happen between different nations are sometimes 
of a very intricate nature, the circumstances of 
the q^uestion exceedingly difficult to unravel, 
the interests of each party difficult to reconcile, 
and their respective claims difficult to settle, yet 
the decision of the sword would seldom be re- 
sorted to, if uo individuals, neither on one side 
nor the other, had any interest in war. In every 
country, the combined interests of those indi- 
viduals amount to an aggregate of greater 
weight and magnitude than any interest the so- 
vereign can possibly have in commencing hosti- 
lities. This view of things, which will upon 
due examination certainly appear just, will de- 
monstrate the fallacy of that common- place ar- 
gument of some unskilful politicians, that wars 
originate in the ambition of kings. This argu- 
ment might, in some ages, and in some cases, 
have had great weight. In the unsettled times 
of antiquity, when ambition was in its full and 
unrestrained vigour, and when human vanity 
prompted princes to aspire to the titles of herocg 
and conquerors, and to leave what they vainly 
called a deathless name, the justness of the ob- 
servation must in general have been allowed; 



€8 



but the age of conquest and of false heroism is 
past, and kings now, no longer amused with 
the phantom of renown so fascinating to the an- 
cients, aim at more substantial greatness and 
more rational glory. Some, however, have ab- 
surdly thought that wars were the effects of 
monarchical government, and, in consequence of 
this erroneous supposition, imagined that the 
effects of a republican government in France 
v/ould be the establishment of a pacific system 
of pohtics, like that of the United States of 
America 

Americans established a republican govern- 
ment^ but they were not a nation of politicians 
or of warriors. To them, neither of these cha- 
racters, in the European signification of the 
term, is eongeni^il. Separated from the old 
Continent by the v/ide Atlantic, they have lit- 
tle concern with the politics of Europe, the 
operations of its armies, or the balance of its 
power ; and consequently the circumstances of 
their situation are not calculated to induce mar- 
tial habits, or to excite a military taste among 
the people. The moment the Americans^begin 
to intermeddle with the affairs of Europe, the 
moment they aspire, to the character of a war- 
like and conquering nation, they will begin to 
lose sight of their true interest ; they will then 
cease to avail themselves of their local situation, 
and adopt a system of politics uncongenial to 



69 

their moral and social habits, and unsuitable to 
their geographical position on the globe. 

An American, who aspires to raise himself to 
' a higher situation than that in which he stands, 
will, instead of forming ideas of miUtary enter- 
prize and promotion, naturally direct his view 
to commercial or agricultural undertakings. 
In the latter of these pursuits, the' face and 
condition of the country point out the means 
of advancing his fortune, and afford him a 
pleasing and certain prospect. The vast extent 
of land in the back-settlements, which for ages 
to come will not be brought into cultivation, 
furnishes an' opportunity of exertion to the 
most active and indefatigable industry. This 
immense extent of uncultivated country, open 
to every individual at an easy purchase, afford- 
ing such means of acquiring vast pQssessions, 
of which the value will be continually increas - 
jng from generation to generation, offers in- 
ducements sufiicient to call forth the energies of 
the most active genius. The views of the An- 
glo-Americans are, in fact, chiefly directed to 
those pursuit^ ; and the clearing and cultivation 
of waste lands among the inhabitants of tlic 
United States, like mining in Mexico, Peru, 
and some other of the Spanish colonies, is the 
grand object of enterprize. Speculations of 
the former are, liowever, far more sure ilmn 
those of the latter kind ; for the earth seldom 



70 

fdils in time to repay the toils of the husband- 
man, whereas projects of mining are not only 
very expensive, but exceedingly uncertain, and 
often ruinous to the projectors. 

Such being the national habits and individual 
pursuits of the Anglo-Americans, in conjunc- 
tion with a local situation, and a variety of poli- 
tical circumstances, so totally different from 
tliose of the European countries, it is no won- 
der that the republic of the United States 
should prefer a pacific system of politics to vi- 
sionary schemes of conquest, which might, and 
in all probability would, prove unsuccessful; 
and even if they did succeed, would be of 
small advantage to a people already possessing 
an extent of territory containing about fifty 
times more land than the inhabitants are suffi- 
ciently numerous to cultivate. 

These observations on the x'^merican republic 
are in no respect applicable to any of the Euro- 
pean countries, except Russia, the local circum- 
stances of which are, in several particulars, si- 
milar to those of America; but the state of so- 
ciety is far different. If, however, the local, 
poHtical, and social circumstances of the United 
States be very different from those of the Euro- 
pean countries in general, they are more espe- 
cially dissimilar from those of the French em- 
pire. If a person were called upon tp name a 
country which exhibits a complete contrast 



n 

witli the American republic, he would, without 
hesitation, fix upon France. The French mo- 
narchy has almost invariably pursued a bellige- 
rent system, and been more frequently involved 
in hostilities than any other nation of Europe. 
The armies of France have always been nume- 
rous, her generals and officers in great repute, 
and military honours held in higher estimation 
there, than perhaps in any other country of the 
modern world. In a country so circumstanced, 
a taste for military enterprise must always pre- 
vail ; it is a necessary effect arising from an evi- 
dent cause, and it would have been next to a 
miracle if the habits and pursuits of a whole na- 
tion had been totally changed in a moment. 
External forms, whether political or religious, 
my be suddenly altered ; and on these subjects 
the public mind may, in a short space of time, 
undergo a very important change ; but the ha- 
bits and turn of mind of a number of indivi- 
duals in regard to their personal interest are not 
easily obliterated. 

These indeed are not easily annihilated, like 
ideas, and speculative opinions, existing in the 
mind and unconnected with the passions. The 
establishment of the Christian religion, the 
most important of all revolutions, has effaced 
from the minds of men the absurd ideas of 
paganism ; but yet the Christians of modern 
times have the same temporal interests, the 



72 

same passions and desires, as the pagans of an- 
tiquity, and too often employ the same means 
for their gratification. The Christian revolu- 
tion has effected a total change in metaphysical 
ideas, but has not annihilated ambition, nor ex- 
tinguished the spirit -of discord among men ; 
such an effect could therefore scarcely be ex- 
pected from the Anti-Christian revolution of 
France. A proper attention to the political si- 
tuation of that country, and the moral circum- 
stances and habits of the people, will scarcely 
authorise us to consider the tranquillity of Eu^ 
rope and the return of the golden age among 
the possible consequences of the French revolu- 
tion. 

Tliat great philosopher and orator Mr. Burke, 
whose acquaintance with history, and whose 
knowledge of mankind, enabled him to investi- 
gate the whole complicated system of the moral 
world, viewed with a prophetic eye the conse- 
quences of this extraordinary revolution. He 
examined its secret springs, its fundamental 
principles, and predicted its effects on the poli- 
tical systenr of Europe. Some, however, whose 
abilities WTre not inferior to those of Mr. 
Burke, nor perhaps to those of any ot :er per- 
son in anv ao-e or country, differed consider- 
ably from him in opinion; and consequently 
the verification of his predictions ought to be 
attributed ratlier to unforeseen events, than to 



73 



certainty of political foresight, in a combina- 
tion of circumstances too complex and intricate' 
for human penetration. Upon the whole, per- 
haps, Mr. Barkers conjectures have failed in as 
many respects as those of his opponents. Both 
sides of the question were supported by persons 
the most eminent for abilities and virtues that 
any age or nation could ever boast: but infal- 
libility is not the attribute of man. Mr. Burke 
himself could not foresee the aggrandizement of 
the power of France, and the ascendency she 
has gained over so many of the continental na- 
tions, in consequence of the revolution. These, 
as already observed, are events which have hap« 
pened contrary to every appearance on which 
political conjecture could be formed ; but he 
clearly perceived the tendency of the revolu- 
tion to agitate Europe with unexampled con- 
vulsions. Far from promising to the world the i 
cessation of discord and the extinction of the 
lust of conquest, he discovered the , seeds of 
ambition in the very commencement of the re- 
volution, and .perceived a systematically con- 
certed scheme for the purpose of subverting all 
the religious and political establishments of 
Europe, and laying the foundations of univer- 
sal monarchy. The system of infidelily, so 
long one of the most prominent features- of the 
-fevolution, now indeed appears to be in some 
measure set aside; but the avidity of conquest 



and aggrandizement seems to predominate with 
increased strength. 

The towering height to vrhich France has, by 
her arms and her menaces, attained on the conti- 
nent, seems, if we regard present appearances only, 
to threaten httle less than the eventual subjuga- 
tion of 11 Europe. There is, hovrever, one im- 
portant observation to be made on the history of, 
the human mind, a due attention to which will 
cause the prospe ct to appear less alarming. 

If we endeavour to search out the cause, of 
which the operation has given to France this 
dangerous ascendency, we shall find it not 
among those of a physical, but among those of 
a moral nature, ^\^e shall discover it to be no 
other than that extraordinary enthusiasm, which, 
at the commencement of the revolution, and for 
some years afterwards, so remarkably cha- 
racterized the French nation. This is the clue 
which alone can extricate the mind from the 
labyrinth of political and moral ph^enomena, in 
\vhich it would otherwise be bewildered, and of 
which the complexity would baffle every effort 
of speculation. By a due attention to tliis im- 
portant particular, we shall discover the impul- 
sive springs which have given to the pohtical 
machine a motion so singular and extraordinary. 
The resources of France were not greater than 
the}^ had been during the existence of the mo- 
narchy ; but the enthusiasm, which had seized 



75 



the nation, brought those resources into action 
with an energy iniparalleled at any former pe- 
riod. The armies of France were not better, 
but most certainly worse disciphned and worse 
organized, at the commencement of the war 
against the combiiied powers, than they had 
been during the reigns of Louis XIV. and 
Louis XV. ; nor could her commanders be sup- 
posed, in military skill and courage, to surpass 
Conde and Turenne, Luxembourg, Saxe, Bel- 
leisle, Brogho, and many others that might be 
mentioned, whose enterprises, notwithstanding 
their transcendent and universally acknowledged 
military talents, were never crowned with such 
brilliant and extraordinary success as those of 
the republican generals, although the latter had 
a far more formidable mass of enemies to con- 
tend with, than any of those who commanded 
the armies during the time of the monarchy. 
It is evident, that no physical cause existed, 
which could give to the armies of France a 
career of victory and conquest unexampled in 
the annals of the nation, and to the republic a 
political ascendency and domineering power, 
which the monarchy in its most flourishing pe- 
riods haxl never been able to obtain. No other 
cause can be assigned for the production of so 
singular an effect, than that enthusiasm which, 
at certain periods, has made so conspicuous a 
figure in the history of the human mind, and 



76 

in the annals of nations. The reign of enthu- 
siasm, however, is seldom long; its power is 
fluctuating and uncertain ; sometimes it is of 
very short duration. It arises from a certain 
combination of circumstances, and dies away, 
as the causes which produced it cease to ope- 
rate. The history of mankind affords us many 
instances of both national- and individual en- 
thusiasm, and shews that it has actuated diffe- 
rent nations at different times, and impercepti- 
bly disappeared. Neither its existence nor its 
effects have, in any nation whatever, been per- 
manent, although the consequences of its ope- 
ration have sometimes supported the greatness 
of a nation for a considerable length of time 
after the enthusiastic ardour and energy, which 
produces its exaltation, had subsided. The mi- 
litarv enthusiasm of the Babvlonians arose in 
the warhke and victorious reign of Nebuchad- 
nezzar; and although it appears to have expired 
with tlie life of tiiat conqueror, the conse- 
quences it had produced served to support the 
grandeur of the monarchy under his immediate 
successors ; but the Babylonians were no longer 
a warlike and conquering people. Their mar- 
tial spirit' having degenerated into luxurious ef- 
feminacy, their empire fell a prey to the Medes 
and Persians under the command of Cyrus. 
The mihtary genius of the Persians, like that of 
the Babylonians, degenerated ; and their wealthy, 



n 

populous, and once powerful empire became an 
easy conquest to a handful of Greeks and Ma- 
cedonians under Alexander. The military and 
patriotic enthusiasm of the Romans continued 
longer than that of any other nation, and the 
consequences it produced among them were 
more durable. The power, the wealth, and the 
mihtary discipline it had produced in the first 
ages of the republic, supported the Roman 
greatness long after the original cause had 
ceased to operate, or indeed to exist. But the 
conquests of the Mahometan caliphs exhibit the 
most complete specimen of the combined ope- 
rations of religious and mihtary enthusiasm 
that can be found in the history of mankind. 
After they had, before the expiration of the 
ninety-first year of the Hegira (the epoch of 
Mahomet's flight from Mecca to Medina), ex- 
tended their conquests from the Indus to the 
Atlantic, and made themselves masters of Spain 
and Portugal, which at that time had always 
been reckoned a province of Spain, they might 
have been expected to carry their arms much 
farther. It is said by some historians, that the 
Saracens of Spain had projected the conquest of 
all Europe. That enthusiastic ardour, which 
had till then animated them, began hov/ever to 
subside. The defeat, which they received from 
Charles Martel, broke their martial spirit; and 
Spain proved the boundary of their conquests. 



7S 

In perusing tlie annals of the world, we see 
that most nations have had their periods of pros- 
perity and adversity. Some have suddenly risen 
to a towering height of power and greatness, 
and almost as suddenly fallen; others have 
maintained their elevation during a considerable 
length of time. This difference in the fate of 
nations proceeds from combinations of circum- 
stances so complicated, as to admit of an end- 
less variety. These combinations it is often im- 
possible to develop ; their intricacy frequently 
sets at defiance all human investigation, and 
compels us to admire and adore the mysterious 
Providence of that supreme and universal Being, 
who directs and disposes all, and, by a wonder- 
ful and unseen chain of causes and effects, go- 
verns with an absolute control the world he has 
created. 

We are not to suppose the exorbitant power 
of France fixed upon a basis that cannot be 
moved. Uniform experience shews the fluctu- 
ating fate of nations, and forbids us to affix the 
idea of permanency to any degree whatever of 
human greatness. Other nations, we see, have 
had their periods of exaltation, and those fre- 
quently succeeded by periods of depression. 
We have seen the towerino- elevation of the 
house of Austria in the reign of Charles V. and 
the tremendous and menacing power of Spain 
in that of Philip II. Tlie latter part of the fif- 



?9 

teenth, and the beginning of the sixteenth cen- 
tury, constituted the enterprising and flourish- 
ing'^ age of Portugal. In that age, her disco- 
verers and conquerors carried her arms and her 
commerce round the coasts of Africa, Arabia, 
Persia, and India, into countries until then un- 
known to European geographers, and unex- 
plored by European navigators. There- was once 
a time when the Ottoman empire, although now 
rapidly declining and probably verging towards 
3ts dissolution, spread terror and consternation 
throughout Europe ; and the Turkish crescent 
seemed as formidable as the Roman eagles had 
once been. The present age exhibits all the 
nations just mentioned fallen from their former 
greatness, and sunk fur below the place they 
once occupied in the political scale. These are 
but a few of the instances of national vicissi- 
tudes, of which history, both ancient and mo- 
dern, furnishes so numerous an assemblage, and 
which it would here be both tedious and un- 
necessary to enumerate. The prosperity of some 
nations, like that of some individuals, has sud- 
denly shone out like a meteor, and the blaze 
has been as suddenly extinguished : the exalta- 
tion and decline of others have been gradual, 
sometimes almost imperceptible. It is impos- 
sible to trace, with any degree of accuracy, all 
that labyrinth of causes which have produced 
those effects, and given rise to the various poll- 



80 



tical and moral phaenomena which from time to 
time have made their appearance in the world. 
Some of the most conspicuous are easily disco- 
vered ; but there are always a number of colla- 
teral and co-operating causes of a more latent 
kind, which elude investigation, and lie beyond 
the researches not only of succeeding, but 
sometimes of contemporary politicians and his- 
torians. History transmits to posterity a sort 
of general information of the manner in Vvhich 
great and remarkable events were ushered into 
existence, and of the means employed for that 
purpose; but the history of the world neither 
is, nor ever can be, sufficiently accurate to de- 
vdop all that complicated tissue of circum- 
stances, all that concatenation of causes from 
which they originated. Whatever may be the 
remote causes of those great political revolu- 
tions which have at certain periods exalted dif- 
ferent nations to an extraordinary and unex- 
pected height of power, beyond what their 
former state, their existing circumstances, and 
tlieir resources, seemed to shew them able to 
reach ; it is, however, certain, that one very- 
conspicuous, immediate, and effective cause is 
that national enthusiam already mentioned, froin 
Avhatever antecedent cause it may have proceed- 
ed, or by whatever circumstances or considera- 
tions it may have been excited. This kind of 
enthusiasm has seldom been more remarkable in 



81 



its operation and consequences, than in the 
French revolution, and the subsequent transact 
tions of that nation. 

As this national enthusiasm has always had 
its fall as well as its rise ; as it has never been 
long in a fixed state, but often, as soon as it 
had burst out in its full meridian blaze, began 
immediately to verge towards its extinction, it 
is more than probable that French enthusiasm 
may soon subside, as that of otner nations has 
done ; and whenever this happens, France will 
not long remain in that formidable state in 
which she at present appears. The military en- 
thusiasm, which lately animated the French na- 
tion, seems to be already very much weakened, 
if not nearly extinguished. It may, indeed, yet 
exist in their armies, which have been so often 
crowned with victory and accustomed to plun- 
der • but a change of fortune may probably 
cause it to subside among the soldiery as well 
as among the people. It has, indeed, seldom 
been seen, that any great degree of military ar- 
dour has long continued in armies, when the 
spirit of the nation, from winch they were 
drawn, had sunk into a state of cltpression. 
The military skill and discipline of the Romans 
was, to the very last, supviur to that of the 
barbarians who subverteo. the er^pne; but as 
soon as their national spirit was broken and de- 
pressed, the extinction of that martial energy. 



B2 

which had for so many centuries animated the 
Roman legions, and rendered them invincible^ 
followed as a necessary consequence. It is im- 
possible that military enthusiasm should not 
exist in the armies of a nation, v/hen it consti- 
tutes the principal trait of the national charac- 
ter; and it is equally impossible that it should 
continue any long time among the soldiery, 
after the martial spirit of the nation is once ex- 
tino'uished. 

To the operation of this national enthusiasm 
the past successes of the republic must be 
ascribed, and to its continuance or its extinc- 
tion we must look forv/ard, in order to judge of 
its future aggrandizement or depression. This, 
like all other events, must be determined by 
eircumstances^; and these it is not possible to 
anticipate- The other powers of Europe may 
awake from their lethargy. Their jealousies and 
apprehensions may rouse them to arms against 
a predominating power, whose political and mi» 
litary preponderancy renders their independence 
and their very existence precarious ; and France 
may, perhaps, experience a check to her aggran- 
dizing career from quarters in w^hich she does 
not at present fear any opposition. The enthu- 
siasm of France is apparently subsiding, that of 
Great Britain is evidently rising ; the former is 
declining,, the latter is in the first stage of its 
vigour. It is impossible to foresee what revo- 



83 



lutions may take place in the national spirit in 
Austria, or perhaps in Prussia, and what changes 
a thousand unexpected occurrences may pro- 
duce in the political measures of those nations. 
It is even possible that some other countries, 
where such a change is still less to be expected, 
may shew resolution enough to seize some fa- 
vourable moment to assert their independence^ 
It has, indeed, unfortunately happened, that re- 
cent circumstances do not v/arrant us to expect 
that this will very soon be the case. \Ye have 
seen the depression, and sometimes the down- 
fal of nations as highly exalted as France ; and 
why may not that domineering power contri- 
bute to swell the catalogue ? 

Nothing within the range of political con- 
jecture is more probable, than that a few years 
of unsuccessful war w^ould render France unable 
to hold Italy, Switzerland, and Holland, in sub- 
jection, and to extend her domineering influence 
over Spain and Portugal. The final issue of the 
war with Great Britain will greatly contribute to 
determine the extent of her future influence on 
the continent. Some future war with Austria 
may perhaps have a very different issue from 
the two last. That power is yet formidable ; 
and should France be worsted in a continental 
war, she will soon lose her preponderancy in the 
scale of European politics. Spain and Portugal 
would then not liesitate to assert their rights ; 

G 2 



84 

and the Italians would not, perhaps, so patiently 
submit to the occupation of their ports, and the 
interruption of their trade by a foreign power. 
Potent confederacies may yet be formed ; and 
the imperial repubHc may receive a, check simi- 
lar to that which the overbearing monarchy of 
France experienced in the commencement of 
the last century from the triple alliance. What 
has happened may again happen, unless rendered 
impossible by a total change in physical or mo- 
ral circumstances. It is however evident, that 
none exist, which can render it impossible that 
France should fall from the elevation to whicli 
she has lately attained. 

The political constitution of France exposes^ 
her in a peculiar manner to those vicissitudes 
which, in a greater or less degree, are liable ta 
happen to every nation, and to every humau 
establishment. History informs us of the con- 
vulsions with which hereditary monarchies have 
sometimes been agitated, especially in cases of 
disputed succession ; convulsions which hav&- 
often shaken them to the centre, and not unfre- 
quently brought about their final dissolution. 
It is for this reason that, in Well-regulated mo- 
narchies, it has always been considered an ob- 
ject of the greatest importance to preserve the 
royal blood uncontaminated, and to keep the 
line of succession to the regal dignity as clear 
and distinct as possible. Experience has proved 



tills to be one of the most necessaiy regulations 
of monarchical government. It has, however^ 
been sometimes found inadequate to the pur- 
pose, and, in spite of every precaution, the 
jarring interests and rival claims of competitors 
have rendered ineffectual the most sagacious 
measures, and given rise to those intestine com- 
motions which have terminated in the ruin of 
the state. Many instances of this kind might 
be adduced ; and if this has frequently hap- 
pened in old monarchical governments^ Vv'hich, 
by setting bounds to the ambitious vievrs of 
factious individuals, are of all others the best 
•calculated for the preservation of internal tran- 
quilhty, what commotions may not be expected 
to arise in a government constituted like that 
of France, which being under a new dynasty 
leaves so much room for tlie birth of factions 
and the efforts of the ancient family. 

The French imperial republic is now the ex- 
press image of the empire ; or, as it was called 
by the Romans, the repubhc of Rome, in the 
form Vvhich it assumed in the dictatorship of 
Julius Ca3sar. and ever after that period pre- 
served. The office and dignity of the Emperor 
of France is equivalent to the office and dignity 
of the Roman emperors. France is now pre- 
cisely, what Rome then and ever after v^•as, a 
complete military monarchy. Every one is ac- 
ciuainted w'ith the violent concussions with 



86 



which the Roman empire was so frequently agi- 
tated, and which were almost wholly to be at- 
tributed to its constitutional system. Under 
the imperial government of Rome, the succes- 
sion was generally determined by military elec- 
tion^ although the ratification of the senate was 
comm-only required, and seldom refused, as that 
body was o:lad to retain a nominal authority, 
while the army was in possession of the real 
power. As the emperors owed their dignity to 
military election, they depended entirely on mi- 
litary support ; and as they received the purple 
from the soldierv, they could wear it no longer 
than while their conduct was agreeable to that 
body : for that reason vre find that they con- 
stantly studied, by liberal donations and every 
other means in their power, to conciliate the fa- 
vour of the military' order ; but as every military 
commander had the same, and sometimes a bet- 
ter opportunity of doing this than the reigning 
emperor, nothing was more commen than to 
see those sovereigns of the world precipitated 
fr®m their exalted station by the SRxne hands 
that had decorated them with the imperial pur- 
ple. A sy stem so loose, so dependent on mili- 
tary election and support, and so exposed to the 
effect of military caprice, afforded to the com- 
manders of armies an opportunity of supplant- 
ing the emperor in the affections of the sol- 
diery, and from the reign of Commodus to that 



87 

of Constantine, no less than ninety- two mili- 
tary commanders had, with various succesSj 
erected the standard of revolt. Those internal 
commotions very often rendered the empire a 
scene of anarchy and Woodshed ; and if any of 
the neighbouring nations had been as well- 
skilled in the art of war as the Romans, if any 
of them had been as formidable in respect of 
Rome, as some of the European states are in re- 
spect of France, it appears extremely probable 
that the colossal fabric of the Roman empire 
would have been much sooner overturned, and 
that its domineering power would not so long 
liave held in subjection the rest of mankind. 

In comparing the empire of modern France 
with that of ancient Rome, their similarity ap- 
pears evident and striking ; and it is more than 
possible, that the imperial government of France, 
which bears so near a resemblance to that of 
Rome, may be exposed to similar revolutions, 
although not perhaps during the reign of the 
present empena*, whose power rests on an ex- 
traordinary train of successes. If such should 
happen, and the case is far from improbable, it 
is easy to perceive that they must prove more 
disastrous to France, more fatal to her power, 
than those which so frequently agitated the Ro- 
man empire were to that vast political structure. 
Rome, in the midst of those scenes of anarchy 
which she so frequently exhibited, scarcely ever 
1 



88 



failed to present a formidable front to her fo- 
reign enemies. France, soon after the establish- 
ment of her republican government, exhibited 
a spectacle perfectly similar, and while she was 
a prey to internal faction and discord at home, 
saw herself triumphant abroad, and her arms aU 
most every where successful. In the French 
republic, this phsenomenon originated from that 
enthusiastic impulse which pervaded and ani- 
mated the people in the first moments of their 
imagined acquisition of liberty : in the Roman 
empire, it was owing to the superiority of Ro- 
man discipline. While the military commanders 
of Rome were contending for the purple, and 
her armies shedding their blood in the contest, 
a few detached legions were generally sufficient 
to repulse innumerable hosts of barbarians. 
The circumstances of the world are now totally 
changed. If the neighbouring nations had, in 
discipline and military skill, been equal, or 
nearly equal to the Romans, they would have 
more effectually profited by the intestine com- 
motions which so frequently agitated the em- 
pire, and have shaken off a yoke, of which they 
so long and so severely felt the galhng pressure. 
But France neither does, nor ever can, possess 
this singular advantage, which operated so pow- 
erfully in favour of the Romans. The art of 
war is now universally known among the Euro- 
peans. In this respect, France can claim but 



8Q 

Iktle pre-eminence. Most of the nations over 
whom she at present extends her influence, are 
equally as well skilled in the art of war as the 
French: if their discipline be relaxed, it may 
without much difficulty be restored ; and if the 
spirit and patriotism of those nations could 
once be roused, they possess resources sufficient 
to enable them to make siich exertions as might 
restore their independence. Although the gi- 
gantic power of France is at present so formid- 
able to all her neighbours, and wears an aspect 
so menacing to all Europe, yet if we make an 
accurate and impartial estimate of existing cir- 
cumstances, the foundation on which it rests 
will be found extremely precarious. 

To a nation which has been great and proud, 
and proud because it was great, a revolution in 
the national spirit, says Mr. Burke, is the most 
teri ble of all revolutions. That illustrious se- 
nator considered this remark as applicable, at 
that time, to England ; subsequent events, how- 
ever, happily discovered the impropriety of the 
application. There is, however, no doubt but 
it is or may be in its fullest extent applicable 
to France. Her greatness is owing to the 
sword : her power is founded on conquest, and 
supported by violence. To a power so founded 
and so supported, a depression of the national 
spirit must be peculiarly disastrous and fatal; 
and that revolution is probably fast approaching. 



90 

As the entlmsiasm of France has roused that 
of Great Britain, and called all her energies into 
exertion, the nature, the principle, and the 
founda,tion of that enthusiastic ardour which 
animates and pervades each of the two nations, 
will constitute an important and interesting 
subject of inquiry. 

The enthusiasm of the French nation was a 
natural effect of the revolution. The people, in 
the first moment of their frenzy imagining them- 
selves in the full possession of liberty, were im- 
mediately inspired with an enthusiastic ardour 
for preserving the new acquisition. The artful 
demagogues, who, under the pretence of esta- 
blishing the liberties of the people, aimed solely 
at their own aggrandizement, laid hold of this 
favourable opportunity, and rendered the pa- 
triotic spirit of the nation subservient to their 
own designs. The deluded people became an 
instrument in the hands of their leaders, and sa- 
crificed more than two millions of citizens, un- 
der the pretext of establishing the rights of man, 
which, among them, existed only in theory and 
in name; v/hile, by casting a glance across the 
Channel, they might have seen them existing in 
realit}^ and in practice, established upon the 
rnost solid foundation, and resting on the basis 
of experiment, flourishing in splendid tranquil- 
lity, and constituting a system of public and 
private felicity. This glorious spectacle Britain 



91 

then offered to their contemplation, and stili 
exhibits the same to the view of France and of 
all Europe. When the people of France look on 
their present state so very different from that 
flattering picture which their hopes and expec- 
tations had delineated, they will find little to 
support, and render permanent, that enthusiasm 
which has so strongly animated and so miserably 
deluded them. The enthusiasm of France rests 
therefore on an unstable foundation, while that 
of Great Britain is fixed on the immoveable 
basis of rational liberty, or equitable laws, and 
of individual security. 

Every Briton is conscious of his enjoyment of 
all the blessings that civil and political society 
can confer on individuals. He considers him- 
self a member of a vast political community, 
firmly united by an excellent system of laws, 
under a government prudent, beneficent, and 
energetic, with a patriotic monarch at its head ; 
a monarch who knows that his own interests 
and those of his subjects are inseparable, and 
who has no other wish than to stand or fall 
with his people ; a monarch, in fine, whose 
character, as well as his throne, is exalted 
above those of most of the princes celebrated 
in history, as much as the king of a free peo- 
ple is a more glorious title than that of the 
chief of a banditti or a ruler of slaves. He 
'-ces both his person and his property secured by 



Q2 

a political constitution, which atrofds equal pro- 
tection to the poor and the rich, to the peasant 
and the peer. If he peruse the histories of for- 
mer ages, or cast his eyes around him at the 
present day; if he examine the political systems 
of antiquity, or contemplate those of the 
modern world ; he cannot fail of returning 
thanks to Divine Providence for having placed 
him under the benio-n influence of the British 
constitution. Every Briton who reflects on his 
situation, is convinced that he is'in the actual 
and full possession of true liberty, of the real 
rights of man, while the people of France have 
bevviidered themselves in extravagant theories, 
amused themselves with names, and spilt oceans 
of blood in pursuit of a phantom. The enthu- 
siasm of Britain, which has for its object the 
conservation of all the blessings that can result 
from civihzed society, and are experimentally 
felt and enjoyed by every individual, originates 
in a permanent principle, and rests on a solid 
foundation; but that of France, founded on 
romantic speculation and extravagant expecta- 
tions, checked by repeated disappointments, 
possesses no principle of permanency. The en- 
thusiasm of Britain is a steady flame, while 
that of France may be compared to the sudden 
bursts of a volcano, violent indeed for a mo- 
ment, and often destructive, but seldom of long 
duration, 

3 



In the flush of expectation, the ideas and 
sentiments of men are very different from what 
they are found after experiencing disappoint- 
ment. In the first period of the revolution, 
the minds of the people of France, as it is 
usually the case in circumstances so interesting 
and so extraordinary, were filled with romantic 
id^as and extravagant expectations. These have 
not been, and indeed could not be realized. 
The armies, inspirited by the same enthusiasm 
which pervaded the whole nation, marched to 
death or to victory, and success wound up that 
enthusiasm to the highest pitch. The people, 
disappointed in their unreasonable and romantic 
expectations, are no longer inspired with the 
same revolutionary frenz}^ ; and probably some 
unsuccessful expeditions, or a few years of un- 
successful war, may extinguish the martial spirit 
of tlie army. How soon, or with what force 
these causes may operate, what may be the ex- 
tent of their effects, or how long the power 
which France has already acquired may support 
her predominancy on the Continent, it is im- 
possible to ascertain ; these things are yet con- 
cealed in the womb of futurity, and elude every 
research of rational conjecture. It is, how- 
ever, evident that France must yet for some 
time continue formidable, unless some import- 
ant revolution in her circumstances should take 
place which cannot be foreseen, but which is 
not inconsistent with probabihry» 



94 

The present existing circumstances of our 
great rival are the first objects which present 
themselves to the contemplation of an English- 
man. These more imperiously claim our atten- 
tion, and furnish surer grounds of calculation, 
than any supposed remote consequences of her 
aggrandized power, of which the anticipation 
can at the best be no more than loose conjec- 
ture, and every estimate uncertain. Among 
the immediate consequences of the French re- 
volution, we see that balance of power, for the 
maintaining of which oceans of blood hav^e 
been spilt, now broken and destroyed. The 
Italian states, reduced to an absolute depend* 
ence on France, are subservient to her interests, 
and obliged to comply with her requisitions. 
Holland, no more than an appendage to the new 
empire ; Spain in nearly the same predicament; 
Portugal continually exposed to the danger of 
aggression and subjugation, her independence, 
and even her very existence, entirely depending 
on the favour and support of England. The 
Netherlands, so long an object of contest be- 
tween Spain, Austria, and France, and the 
tlieatre of so many wars, are now annexed to 
the GaHic empire, the Rhine made its boundary, 
and Sv/itzerland, which once so nobly acquired, 
and so long maintained her independence, now 
Iielps to swell the catalogue of countries swal- 
lowed up in the political vortex of France, 



95 



Ever since the balance of power became an 
object of political attention in Europe, the Aus- 
trian Netherlands werec onsidered an import- 
ant barrier to both Holland and England. To 
the former they were a necessary bulwark 
against the aggression of France ; which, with- 
out the interposition of such a barrier, might 
at any time, whenever she pleased, have poured 
her armies into the United Provinces ; and it 
was ' always esteemed if not absolutely neces- 
sary, at least exceedingly conducive to the se- 
curity of England, that a maritime country, 
presenting a considerable extent of coast di- 
rectly opposite to her shores, shoukl not be 
under the dominion of her powerful rival, and 
natural enemy. This barrier, the preservation 
of which was once thought an object of the 
last importance to the security of England is now 
broken down, and those provinces under the 
denomination of the department of Belgium, 
now constitute an integral part of the French 
empire. The subjugation of Holland was the 
immediate, and indeed necessary consequence 
of that of the Belgic provinces; and the perpe- 
tual annexation of Belgium to France, seem? 
to involve as a consequence equally unavoidable 
the perpetual dependence of the Batavian re- 
public upon the French empire: thus, by her 
continental successes, France is enabled Uf 
command all the coast of the southern and 



90 

western part of the continent of Europe on the 
^lediterranean, and the ocean from the Adriatic 
to the Elbe. From this commanding situation 
she imperiously dictates to some of the conti- 
nental powers, paralizes others, and formidably 
confronts and menaces England. 

France aggrandized, in consequence of so 
gigantic a career of conquest, by the accession 
of new territories, and still more by the pre- 
ponderating influence v/hich she has gained on 
the continent, but most of all rendered formid- 
able to England by the command of so vast 
an extent of sea- coast, must now be considered 
as a far more powerful and more dangerous 
enemy than at any former period. It is there- 
fore requisite to inquire how far, and in wdiat 
manner, circumstances of so threatening an ap- 
pearance call upon Great Britain to stand upon 
her guard against the enterprises of so formida- 
ble a neighbour, and so powerful a rival; and 
this inquiry naturally leads into an investigation 
of the causes and probable consequences of the 
war in v/hich we are at present engaged. 

The renewal of hostilities between Great 
Britain and France, after so very short an inter- 
val of peace, may be traced to the very same 
source, and ascribed to the same original causes 
as the late important contest, which so long at- 
tracted the public attention, and of which the 
expediency vv'as so eminently the subject of po- 
litical discussion. 



97 

The exorbitant aggrandizement of France^ 
her visible ambition, and her dangerous pohtics, 
were the circumstances which, in both cases, 
imperiously called upon England to obviate the 
dangers which threatened her, and imposed on 
her the disagreeable necessity of having recourse 
to arms, as no alternative seemed to offer itself, 
but that of either immediately adopting bellige- 
rent measures, or standing exposed to future 
evils, \vhich, although a little more remote, 
were of an incalculable magnitude, and ap- 
peared unavoidable. 

It is a mistaken notion to suppose, that the 
possession of Malta was the object of the pre- 
sent war : the real cause of the dispute had a 
far deeper root. The British government had 
testified too great a desire for peace, to suffer its 
infringement on account of that subject. Its 
connection with matters of greater moment was 
the sole consideration that rendered the posses- 
sion of that island an object of any political 
impo^rtance. The views of the consular go- 
vernment had almost ever after the restoration 
of peace appeared unequivocally hostile to Great 
Britain, to her commerce, and her manufac- 
tures; and those Avho had the least knov/ledge 
of political affairs w^ere at no loss to discover 
that the peace could not be of any long dura- 
tion. As every one could perceive thi^ to be 
the case, it is evident that the vigilance of the 

H 



98 

British ministry had long been attentive to ex- 
isting circumstances ; and, after the sacrifices 
made to, procure the blessings of peace, could 
not view without regret the portentous aspect 
of thino-s which threatened soon to frustrate its 
benevolent intentions. Circumstanced in such 
a manner, it could not have been consistent 
with sound policy to give up a place so strong, 
both by art and nature, as the island of •Malta ; 
for it is to be considered, that the surrender 
of that island to the Knights, or to any power 
not able to retain the possession of it, would be, 
in effect, nothing less than giving it up to 
France ; as she would, in that case, be able ta 
seize on it at the moment of the commence- 
ment of hostilities, and it might cost Great 
Britain a great expense and effusion of blood 
to regain that important place. These conside- 
rations clearlv shew that the retention of Malta, 
when the hostile intentions of the republic were 
apparent, was a measure of strict propriety and 
sound policy. 

The British Government had evinced, in the 
most unequivocal manner, the sincerity of its 
pacific intentions by the surrender of the,great- 
est part of its conquests. Had it not been sin- 
cerely desirous of putting a stop to the effusion 
of blood, and of restoring to its subjects, and 
to Europe, the blessings of peace, it surely 
would not have made such sacrifices to obtain 



99 



it. Britain plainly shewed to the world, that 
she had not made war through the lust of con- 
quest : on the contrary, she gave up conquests 
of the greatest importance, and declared, hy 
facts of the most unequivocal nature, that ter- 
ritorial acquisitions had not been her object. It 
is evident, beyond a possibility of contradiction 
or doubt, that if the British government had 
not been sincere in its desire of a permanent 
peace, a place of such importance as the Cape 
of Good Hope would not have been given up, 
not to mention others of inferior note. If no 
other proof of the sincerity of Great Britain 
could be adduced, the surrender of so im.portant 
an acquisition would be sufficient to put the 
matter beyond dispute. 

The surrender of such important conquests^ 
which all the power of the enemy could not 
have wrested out of her hands, clearly shew 
that Britain would not, after so many and so 
great sacrifices, have involved herself in , a new 
war for the sake of Malta. Had the British go- 
vernment sought a pretext for a renewal of 
hostilities, it would certainly have retained pos- 
session of the rest of its conquests. It is there- 
fore evident that, after the surrender of such 
important possessioYis, good reasons had been 
discovered for proceeding no farther on that 
principle, and that the hostile aspect of France 
had made the retention of Malta a point of ne- 



ICO 



cessary precaution in so critical a state of affairs. 
The surrender of that island does not, however, 
appear to have been refused, but only post- 
poned, by the British government, until cir- 
cumstances should determine how far the mea- 
sure was consistent with sound policy ; not the 
policy of ambition^ but of self-preservation. 

If ambition had actuated the British govern- 
ment in recurring to belligerent measures so 
soon after the termination of a war, in which, 
amidst the disasters experienced by so many 
European nations, her arms had been crowned 
with signal successes, it would have been unne- 
cessary to proceed to any restitutions. Had the 
extension of its dominions been its object in 
the recommencement of hostihties, it is naturae 
to conclude that conquests would not have been 
given up which might so easily have been re- 
'tained. The cession of so many important ac- 
quisitions spoke the ardent desire of Great Bri- 
tain to restore tranquillity ; and the actual sur- 
render of the greatest part of them demonstrated 
the sincerity of her intentions. These are facts 
which prove more forcibly than any arguments, 
that it was the determination of government to 
execute ^rith punctuality the articles of the 
treaty of Amiens, and to leave nothing unper- 
formed that might contribute to the perm^inency 
of the pacific system, of which that treaty was 
supposed to be the 



While things were proceeding in this promis- 
ing manner, Great Britain discovered the exist- 
ence of a systematic hostiHty in the conduct of 
the republic, and the uniform tendency of its 
poUtics to the depression of this country, and 
the embarrassment and diminution of its com- 
merce. At the same time, government could 
not fail of observing the numerous forces the 
republic kept on foot, with the military con- 
scriptions for their augmentation, besides its 
persevering system of continental aggrandize- 
ment, which still continued to operate with un- 
abated vigour. The portentous aspect of this 
assemblage of circumstances could not escape 
the view of the British government ; nor could 
their visible tendency, and ultimate consequen- 
ces, elude its penetration. In such a situation, 
it was time to. suspend the operation of the 
plan of restitution, at least until some unequi- 
vocal marks of the pacific intentions of the con- 
sular cabinet could be obtained. 

The extent of the island of Malta, which, ac- 
cording to our best maps, and the reprcsenta^ 
tions of our best geographical writers, does not 
exceed twenty miles in Icngt)]^ and twelve 
miles in breadth, is not so considerable as to 
render it an acquisition of any great benefit to 
its possessors. The knights were not sup- 
ported in their greatness from the revenues 
vhich could arise from so small a territory. 



102 

They had very considerable possesiicns in the 
different Roman catholic countries of Europe, 
and by these their state and power were sup- 
ported. Malta of itself, indeed, is of little con- 
sideration ; the use it may be of to any other 
power is that alone which renders it an object 
of impoitance. Its convenient situation be- 
tween Sicily and Africa, and in the direct route 
from France to Egypt, renders it an advanta- 
geous pos^ in the hands of the republic, and 
pecuhariy favourable to its designs upon the 
latter country. Those designs are well known, 
and the object of them is no secret. The geo- 
graphical position, and topographical circum- 
stances of Egypt, point out that country as af- 
fording means of either attacking our posses- 
sions in India, annoying our com^merce in that 
quarter, or of dra^ving the oriental trade into a 
different channel. When these circumstances 
are dulv considered, can it be wondered that the 
British government, plainly perceiving from ti e 
hostile appearance of Fiance, that a new war 
could not long be avoided, should take the pru- 
dent measure of retaining a post which, if de- 
livered up, could hardly fail of being seized by 
the enemy as soon as hostilities should' com- 
mence, and rendered conducive to the success- 
ful execution of one of his most favourite pro- 
jects r Ought we not, indeed, to applaud the 
sagacity of administration in penetrating, and 



103 



timel}^ circLimventing his designs ? According 
to the appearance of things at that time, there 
is every reason to believe, that the evacuation of 
INIalta would not have preventec} the recom- 
mencement of hostih'ties ; if it had somewhat 
retarded, that event, it is all that can be sup- 
posed ; and that retardment would probably 
not have been any longer than until France had 
been better prepared for the contest Ambi- 
tion, however, infatuated her councils so far as 
to impel her to engage with precipitancy in a 
war which she might have avoided, and for an 
object unattainable by arm^s ; for if she could 
not by negotiation induce Great Britain to eva- 
cuate that island, it was highly improbable that 
she should be able to wrest it from her by con* 
quest. 

The prudent precaution, and sound policy of 
the British government, in making timely pre- 
parations to meet an evil that appeared unavoid- 
able, are therefore not less conspicuous, than the 
imprudent rashness of France in precipitating 
herself into a ruinous war, in expectation of an 
issue which may be classed among improbabili- 
ties of the first magnitude, 

In reviewing the circumstances which in- 
duced, M'^hich indeed imperiously called on Great 
Britain again to have recourse to hostilities, after 
so short an interval of peace, it is far, very far 
indeed from being our intention to blow tlie 



104 



tnimpct of war. It is impossible to view that 
scourge of the human species, without deploring 
its baleful effects, which the glory of victory, 
and the charms of conquest, cannot compensate. 
Defence is the only principle on which war can 
be lawfully undertaken ; and the preservation of 
our property, our liberty, our laws and consti- 
tution, are the only objects that can be justly 
esteemed a compensation for the evils it inflicts. 
This evidently appears, upon the most candid 
inquir}', to have been the only consideration 
that actuated the British government, in enter- 
ing on the present grand and important contest. 
Its past conduct, both in the conclusion of the 
peace, and subsequent to that transaction, has 
afforded ample proof that it had not carried on 
the war for the sake of aggrandizement by con- 
quest, and that extension of dominion was not 
the object of British politics. War, notwith- 
standing its frequency, is an evil which we 
cannot too earnestly deprecate, or too solicit- 
ously avoid. It originates in the depravity of 
human narore, and those who promote, encou- 
rage, or continue it, through ambition, or other 
unworthy or unjust motives, must expect to be 
called to a severe account by the Sovereign of 
the Universe, the common Father of all man- 
kind, who inspects the hearts of all men, who 
knows the motives of their conduct, and the 
ends at which they aim, as well as the means of 



105 



which they make use, and who will impute all 
the hves lost in unnecessary war, as so many 
murders to those whose inordinate ambition, or 
avarice, are the cause of hostilities, and who 
destroy their fellow mortals for their o\yu ho- 
nour or emolument. This consideration, which 
is certainly no mistake, ought at all times to be 
present to the minds of the rulers of the world. 
It would be a happy circumstance, if it ope- 
lated at this time on the minds of our enemies, 
who are in vain seeking our destruction, and 
the overthrow of a constitution which, if they 
would adopt it for a model, would confer upon 
them a degree of civil and political happiness, 
with v/hich they have never yet been acquainted. 
It is highly requisite that every inhabitant of 
this united kingdom should, at this momentous 
crisis, view things in their proper light, and be 
convinced that the war in Mdiich we are at pre- 
sent engaged, is a war, not of the government, 
but of the people ; not a quarrel of courts, but 
a national cause, in which his property, his li- 
berty, and the laws and constitution, which 
ensure to him the enjoyment of his domestic 
comforts, aie intimately concerned ; and on the 
issue of which their continuance or annihilation 
depends. 

One certain and unavoidable consequence of 
this, as of every other war, must be the aug- 
mentation of taxes. This is a circumstance 



wliicli is seldom agreeable : it ougJit not, ho\r- 
cver, to be thought a subject cf complaint, 
Avhen it is the effect of necessity. It is, per- 
haps, difficult to lind another couii try in Europe 
which is iess burdened with taxes, in proportion 
to its abihty of payment, for this must always 
be taken into consideration. The proportion 
between the sum paid for the support-of govern- 
ment, and that which remains behind in the 
pockets of the subjects, is the standard by 
which the weight of taxation ought to be esti- 
mated. The expenditure of Great Britain, as 
well as lier national debt, is nominally great ; 
but when compared vrith her income, it is, per- 
haps, less than that of most other nations of 
Europe. The nominal expenditure of a state is 
not, any more thau its nominal revenue, to be 
made in those cases a rule of computation. In 
this respect, the comparison to be made between 
nations, and between individuals, is exactly 
similar. If the whole annual income of a na- 
tion be no more than one hundred millions, 
and its public expenditure amount to ten mil 
lions, that nation is as heavily burdened as ano- 
ther which incurs an expenditure of twenty 
millions, but possesses an income of two hun- 
dred millions; in the same manner as an indivi- 
dual possessing one thousand pounds, and out 
of that sum paying only one hundred, finds his 
property diminished in the same proportion as 



107 

he who pays double that sum, but is, at the 
same time, master of a property twice as great. 
The comparison may be carried still farther: for 
the case admits of this additional remark, that 
those who possess but little find themselves 
more burdened, and their comforts more 
abridged by disbursements, which, numerically 
considered, appear trifling, than those who, 
posses$iug greater affluence, expend sums, not 
only nominally greater, but actually greater, in 
proportion to the amount of their property. 
These things, duly considered, wall lead us to 
conclude, that we are far from having any rea- 
son to complain. If, while we consider the seem- 
ing greatness of our national expenditure, we 
contemplate, at the same time, the inexhausti- 
ble sources of our wealth, and place, in a com- 
parative point of view, the agriculture, the ma 
nufactures, the extensive commerce, and vast 
trading capital of Great Britain, with the as- 
semblage of similar circumstances in most other 
countries, we shall readily perceive that, al- 
though our taxes may be nominally higher, 
they are really lower than those of almost every 
other nation ; and if we take into the account 
the civil and political happiness which our ex- 
cellent constitution affords us, it will appear 
evident, beyond a possibility of doubt, that 
the subjects of Great Britain, especially the 
lower classes; are more lightly burdened than 



108 

tliose of, perhaps, any country in Europe. 
These are not merely arguments of speculation : 
they are corroborated by the observations of all 
v/ho have travelled on the continent; but, if 
they do not appear sufficiently convincing, let 
every subject of this country ask himself, whe- 
ther it would not be preferable to make a sacrifice 
of half of his property, rather than to suffer 
Great Britain to become a province of France ? 
Common sense will suggest the answer, Avhich 
will undoubtedly be given without hesitation. 
The necessary sacrifices ouo-ht to be made with- 
out reluctance, by every Briton who loves his 
country ; and there is no doubt but the British 
government, which has already so unequivo- 
cally manifested its love of peace, v/ill take the 
necessary measures for procuring that blessing, 
as soon as it can be done v/ith a prospect of na- 
tional security. 

If France did not exhaust her resources by 
ambitious projects of aggrandizement ; if, con- 
tented with her fertile and extensive territories, 
she could resolve to renounce her inordinate de- 
sire of power and extensive sway; if she would 
rest satisfied v/ith the advantages which nature 
has profusely bestowed upon her; if her rulers 
would respect the rights of mankind in reality, 
as well as in pretence, her subjects might he 
classed among the, happiest of mankind. Bless- 
ed with a fertile soil and genial climate, they 



log 

would have nothing to do but to improve those 
advantages to their own happiness. But, to her 
own misfortune, and that of Europe, her exor- 
bitant power leads her to views of still greater 
aggrandizement. A military government, and 
a military taste, seem to be established in that 
country ; a circumstance vrhich is far from hold- 
ing out a prospect of tranquilHty to Europe. 
France appears to proceed on the same plan as 
Rome formerly did, and to adopt the same mea- 
sures for its accomplishment When Rome was 
carrying her victorious arms from one country 
to another, subduing nation after nation, and 
adding conquest to conquest, she clearly saw. 
that while Carthage flourished by commerce, 
she would rival her in power, prove an eternal 
obstacle to her aggrandizement, and frustrate 
all her plans of universal empire. Having at 
last, after a contest which, including some in- 
tervals of peace, continued one hundred and 
eighteen years, annihilated her great rival ; 
Rome found no farther impediment in the exe- 
cution of her ambitious projects. France sees 
in Great Britain the same rival of her power, 
the same obstacle to her pursuits, Avhich Rome 
saw in Cliarthage ; and she is not ignorant that, 
in the event of the subjugation of this country, 
she would draw the same advantages from the 
conquest, as Rome did from the extinction of 
that enemy. With the vast accession of 



lia 



strength which the subjugation of this country 
Avoulcl bring to her ah'eady enormous power; 
with the wealth and the navy of Great Britain 
at her disposal, France would find no difficulty 
in carrying her system of conquest to whatever 
extent she pleased. None but herself alone 
would be able to set bounds to the extension of 
her dominions : she would consequently engross 
all the power of the old continent, and in a 
great measure monopolize the commerce and 
wealth of the world. 

The advantages which France would derive 
from the conquest of Britain, and the junction 
of the naval force of this country with her own 
military strength, being so obvious, and of 
such unparalleled magnitude, it is no wonder 
that her emperor should form the vast design. 
The project is consistent with his enterprising 
character ; and its success would be the con- 
summation of his great plan. The conquest of 
Britain would place the name of Buonaparte 
above the names of Alexander and C^sar, and 
ail the heroes of ancient and modern times. 

The most adventurous projector must, how- 
ever, be well aware that the conquest of a 
country possessing an insular situation, and co- 
vering the surrounding seas, with a naval force 
beyond comparison superior to any which the 
enemy can ever display upon that element, is 
an enterprise almost too arduous to be admitted 



ill 



into political speculation, and certainly too dif- 
ficult to be attempted, except by a rash and des- 
perate enemy, who is determined to hazard 
every tiling, and to sacrifice fleets and armies 
in an expedition which cannot promise any 
other than an unsuccessful issue. This consi- 
deration does not, however, promise any secu- 
rity to England against the attempt, and there- 
fore ought not to throw her ofl* her guard. 
The French government is now reduced to the 
necessity of taking decisive measures, and m.ak- 
ing some grand attempt. Its fleets are not able 
to miCet those of Great Britain on the ocean, or 
of attempting any distant expedition. No at- 
tempt can therefore be meditated against any of 
our distant possessions v/ith the least probability 
of ultimate success. That is so far from being 
the case, that France is wholly uncapable of 
protecting her own settlements, which must fall 
whenever Great Britain shall deem it expedient to 
take possession of them. If the fleets of France 
could escape the vigilance of our cruizers, and 
sail on some distant expedition against any of 
our colonies; if its armaments, after being so 
fortunate, should even be so far successful as to 
capture any of our possessions ia the East or 
West, it is evident that such conquests could 
not be retained, while Great Britain, mistress of 
the seas, would be able, whenever she pleased, 
to send out her forces without any hazard of 



112 



interruption, and to expel the enemy from his 
new acquisitions. 

This inabihty of France to carry on a naval 
war, or to attack our distant possessions, is far 
from ensuring us against her attempts at home ; 
on the contrary, it imposes on her the necessity 
of making some attack on these kingdoms, 
however desperate the enterprise may appear, 
and however ruinous may be its consequences. 
Some may, perhaps, endeavour to persuade 
themsehTs that nothing of the kind will ever 
be attempted ; but this is a dangerous persua- 
sion, tending to throw the nation off its guard ; 
and, if it was universal, would be the means of 
effecting its ruin : but it is an animating consi- 
deration, that we have a government which has 
already given demonstrative proofs of its vigi- 
lance, and shcw^n itself incapable of being lul- 
led into a careless security. 

It may be laid down as an unerring maxim in 
politics, as well as in any other affairs of human 
life, that to slight danger is to invite it, and 
that the supposition of its distance facili- 
tates its approach. An attempt to invade this 
country is only probable ; but we ought to be 
[aepared for the event, as if it was absolutely 
certain. It is more than probable that the pro- 
ject will, by the vigilance and bravery of our 
naval guardians, be frustrated in the commence- 
ment of its execution, and that the enemy will 



113 



never reacli our coasts with any such force as 
can endanger our national safety, or materially 
prejudice our affairs ; but this expectation, 
pleasing and probable as it is, is not to be relied 
on. The nation ought always to be in the same 
state of preparation as if the invading army 
was already landed in its full force upon our 
shores. Such, indeed, is the plan which the 
prudence of government has adopted, well 
knowing, that the most sanguine expectation. 
2nay prove fallacious, and that the surest me- 
thod of repelUng danger, is to be prepared to 
meet it in its fullest extent. 

If the French emperor never attempt to carry 
his menaces into execution, as some suppose he 
will not, the cause of his forbearance will be 
no other than his finding the scheme rendered 
impracticable by the vigilance of the British go- 
vernment. It is, indeed, to be ascribed to the 
prudent and timely precautions of administration 
that we at this moment enjoy tranquillity and 
safety, and that we have not the mortificatioii 
of seeing the enemy already in the heart of our 
country, which would, no doubt, before this 
time, have been the case, had his visit not beea 
deferred on account of the measures taken for 
liis reception. If there be any method which 
can prevent the threatened evil, it is that of be« 
ing in a constant state of preparation to meet 
iU approach, 

X 



114 



The national spirit has eminently seconded 
the prudent measures of the government ; and 
in no period of British history has it ever ap* 
peared in so grand and imposing a point of view. 
The volunteering system is undoubtedly the 
most sagacious and the best concerted plan of 
national defence ever struck out by any govern- 
ment ; and the ardour with which it has been 
adopted in every part of the country, affords a 
grand display of British courage and patriotism. 
The whole svstem involves numberless advan- 
tages of the greatest magnitude. It exhibits an 
unequivocal proof of the attachment of Britons^ 
to the constitution of their country. It extin- 
guishes the hopes of such as may be disaffected, 
and annihilates the expectations which they 
might form of rising on the ruins of their coun- 
try. The greatest part of those, whose political 
principles liad been contaminated by the artful 
insinuations of the apostles of sedition, have 
awakened from their error, and the illusory 
dreams, which had once bewildered their minds, 
are dissipated ; but it would argue the grossest 
ignorance of the moral world to suppose that 
we have no disaffected persons in the country. 
Some such there certainly are in this, and in 
every country; and such there undoubtedly 
would be if public affairs were conducted by an 
administration of angels. As there are always 
some persons of this description, it must be 



115 



highly satisfactory to every one who loves his 
sovereign and his country, to see their views 
frustrated, and their hopes extinguished, hy the 
presence of a numerous and respectable body of 
armed subjects, ready to defend the constitu- 
tion, and support the government of their coun- 
try with equal zeal against foreign or domestic 
enemies. 

It is indeed to be presumed, it may even be 
considered as an indisputable fact, that the num- 
ber of the disaffected in this kingdom is at pre- 
sent very small, and composed of persons of 
little influence and respectabihty. The oppor- 
tunity which France has afforded of observing 
the baleful effects of revolutionary principles, 
has opened the eyes of all thinking persons in 
this country, dispersed the illusions of visionary 
theories, and made the people sensible of the 
blessings they enjoy under a system of govern- 
ment founded on the basis of liberty, and com* 
pleted by the continued exertions of the accu- 
mulated wisdom and experience of successive 
ages. In times of public danger, it is, how- 
ever, impossible to calculate the mischiefs which 
may sometimes origrnate from causes that seem 
the most despicable and insignificant ; and no 
better means of exti nguishing any sparks of se- 
dition yet remaining can be devised, than a for- 
midable army of citizens, voluntarily associated 

I ^ 



no 

for the defence of their countn'. their lavrs, and 
their government. 

The defence of those grand objects of na- 
tional concern against the aggression of a fo- 
reign enemy, was the consideration that roused 
the spirit of the yeomanry of this nation, and 
gave birth :o the volunteer system ; the noblest^ 
specimen of national courage and patriotism 
fr ^r age or country has ever exhibited. The 
h ;::..c^ of Greece and Rome afford singular 
and brilliant instances of heroism and patriotic 
zeal ; b;ir rV.e i:j:5*: : : . 2ges of Greek and 

Eon:an patriotism. :jing similar or 

equal to the scene ^vuIc^i Gizui Britain at this 
moment disolavs. An armv consistins: of vast 
numbers of cisciplined citizens, of property and 
respectability, engaged in the various branches 
of agriculture and commerce, and many of 
them of a stiU more elevated rank, who have 
joined the art of war to the employments of 
peace, taken up arras, and voluntarily offered 
themselves to hght the battles of their country, 
is a spectacle never before exhibited on the 
theatre of the world ; a new phjEnomenoq, which 
Britain has had the peculiar honour of pro- 
ducing. Such an association of armed patriots* 
cannot fail of exciting serious reflections in the 
mind of the enemy. Such a spectacle must 
make the probable consequences of his medi- 



117 

tated invasion appear in a very diiferent light 
from that in which they had, at the first, pre- 
sented themselves to his contemplation. 

Should the new emperor, however, persist in 
his design, and not suffer himself to be moved, 
•by any consideration, from carrying, or at least 
attempting to carry his desperate project into 
execution, Britain can have little to fear from 
the event, armed as she is at every point. With 
such a decided superiority at sea, and such an 
army of brave defenders at home, it is next to 
impossible that the most formidable efforts of 
the enemy can make any impression. Every 
port blockaded, and the British fleets in every 
quarter riding triumphant, ready to annihilate 
the invading flotilla as soon as ever it leaves its 
own shores, and an irresistible armed force pre- 
pared to overwhelm the invaders at the moment 
of disembarkation, if they should happen to 
escape the vigilance of the navy, form a com- 
bination of obstacles too great to be surmounted 
by any exertion of mihtary talents, even when ♦ 
seconded and invigorated by the most desperate 
resolutiou. 

As the two nations are at present circumstan- 
ced, in respect to naval strength, the project of 
invasion requires, in order to make the attempt 
with any probabihty of success, a particular 
combination of favourable incidents, such as is 
seldom experienced. For this purpose, it is ab- 



118 



solately necessary that the state of the weather 
he such as to obhge our blockading squadrons 
to leave their stations. The whole, or the 
greater part of the invading army, must be at 
that moment readv to embark, with its ammu- 
nition, baggage, &c. The whole flotilla must 
at the same time be ready to sail ; nothing must 
be wanting; all must be in readiness at the fa- 
vourable moment. That, however, is not all. 
The state of the winds and weather must conti- 
nue such as to prevent our fleets from resuming 
their stations, or getting out to sea, until the 
enemy has had sufficient time to embark his ar- 
my, cross the sea, and effect a landing. Unless 
all these circumstances coincide in favour of his 
enterprize, he cannot make the attempt with 
the least probabihty of success. Such a coinci- 
dence, however, would be somewhat extraordi- 
nary, and is very seldom to be met with ; and 
the failure of a single circumstance of the criti- 
cal combination, would be sufficient to retard 
and embarrass the enterprise, or, perhaps, to 
entirely frustrate the design ; for so long as our 
blockading fleets are able to keep their stations, 
the invading flotilla will be prevented from 
coming out of port: and if the storms, which 
may possibly interrupt the blockade, as has al- 
ready been the case, should afford an opportu- 
nity of sailing, and throw the armament in the 
way of the British fleets, before it can reach the 



il9 

place of destination, its destruction must be the 
inevitable consequence. 

A plan of such magnitude and extent as the 
meditated invasion must, at all times, and in 
every possible combination of circumstances, in- 
volve a multiplicity of embarrassing manoeuvres. 
In the present situation of things, every parti- 
cular existing circumstance announces it to be 
superlatively difficult and perilous. The obstacles 
placed in the v/ay of its execution, appear little 
less than absolutely insurmountable ; and the 
existence of such a coincidence as v/ould be re- 
quisite to its success, may be ranked in the first 
class of improbabilities. If we take a distinct 
and accurate view of our national circum- 
stances, and make a just estimate of our re- 
sources and means of protection, we shall find 
the most solid grounds to hope that we shall, 
in spite of the menaces of the enemy, enjoy se- 
curity and tranquillity in this favoured island, 
without experiencing the necessity of engaging 
the enemy by land in our own country; and 
that the invading army will, whenever the at- 
tempt is made, either be entirely exterminated 
before it can efiecv a landing, or at least be able 
to land so small a number of forces as can give 
very little further trouble than that of disposing 
of them as prisoners. 

If, however, we should suppose the event to 
happen contrary to every expectation which 



120 



existing appearances authorise us to form, if 
we imagine the very worst that can happen, and 
figure to ourselves the invading army ah'eady ' 
landed on our shores, with all its ammunition, 
&c. and in complete equipment for a campaign ; 
is the state of the nation, on that account, to 
be esteemed desperate ? Let us hope not. This 
is a case which has happened in many countries. 
It is not absolutely impossible that it may hap- 
pen in ours ; but we have the strongest reasons 
to hope that it will not ; for, however possible 
the case may be, all existing circumstances, as 
every one may observe, fully authorize us to 
consider it extremely improbable, and fahing 
at the least very little short of impossibility. 
In the worst case, however, that is possible, 
the event cannot be in the-least doubtful. The 
invasion, if carried into full execution, could 
not terminate otherwise than in the destruction 
or capture of the invading army. 

The Greeks, when invaded by Xerxes, had, 
all circumstances considered, a force to con^ 
tend with beyond all comparison more formid- 
able than any wdiich France can ever pour into 
this country. The Persian a^ny was almost in- 
numerable, and to an effeminate or unwarlike 
people w^ould have been absolutely irresistible. 
This formidable host, however, saw its progress 
checked by a mere handful of Spartans at the 
defile of Thermopilae. After t-he naval arma^ 



121 



ment of the invaders had experienced the same 
destructive effects of Grecian valour, the Per- 
sian monarch, v/ith the main hody of his army, 
was glad to retreat over the Hellespont into 
Asia ; and the troops which he left to carry on 
the war against the Greeks were soon captured 
or destroyed. The danger to vvhich Britain 
might be exposed from a French invasion, even 
supposing the whole army destined for the ex- 
pedition already landed^ would not bear any 
proportion to that of the Greeks from the tre- 
mendous armament of Xerxes. They were in- 
vaded by an enemy whose numbers at the first 
bore down all opposition, and whose approach 
it was impossible to prevent. They saw their 
country almost covered with the countless mul- 
titudes of armed foes ; and nothing could pre- 
vent the hostile army from receiving reinforce- 
ments on every occasion from Asia. The inva- 
ders possessed immense resources of every kind. 
The vast regions of Asia could furnish conti- 
nual supplies, not only of troops, but of pro* 
visions, and every other article requisite for 
carrying on the war with every imaginable ad- 
vantage. In a word, the resources of the Per- 
sians appeared inexhaustible, while those of the 
Greeks were consumed, destroyed, or inter- 
cepted, by the invading army, Greece resem- 
bled a city closely besieged, and some of its 
principal provinces exhibited the appearance of 



122 



a town taken by storm and given up to pillasrc. 
External circumstances all concurred to make 
their case appear hopeless, and their misfortunes 
without remedy. Their resources were wholly 
in themselves. Their courage and patriotic 
spirit alone supported their sinking country, 
and enabled them to drive out the innumerable 
hosts of Persian invaders. England stands upon 
far more advantageous ground in her grand 
contest with France, than Greece did at that 
time in respect of Persia. ]f the Helles- 
pont had been as wide as ihe British Channel, 
and the sovereignty of the sea3 as indisputably 
in the possession of the Greeks as it is now in 
that of Great Britain, or if Greece could have 
in conjunction with these advantages exhibited 
the formidable and unexampled spectacle of 
above 360,000 citizens voluntarily devoting them- 
selves to the defence of their countPk', that peo- 
ple would have regarded the prodigious arma- 
ment of the Persians rather as an object of ri- 
dicule than of alarm. 

If we could even suppose the most singular 
concurrence of fortuitous incident in favour of 
the enemy, and figure to ourselves the most 
powerful aud numerous army the French can 
possibly transport hither, already encamped on 
our shores, with all their artillery, baggage, 
provisions, and evTry thing requisite for carry- 
ing on the war, even in this case, the very 



123 



worst that can be supposed, the British army 
would have all the advantages that a local know- 
ledge of the country could give, besides the 
support of a friendly people, a whole nation of 
relatives, neighbours, and countrymen, united 
in one common cause, and stimulated by the 
same interests. Successive levies and associ- 
ations of armed men, squadron after squadron, 
and battalion after battahon, would continually 
bring a fresh accession of strength to the de- 
fensive army, while the invaders would be ha- 
rassed and annoyed on every side. England is 
a country which, although not mountainous or 
woody, is not destitute of advantageous posts, 
of which the defenders would know how to 
make use. Of these the invaders could not ac- 
quire a competent knowledge otherwise than by 
reconnoitring, and the parties sent out for that 
purpose might easily be cut off in the interior 
of a hostile country, and in the midst of a 
people determined to stop the advances of the 
enemy. The native army would have all the ad* 
vantas^es which the most exact local knowledge 
of the country could give. In the British army, 
collected from all the d liferent parts of the 
kingdom, men would be found who are perfectly 
acquainted with every eminence and every val- 
ley, every river, brook, and rividet, every 
wood, and marsh, every highway, and every 
by-road, in every particular district tlirough- 



124 



mit the whole country. The advantages result- 
ing fi'oin so perfect a knowledge of local cir- 
cumstances are incalculable, and could not fail 
of giving, in this respect, a decided superiority 
to the native army, and of embarrassing the 
operations of the enemy, who could not by 
any means become so fully acquainted with 
every topographical particular. Another cir- 
cumstance of still greater importance, and 
which must eventually prove fatal to the in- 
vaders, merits a still more particular consider- 
ation. They would find it extremely difficult to 
reinforce their army. Should a fortuitous con- 
currence of circumstances, contrary to every ex- 
isting appearance, enable them, at some particu- 
lar juncture, to land any considerable body of 
men, it would be unreasonable to suppose, that 
the same critical combination would a second 
time take place. The invaders, shut up in a hos- 
tile country, and all communication with their 
€wn cut off by our fleets, v/ouid find it not only 
difiicult, but, according to every probability of 
rational conjecture, absolutely impossible to pro- 
cure reinforcements. In such a situation, vic- 
tory itself must soon diminish their numbers, 
and eventually effect their extirj)ation. Their 
provisions .would be exhausted, and their sup- 
plies every where intercepted, while the defen- 
sive army v/ould be abundantly furnished with- 
out any great difficulty ; for, excepting th^ 



m 

part immediately attacked, the operations of 
agriculture would not be materially impeded. 
There would be left, in every part of the king- 
dom, a number of hands sufficient for the culti- 
vation of the soil. Great Britain has at present 
an armed force, fully capable of exterminating 
any army the enemy can possibly bring over ; 
it may, indeed, be confidently hoped, that the 
British volunteers, militia, &c. will be far more 
than sufficient for that purpose. If that be the 
case, which scarcely admits of a doubt, there is 
no appearance that the levy en ?72cme would be 
necessary, and agriculture would consequently 
be less interrupted than some miglit expect. In- 
deed, when we consider the number of persons 
who, although tolerably active in their respec- 
tive employments, are yet totally disqualified 
for a mihtary life, it seems that the iety en masse 
could not be of any great service; as such enor- 
mous multitudes, of which one half would never 
be effective, would rather bring an incumbrance 
than additional strength to disciplined troops. 
In the greatest emergency, the forces already 
on foot might be effectually recruited by ballot 
from the first and second classes. It will, how- 
ever, be easily perceived, that the worst cases 
that can happen are here supposed. Every vi- 
sible appearance authorises a confident hope that 
these measures will not be found necessary, and 
that the circumstances here brought under exa- 



126 

niination exist only in supposition, and will 
never have any existence in reality. 

One very important consideration relative to 
the inevitable consequences of an invasion and 
conquest of this kingdom, if the enemy could 
accomplish that project, ought in a particular 
manner to fasten on the minds of the lower or- 
ders of the people, and stimulate them to sup- 
port their excellent constitution and govern- 
ment equally against foreign aggression and re- 
volutionary innovation, which are, in an equal 
clegree, hostile to their social blessings and do- 
mestic comforts. It has long been an opinion 
among people of this description, that the great 
and opulent would be the only persons who 
would feel the pressure of the calamity, and that 
the poor, having nothing to lose, could not feel 
much alteration in their circumstances. This is 
well known to have been, some years ago, a 
prevailing opinion among that class of people. 
No person, indeed, who then had the opportu- 
nity of hearing their conversations, could doubt 
of their sentiments. Good sense has, hovrever, 
of late so far prevailed over the false reasonings 
of ill designing persons, that this opinion has 
considerably lost ground ; but although it is 
much less prevalent than at the time alluded to, 
it is not yet wholly obliterated. The notion, 
indeed, is so naturally the offspring of ignorance, 
and want of thought, that there is no wonder it 



127 



should take fast hold on minds unaccustomed 
to reflection. It cannot indeed originate in any 
Qther principle than a profound ignorance of the 
mechanism of society, and of the connection 
between causes and consequences. The lower 
orders, whether manufacturers, mechanics, or 
husbandmen, ought to consider that they are 
the people who would in general sufler the 
soonest, and the most severely; and that where 
a great property exists a great deal might be 
lost, and yet out of the wreck of an ample for- 
tune something might be preservecl, which might 
place the possessors above that pining want 
which the lower classes must feel when trade is 
annihilated, and employment ceases. In the 
confusion and despondency that must for a con- 
.-iderable time prevail in a conquered countr}^, 
no business but such as is absolutely necessary 
would be transacted, and that would be carried 
on in a parsimonious manner and on a con- 
tracted scale. The spirit of commercial specu- 
lation and agricultural improvement would be 
extinguished, and the employment and income 
of the poor would consequently be diminislied 
in a proportion difficult to calculate. That the 
poor in a country like this have nothing to lose 
is an egregious error, which a very little consi- 
deration would rectify. They have the cer- 
tainty of employment and reward to lose. They 
are also exposed to the loss of that sure support 



12S 

in sickness and age, the benefit of the poor lawsj 
which ensure subsistence to every family and 
every individual. The labouring poor of this 
country would, in the event of its subjugation, 
Starve for want of employment; and it would 
be absurd to suppose that the victors would, in 
the bustle of conquest and the unsettled state of 
affairs, have the leisure to attend to the wants 
of the sufferers. They would, at least for a 
considerable time, have more important regula- 
tions to make, and more weighty concerns to 
occupy their attention. Such would be the ne- 
cessary consequences of a revolution, or a con- 
quest by a foreign enemy. This important con- 
sideration ought to be indelibly impressed on 
the minds of the inhabitants of this country, 
that the downfal of the great and opulent, from 
whatever cause it might happen, could not fail 
of involving, as a necessary consequence, the 
certain ruin and irremediable distress of the 
lower orders of the people, 

I am, Sir, 

Yours, &c. 



J. BIGLAND. 



LETTER IIL 

DEAR SIRj 

You will readily perceive that, of, all tile 
measures which France, in her present circum- 
stances, could have adopted, the war she has 
undertaken against Great Britain is the least 
consistent with sound policy. She has much 
more to lose, than she can possibly gain by the 
most successful issue, which any existing ap- 
pearances could authorise her to expect. 

Although her successes in the late continental 
war had proved extremely conducive to the ag- 
grandizement of her power, and to the extensiort 
of her territorial possesions, as well as her in- 
fluence, that war had, nevertheless, annihilated 
her marine, as well as her foreign trade, Her 
colonies were in a state of insurrection, and en- 
tirely useless to the mother-country. The re- 
establishment of order in her colonies, and the 
restoration of her com.merce, were measures ab- 
solutely necessary, in order to put her navy 
upon a respectable footing, without which, she 
could never have any rational hopes of success 
in a war with England. By prematurely en- 
gaging in hostilities with a power capable pf 



130 

annihilating the feeble remains of her naval 
force, she has entirely abandoned those desirable 
objects, and deprived herself of all those advan- 
tages which might, and certainly would, have 
accrued to her from the continuance of peace, 
and which, in her situation, wTre peculiarly ne- 
cessary to her welfare. Her colonies must now 
be inevitably lost, and some of the most valu- 
able branches^ of her commerce for ever anni- 
hilated. 

If we take a view of the importance of the 
colonies lately possessed by France, and consi- 
der the apparent certainty of their being con- 
quered by Great Rritain, we shall be able to 
make some estimate of the loss which the former 
is likely to sustain by the war in which she has 
so rashly engaged ; a loss that no advantage she 
can reasonably expect, will ever be able to com- 
pensate. N. L'Abb6 Raynal has given the fol- 
lowing statement of the value of the imports of 
France from her colonies, viz. 

From St. Domingo, - 5,913,424 L. 

Cayenne, - - 20,354 

> Martinique, - 700,654 

Guadaloupe, - 592,307 

Tofal - - - 7,226,739 L^ 
Consumed in France, 2, 1 99, 740 



F-xported from France, 5,026,99.9 L^ Sterlv 



135 



The same author gives also the following 
statement of the population of that part of St 
Domingo, then possessed by the French : 
Whites, - - - 32,050 
MulattoeS; and free Negroes, 6,036 
Slaves, - - - 300,000 

Total - . - - - 338,086 
Those statements are calculated for A. D. 
l775, since which considerable improvements 
had undoubtedly been made. Another state- 
ment, made in the year 1788, fixes the popula- 
tion at 27,717 whites, 21,808 free people of co- 
lour, and 405,528 slaves; its trade employed 
580 vessels, carrying the aggregate burden of 
18^,679 tons; the imports into the island 
amounted to twelve millions of dollars, of which 
more than the value of eight millions consisted 
of the manufactured goods of France, and the 
rest w^as made up of French produce. The 
Spanish merchants exported in French goods;, 
or money, 1,400,000 dollars ; and ninety-eight 
French ships, carrying 40,130 tons, imported 
annually 26,506 negroes, that sold, on an ave- 
rage, for eight millions of dollars* 

At the conclusion of the late war, the Spanish 
part of the island was also ceded to France; 
and if the preceding estimates of the population, 
trade, and wealth of that part which was pre- 
viously possessed hgr the French^ b^ in any rea,-* 



132 



sonaBle degree correct, they -must be macit 
augmented, in order to exhibit a just statement 
of those matters as they must have stood, after, 
the French had acquired the sovereignty of the 
whole of that large and valuable island, which^ 
extending from the 17th to the 21st degree N= 
lat. and from the 67th to the 74th degree W. 
long, is not less than 450 miles in length, and 
loO miles in breadth. This v-aluable colony is 
now irretrievably lost. If the peace had conti- 
nued, there is no doirbt but the revolted ne- 
groes would, at last, ha-ve been subdued, al- 
though the contest might, probably, have been 
long and bloody. Nothing, however, but the 
continuance of peace with England could have 
rendered the recovery of that island possible, 
Ko advantage France can derive from the waiJ, 
no stroke she can possibly strike, will compen- 
sate the loss of so valuable a possession. Not 
only St. Domingo is nov/ for ever lost to France, 
hut Martinique and Guadaloupe must at last al-- 
most inevitably fall a conquest to the BritisL 
arms; and France will, in all probability, be 
dispossessed of all her West India settlements, 
which have been long to her a mine of wealth, 
scarcely less lucrative than the mines of Mexico 
and Peru have been to Spain. 

France had, for some time, almost monopcn 
lized the sugar ti'ade^ and, by her accpiisitiou 
of the whole island of St Domii^^o. would, in 



133 



^me^ have been furnished by her colonies with 
greater quantity of that vahiable article of 
commerce than all the rest of the world pro- 
duces. This source of wealth will now be 
-turned into a different channel, and that lucrative 
^trade transferred to other hands. This might, 
ii'om the first, have been anticipated, as a neces- 
sary consequence of a war with Great Britain^ 
in the present circumstances. 

It may, indeed, be alleged, that the revolt of 
?St. Domingo being so general, and so formid- 
able, the negro armies -so numerous, and the 
interior of the island almost inaccessible, the 
J'rench were not likely to have ever reduced it 
to subjection. The interior consists of an ini- 
xiiense mass of mountains, enveloped in a laby- 
rinth of v/oods, absolutely impervious to an army. 
A celebrated geographical work has these re- 
markable v/ords : ^Mt is the decided opinion of 
the best and most competent judges, that all 
the powers of Europe combined could not now 
frustrate the views of the people of colour in 
St. Domingo ; and that a few years will present 
lis with the new, and perhaps formidable, pha3- 
nomenon of a black empire established in the 
noblest island of the western ocean, in alliance 
with America, and only connected with that 
continent." This new phtenomenon lias now 
made its appearance, and it may, perhaps, 
prove no less formidable, than novel and unpre- 



134 



cedented. The judicious writer of that de- 
servedly celebrated and popular work, has here 
formed a very just conjecture, which a short 
space of time has realized. If, however, we 
examine with accuracy the opinion of those 
who, at that time, appear to have supposed the 
combined force of all Europe inadequate to the 
reduction of the negro empire of St. Domingo, 
we shall be inclined to consider it as somewhat 
too hastily formed. 

The event they predicted has indeed taken 
place, and has so far demonstrated the justness 
of their speculations ; but circumstances have 
favoured the affairs of the negroes in that 
island. The recommencement of the war with 
England has, as it might have been expected, 
entirely crippled the exertions of France in that 
quarter, and prevented her from sending her 
fleets and armies to deluge the plains of Hispa- 
niola with blood, as she certainly would have 
done, if a renewal of hostilities with this coun- 
try had not taken place. The whole combined 
force of Europe would have been able to have 
covered the island with troops, and to have ex- 
terminated the whole race of the black inhabit- 
ants. It is not improbable that France alone 
would, when disengaged from other quarrels, 
have in time completed their reduction, or their 
extirpation. It can hardly be supposed that 
her gigantic power would not have been equal 



135 



to the task, arduous as it might hav^e seemed, 
and as it would undoubtedly have proved. The 
negroes v/ould, indeed, have had one very 
great advantage over any troops that eould have 
been sent from Europe : the climate, to which 
they are inured, would have operated power- 
fully in their favour against men unaccustomed 
to its influence ; and its malignant effects would, 
in this respect, have been equivalent to an army. 
The sacrifice of human lives does not, howevef, 
appear a very material consideration with the 
imperial republic ; and, it is more than proba- 
ble, that by sending army after army, it would, 
at length, have accomplished the subjugation of 
the island. The armies of France might have 
penetrated the island on every side ; and, in 
process of time, perhaps, have reached its most 
interior recesses. There are few local difficul- 
ties, which human perseverance may not sur- 
mount, when military opposition is overpower- 
ed. Had the French been an impotent and 
un warlike nation, they most certainly could 
never have completed the subjection of so large 
and populous an island : but, in the present cir- 
cumstances, it must be acknowledged, that it 
does not seem consistent with probability that 
the negroes could have withstood the gigantic 
'efforts which France would most certainly have 
made, for the preservation of so valuable a po3- 
Session. . , 



130 



Before the renewal of hostilities witli Great 
Britain, the French had retained, or recovered, 
the possession of the greatest part of the terri- 
tory along the coast ; and if the force already 
in the island had heen supported and strength- 
ened by reinforcements from Europe, they 
might, no doubt, have regained the possession 
of the rest. Although the negroes of St. Do- 
ipiingo are trained to arms, and undoubtedly 
are now, after so many reiterated scenes of car-? 
liage, tolerably acquainted with mihtary disci- 
pline, yet, in tactical skill in the field, or in the 
attack and defence of fortified posts, and vari- 
ous other operations of war, they can hardly 
"be supposed equal to the veteran troops of 
France. Those parts of the country near the 
coast, which, according to the descriptions of 
all who have visited the island, are by far the 
most fertile, and by far the most valuable, as well 
on that account, ashy reason of their situation for 
commerce, would undoubtedly have been subdu- 
ed, and the interior parts of the island held in a 
state of continual siege. If the negroes could 
not have been driven out of the mountains and 
forests of the interior, they would have been sur- 
Tounded and closed in on every side, and, conse- 
quently, have found it necessary to com.e to an 
accom.modation, which, as a measure of recipro- 
cal utility, would, no doubtj have been acceded 
to the French. Thus it appears in the highest 



137 

cjegree probable, that if the war with Great 
Britain had not intervened, St. Domingo would 
have been re-united to the repubUc, and per- 
haps upon terms equally beneficial to the colony 
and the mother-country. It is certain that 
Great Britain would not have opposed the re- 
duction of that island. It would not indeed 
have been her interest, had she not been pro- 
voked to it by the determined hostility of France, 
and laid under the necessity of opposing the 
aggrandizement of her potent rival; in every 
quarter of the globe. 

It appears exceedingly doubtful how far the 
establishment of a polished and warlike negro 
empire, in the most commanding situation, and 
almost in the centre of the West Indies, may be 
compatible with the safety of the European set- 
tlements : the event may be placed in the class 
of those extraordinary phenomena, of which 
the effects elude all human penetration. It ap- 
pears pregnant with consequences of the greatest 
magnitude ; and it cannot be dissembled that 
it seems to forebode an important, and it is to 
be feared, a bloody revolution, at some future 
period, in that part of the world. The negroes 
are now establishing an independent, powerful, 
and warlike empire in those parts, to which they 
were originally conveyed as slaves. What may 
be the result is yet concealed in the womb of 
futurity ; and the tendency of so singular and 



138 



extraordinary an occurrence might afford 
gToimds for a great deal of political speculation. 
A circumstance so novel is worthy tlie attention 
of the statesman, and the moralist. No ima- 
ginable event could wear an aspect more omi* 
nous to the slave trade; and if, among its con- 
sequences, we should suppose the abolition of that 
traffic, the <:onjecture ivould not be devoid of 
probability. It is, however, to be hoped, that as 
soon as circumstances appear favourable to the 
measure, that trade will be abolished by the 
Europeans, without any violent revolution. 

The certain loss of St. Dominao, and the 
more than probable loss of her other West India 
cxjlonies, being the inevitable consequences 
which Frasice had to expect from a war with 
Great Britain, it may very reasonably be asked, 
what compensation she can promise herself for 
losses of such an incalculable magnitude } 
From a war with Great Britain she cannot ex- 
pect any inci^ase of her influence on the con- 
tinent. She has, indeed, taken possession- of 
Hanover, the only vulnerable part of her ene- 
my's dominions, and that electorate may serve 
lier as a pledge for the restoration of some of 
the British conquests; but St. Domingo is irre- 
trievable lost, which, according to the compu- 
tations of W. L'x^bbe Raynal, and others, may, 
in respect of its importance and intrinsic value, 
be deemed almost equivalent to all the rest of 



139 

the West India Islands. From the statement of 
that author, it appears that the value of the 
produce, imported annually from the French 
settlements in St. Domingo, amounted to three 
times the value imported from all the other 
settlements, of that nation, in the West Indies ; 
and to more than half the value imported from 
all the other European islands. Calculations of 
this kind, it must be confessed, are never exact, 
nor can that be expected. Indeed, they are 
seldom consistent in their different component 
parts, as an attentive reader may often observe, 
Ayhenever any recapitulation is used ; a circum- 
stance which contributes, in no small degree, 
to diminish the confidence we might otherwise 
be induced to place in such statements. They 
are, however, for the most part, sufficiently 
correct to display a general v^iew of the sub- 
ject; and if we make, according to this calcu- 
lation, an estimate of the increased value of St. 
Domingo, by the cession of the Spanish part, 
we shall be able, in some measure, to appreciate 
the loss which France has sustained by the re- 
volt of that island, and its final dismemberment 
from her empire, in consequence of the war 
with Great Britain. 

As the disadvantages resulting to the French 
empire from the war are so obvious, and so con 
siderable, as it cannot augment, but may dimi- 
nish its influence in the continental system, it 
i» not difficult to perceive to what quarter France 



140 

directs her views to look for her mdemnities. 
It is, indeed, easy to see where she expects, 
but not so easy to discover where she will be 
able to find n compensation for the loss of her 
colonies, and the annihilation of her commerce. 
Nothing but the invasion and conquest of Eng- 
land can answer her purpose. This end once 
attained, not only her colonies would soon be 
recovered, but, by the co-operation of the 
British navy with her own military force, the 
whole world would be at her disposal. This is 
tlie grand object to which the views of France 
are directed ; the ignis fatuus which misleads 
them. Time and experience will remove the il- 
liision, and disappointment will cause the phaa- 
tom to vanish. 

That generosity which never refuses to ac- 
knowledge the merit of an enemy, will not 
deny that the new created Emperor of France 
possesses great pohtical and military abilities ; 
but, in this point, he has overshot his mark ; by 
his rashness in precipitating the nation into 
another v/ar, before the wounds it had received 
in the late grand contest Vv^ere healed, he has 
exposed it to irremediable misfortunes, and, by 
the precipitancy of his measures, has, perhaps, 
saved the country he wished to ruin. Had 
France dissembled for some time, she would, in 
all probability, have reduced St. Domingo, and 
have placed all her colonies in a state of secu- 
rity. She might also have strengthened her 



141 



marine, and have commenced liostilities witli 
greater advantage. Circumstanced as she was> 
in regard to her marine, her commerce, and her 
colonial possessions, a war with England was 
the most ruinous measure that could have been 
adopted. 

If an unconcerned spectator of the transac- 
tions which pass in review before his eyes, on 
the great theatre of Europe, cannot refrain from 
reprobating the conduct of the French govern- 
ment, in thus rashly precipitating itself into 
another v/ar, as equajiy inimical to its own inte- 
rests, and to the general tranquilhty, every Eng- 
lishman must applaud the provident sagacity of 
the British cabinet, in so quickly penetrating., 
and so effectually counteracting, the designs of 
the enemy. To the prompt and decisive mea- 
sures of Administration, Britaiaowes her safety^ 
lier independence, aad the continuation of her 
national existence. In such an emergency, ir- 
lesolution and procrastination must have been 
fatal • . 

The annihilation, or, at least, the diminutiori 
©four trade, is one of the principal views of the 
Gallic cabinet, and one of the great ends pro- 
posed to be obtained by the war. If the sub- 
version of the Britisli governiijent, and the con- 
quest of tlie country be the primary, the extinc- 
tion of its commerce is a secondary, object of 
the politics of St, Cloud. Tq thi^ end all tlie 



142 



liieasures of the French government have a di- 
rect and uniform tendency. In this view it has 
exerted all its influence to procure the ports of 
Europe to be shut against our vessels and our 
manufactures, and has in part succeeded. A 
war against commerce and manufactures, how- 
ever, is dilferent from a war with armies, and re- 
quires a different management, such as will per- 
haps prove too difficult for the military skill of 
the Gallic emperor, and baffle the efforts of his 
numerous legions. Trade flourishes, and forces 
its way, by the silent but continual efforts of 
persevering industry, and not by enterprising- 
violence. It does not so much depend on poli- 
tical schemes, and military operations, as on the 
industry and commercial genius of the people. 
So long as the British workmen maintain their 
superioi'ity of skill, and consequently their ma* 
nufactured goods their superior value, nothing 
can hinder those articles from finding a market. 
Commerce may meet with temporary checks and 
impediments ; but it makes its way at the last, 
surmounts every obstacle, and falls into its ac- 
customed and natural channels. The universal 
rule in trade is, that the best and cheapest 
goods find the readiest and most certain sale : 
and so lon^ as the British manufactures main- 
tain their superiority, they will, by some chan- 
nel, find their way into those countries where 
the French government prohibits their entrance. 



143 



its most rfgld prohibitions are found inelfec" 
tual even in France, and are not able to prevent 
the manufactured goods of Great Britain from 
entering, by different channels, into that coun- 
try. If this be the case in France, as it may 
from good authority be asserted that it really is, 
it is evident that all the influence of that go- 
vernment cannot prevent the introduction of 
British goods into the other countries, which, 
although under its absolute control, are not so 
immediately under its inspection. Changes may 
perhaps, at no very distant period, take place in 
the affairs of France, that may be followed by 
important consequences. The exclusion of our 
manufactures from those countries over v^'hicli 
France now extends her influence, may indeed 
produce a temporary diminution of their con- 
sumption, a circumstance which must, so long 
as it exists, embarrass our manufacturing system. 
This embarrassment can, however, be no more 
than temporary, unless the French government 
intend to make the war perpetual. On the re- 
turn of peace, the demand for British goods will 
be greater, in proportion to the length of time 
they have been prohibited. 

Before the government of France conceived 
vhe design of annihilating the trade of Britain, 
)y excluding her manufactures from those cour- 
ries over which its exei ts its influence, it ought 
ai^st to have consiJered> whether thoae of its. 



U4 

o^rn people were m such a state as to supply 
their place, or whether it could put them into 
such a condition. The manufactures of France 
are most certainly in no such state ; and if the 
government of that country had formed the de- 
sign of establishing a commercial and manufac- 
turing sj^stem, it should have sincerely adopted 
paciiic measures, as the only means of making 
it flourish. The military state of France, and 
the belligerent system to which she still adheres, 
are far from being calculated for the advance- 
ment of manufactures and trade, ,which, more 
imperiously even than arts and sciences, require 
public tranquillit}'. 

Whatever effects the conduct of France may 
produce on the trade and manufactures of Great 
Eritain, her measures are not calculated to enable 
her own to supply their place in foreign mar- 
kets ; and as trade is the natural source, and 
foundation of naval strength, the same military 
and belli 2:erent svstem, which is so inimical to 
the commerce of France, equally militates 
against the aggrandizement of her maritime 
power. The navy of France, it is true, has at 
certain periods been formidable, and the ne\r 
empire may possibly equip fleets of considerable 
strength, as the old monarchy has sometimes 
done; but while her commerce is not adequate 
to the support of her navy, and to the furnish- 
ing of ^anien, her marine cannot long make 



145 



any conspicuous figure ; at least, it can never 
rival, nor endanger, the naval power of Britain. 
Ill this particular circumstance, the British navy 
forms a distinguishing contrast to that of France. 
The commerce of Britain is the nursery of her 
navy, while her naval superiority affords secu- 
rity to her commerce, and enables her in war, 
as well as in peace, to export her commodities 
to every part of the world, and to see the safe 
return of her mercantile fleeis, from every quar- 
ter of the globe. The naval strength of Britain 
being the effect of her trade, is a natural cir- 
cumstance ; while that of France must be pro- 
duced by a violent and unnatural effort, and has 
been annihilated in almost every contest with 
the former country. While the superiority of 
British manufactures is universally known, and 
universally acknowledged, and while her fleets 
are able to protect her exports and her imports, 
every effort of a foreign enemy to destroy her 
commerce, must, eventually, prove ineffectual 



14(5 



LETTER IV. 

SIR, 

In reviewing the innumerable and unparalleled 
improvements which have taken place in Europe 
during the two or three last centuries, an Eng- 
lishman will not fail to cast a glance on the cir- 
cumstances which have afforded to Great Britain 
the means of attaining to this commercial and 
naval pre-eminence. It is certainly a subject 
which must afford him the most pleasing and 
most interesting retrospect. 

It would be useless, it would even be in stilt- 
ing to an English reader, to recapitulate the se- 
ries of events recorded in the history of his 
country, with which, it is presumed, no Eng- 
lishman who has any pretensions to literary 
knowledge is unacquainted. We cannot, how- 
ever, but remark the extraordinary progress 
Great Britain has made in arts and arms, in 
commerce, manufactures, and naval strength, 
since the defeat of the Spanish Armada. Scarcel}'' 
any Englishman is ignorant of the progressive 
aggrandizement of his country since that mo- 
meatoiis period, »or of the brilliant exploits of 



\ 



147 

his coimtiymen • which have rendered the name 
of Britain as illustrious, as her power and opu- 
lence are conspicuous. The retrospect is, how- 
ever, too pleasing to be totally overlooked; espe- 
cially as, to form a just idea of the political cir- 
cumstances of this country, it is requisite to 
contemplate the causes of its present elevation. 

From the time of the conquest, England, al- 
though illustrious for warlike achievements, of 
which the victories of Cressy, Agincourt, and 
Poictiers, are perpetual memorials, had, like 
most of the other nations of Europe during the 
space of four, or even of live centuries, made 
very little improvement in trade or manufac-^ 
tures. The British wool was manufactured in 
the Netherlands, which were then the centre of 
European wealth and commerce. At that time, 
when trade had not introduced riches and ele- 
gance among the people, the houses of London, 
like those of all the other great cities of Europe, 
except Rome and Constantinople, were for the 
most part built of wood and covered with 
thatch. Scarcely any, except some of the prin- 
cipal noblemen and prelates of the church, had 
houses of stone. This was the state of the 
British metropolis during the reigns of the Plan- 
taganets ; and it was little better in the time of 
Queen Elizabeth. Under the first Norman kings, 
even chimneys were unknown ; and so late as 
A. D. the only streets in London that 



us 

TV'ere paved u'ere Upper Thames -street, Ludgate* 
street, Fleet-street, and the Strand as far as 
Charing-cross. It is at this time impossible to 
traverse the streets of the metropolis, without 
contemplating the important change which 
commerce and civilization have produced, not 
only in this but in every country in Eu- 
rope. Paris and the other European capitals 
have been equally embellished within the t\ro 
last centuries. , Trade and m.anufactures, by fur- 
nishing such numbers of people with the means 
of procuring a livehhood, are the principal 
causes and supports of an increased population. 
This is exemplified in almost every trading town, 
but particularly in London, which contained no 
more than 150,000 inhabitants at Elizabeth's ac- 
cession to the throne, but contains at present 
about six tim^es that number. When these effects 
of commerce are considered, it is not to be won- 
dered that, where it flourishes in an eminent de- 
gree, it should raise the nation to the highest 
pitch of splendour and political greatness. No 
country in Europe has risen to such a height of 
commercial opulence and naval strength as Bri- 
tain; Her naval superiority is the consequence 
of her multifarious and extensive traffic, the 
means of her protection, and the support and 
guarantee of her independence. 

It seems, on the first reflection, no small mat- 
ter of surprise, that neither our Norman kings 



14Q 



nor their subjects ever turned their attention to 
commercial enterprises and naval aiFairs, in such a 
manner as the situation of their country re- 
quired, and seemed to point out ; and that they 
so much neglected the advantages which nature 
had thrown in their way. Upon a more mature 
consideration it will, however, appear, that al- 
though the local situation of the country was 
peculiarly adapted to maritime pursuits, neither 
the political views of those princes, nor the mo- 
ral circumstances of the people, were favourable 
- to commercial and naval improvements. The 
kings of the Norman dynasty were mostly en- 
gaged in affairs of a different nature. They 
possessed nearly one-third of France, and were 
frequently engaged in wars with that kingdom. 
Those continental connections drew their atten- 
tion, in no small degree, from the affairs of the 
English nation. The disputed succession to the 
kingdom of France, at the decease of Charles 
the Fair, and the opposite claims of Philip of 
Valois, and Edward III. king of England, in- 
volved the two nations in a contest, still more 
important and bloody than any of those which 
had preceded, and which was again revived in 
the reign of ilenry V. The civil wars which 
afterwards broke out between the houses of 
York and Lancaster, were still less favourable to 
commercial pursuits, and national improvements. 
Besides all these unfavourable circumstances^ 



150 



Scotland was in those ages a distinct, and, for 
the most part, an independent kingdom ; and 
the Enghsh monarchs found in the Scotch a 
troublesome, restless, and dangerous enemy. 
From this sketch it evidently appears, that the 
political situation of this country was, in those 
times, -not less diiferent from what it is at the 
present day, than were the commercial and so- 
cial circumstances of the people. 

The condition of the people in these realms, 
as in most of tlie o:her countries of Europe, v/as 
still more unfavourable to trade, than the poli- 
tical situation of the kingdom. Constantinople, 
Venice, Genoa, and some other cities of Italy, 
and the Netherlands, with those called the 
Hanse Towns, engrossed the greatest part of the 
trade of Europe. The lower orders of the people 
were not in such a situation as could either offer 
inducements to undertake, or furnish the means 
of executing commercial projects. The state 
of poverty and dependence in which they were 
held, was the grand obstacle to the improve- 
ment and extension of commerce. In propor- 
tion as the people acquired liberty and inde- 
pendence, trade began to be freed from the fet- 
ters with which it had been so Ions; shackled. 
Libertv and commerce 2:0 hand in hand : their 
effects are reciprocal. The improvement of 
commerce contributed, more than any other 
circumstance, to the emancipation of the great 



351 



body of the people; and the estabhshment of 
liberty gave to commerce its full scope. 

As soon as a variety of circumstances had 
concurred to excite a mercantile spirit among 
tlie nations of Europe, and to furnish the people 
with the means of carrying on commercial en- 
terprises, the utihty of navigation began to be 
more clearly seen and understood. This science 
v/as accordingly studied and improved by men 
of genius, in different countries. Both princes 
and people soon perceived that commerce was 
the way to opulence, and consequently it be- 
came an object of general attention. New 
sources of wealth were explored, and new chan- 
nels of acquisition were opened. All the mari- 
time countries endeavoured to rival each other 
in trade ; but all did not equally succeed. A 
variety of circumstances rendered the commer* 
cial plans of different nations more or less suc- 
cessful. Spain and Portugal had taken the lead;, 
in extending their commerce, and discovering 
new sources of opulence. The former had, by 
the discovery of America, opened new channels 
of trade, and veins of wealth, before totally un- 
known ; and the latter, by tracing the passage 
round the Cape of Good Hope to India, had 
monopolized that lucrative traffic, from which 
the Venetians and Genoese, especially the former, 
had derived their opulence and power. England 
was among the last of the countries of Europe 
that began to make the improvement and ex- 



152 



tension of commerce the grand objects of na- 
tional concern. When tlie Spaniards and Pof- 
tuo;uese had ah'eadv made themselves masters of 
the rich countries of Mexico, Peru, and Brasil, 
estabhshed settlements in India, and round the 
coast of Africa, and extended their comm.erce 
to every quarter of the globe, the English Jiad 
no foreign settlements ; even so late as the ac- 
cession of James I. not a single Englishman was 
estabhshed in America, under the sanction of 
the crown. Although England was so back- 
ward in adopting a commercial system, she at 
last entered into the measure, and soon began to 
rival, and afterwards to outstrip, those nations 
whose example she copied. The exorbitant 
power of Spain, and the hostihty of Philip IT. 
imposed upon her the necessity of attending to 
her marine. She then began to discover the ad- 
vantages of her insular situation ; and the suc- 
cessful expeditions of Drake, Frobisher, and 
others, but more especially the memorable de- 
feat of the Spanish armada, taught her to know 
the natural source of her strength. The revolt 
of the Netherlands, and the long and expensive 
war between those Provinces and Spain, broke 
the power, exhausted the resources and embar- 
rassed the trade of the latter, while England, 
having totally discomfited the most formidable 
armament the world had ever seen, soon began 
to surpass every other country in commercial 
pursuits and naval improvements. Trading com- 



153 



panics were established under the sanction of 
government, for the more effectually carrying 
on of such branches as required too great a ca- 
pital to be managed by private individuals, and 
every measure was adopted which could excite 
a commercial spirit among the people. 

In the moral, as well as in the physical v/orld, 
a certain concurrence of circumstances, a cer- 
tain order of things, must take place for the 
production of every remarkable and great event ; 
and the concatenation of causes must lie in a 
certain direction, and sometimes co-operate a 
long time, in order to unfold those extraordi- 
nary and interesting scenes which are succes- 
sively displayed on this great theatre of human 
action. 

Among the causes which has raised Great 
Britain to her present commercial and maritime 
greatness, we must consider her insular situa- 
tion, her numerous ports, and great extent of 
coast. These physical circumstances, when the 
advantages they offered were sufficiently under- 
stood, could not fail of directing the attention 
of her people to mercantile pursuits. Events, 
however, of a political nature, contributed in 
an eminent degree to render the exertions of 
England successful. Among these we must 
reckon the decline of the naval power and com- 
merce of Spain, by the revolt of the Nether- 
lands. The depression of that powerful mo- 



35i 



narchy was the foundation .on which, at the 
same time, arose the preponderancy of France 
on the continent, and the naval greatness of 
Britain. Both may date their commencement 
from the same «ra, and ascribe their origin to 
the same pohtical cause. Since the defeat of 
the Spanish armada, the trade and maritime 
greatness of Eno'land have, ^rith some short in- 
tervals of variation, been in a continual state of 
advancement through all the fluctuations of 
public affairs. France and Holland, during a 
considerable space of time, rivalled England in 
the sovereignty of the ocean^ until at last expe- 
rience demonstrated the inutility of the attempt, 
and the energy of the British genius, animated 
by the well-poised freedom of the British con- 
stitution, established her commercial preponde- 
rancy, from which her naval superiority fol- 
lowed as a necessary consequence. After a long 
and arduous competition, both the above-men- 
tioned pov. ers were compelled to acknowledge 
the ascendency of the commercial genius of Bri- 
tain. France especially, as already observed, 
has, in almost every contest, seen the ruin of her 
trade, and the destruction of, her marine; while 
England has extended her commerce to every 
region of the globe, tried every species of in- 
dustry, explored every channel of acquisition, 
and progressively risen to a pitch of commercial 
opulence, and naval strength, unequalled in any 



155 



other nation, and unprecedented at any former 
period. 

There is no exaggeration in asserting, that the 
trade of Great Britain extends to every country 
on the surface of the globe, which affords ma- 
terials for commerce, and in which traffic is 
known. The colonial system' necessarily ex- 
cludes her trading vessels from the settlements 
of the other European nations. England is, 
howeyer, as much concerned in the trade of 
Mexico, Peru, Brasil, &c. as are Spain and Por- 
tugal themselves, the principal part of the ma- 
nufactured goods consumed in the Spanish and • 
Portuguese colonies being the productions of 
British industry. A very considerable part of 
the fine vwool produced in Spain, after being im- 
ported into England, and there manufactured, 
is again exported to Spain, and sent from thence 
to Spanish America ; and the Portuguese colo- 
nies are almost entirely supplied with the manu- 
factures of Britain, which are sent from Lisbon 
and Oporto. Thus a great part of the wealth, 
not only of Brasil, but also of Mexico, Peru, 
and other parts of Spanish America, becomes 
concentrated in Britain. 

The depression of the Spanish power, in con- 
sequence of the revolt of the Belgic provinces, 
was not the only benefit which accrued to Eng- 
land from the arbitrary and oppressive measures 
of Philip II. The weakening of a powerful and 
4 



155 



determined enemy must ever be esteemed a 
great political advantage; but "this country de- 
rived from the tyranny of that prince, other be- 
nefits of a commercial nature, and perhaps ot 
almost an equal magnitude. The Netherlands 
had lon^ been famous for industrv and com- 

C3 It.' 

merce ; and their manufactures far surpassed 
those of the rest of Eur pe. In all the cities 
and towns of ^ v "nces, ficairishing manu 
" - : " : r ^ e e t / 7 : , especially in Brussels^ 

: Z 1 Antwerp, and carried on 

both on an extensive scale and in a superior stile 
of exceHence. Antwerp was at that rime the 
great emporium of trade. The troubles whic' 
arose " : : se countries drove out great num- 
ber= :■: ;^c::ious artisans and manufacturers, 
wh I - into other countries in search of that 
tranquillity which their own no longer af- 
for : The perturbated state of France held out 
no prospect of that peaceable retreat which they 
sought, and which persons of that description 
required. Germany and England were the only 
countries in which those expatriated artisans ex- 
pected to meet with encouragement. England, 
especially, afforded them a secure and peaceful 
as3'lum ; and tliither the manufacturers of die 
Netherlands flocked in great numbers, where 
tliey not only found protection, but met with 
all the encouragement their ingenuity and in- 
dustry deserved. Thus the artisans and manu- 



15? 

facturers of the Netherlands carried into Eng- 
land their arts and their commerce; and Phihp, 
bv his ill-concerted and tyrannical miCasures, 
contributed to strengthen and enrich a nation, 
of which he was the implacable enemy. This 
may be reckoned the ara of the Bristih manu- 
facturing system, or at least that from which it 
may date the commjencem.ent of its prosperity. 
Another event of a similar nature was little less 
conduciv^e to the advancement of British in- 
dustry and commerce. After oceans of blood 
had been spilt in France in those religious wars, 
the recollection of which to this day shocks the 
feelings of humanity, the Protestant religion, in 
common with the Catholic, had been established 
in that kingdom by the edict of Nantz ; and 
althouv^h some wars had, through the intrigues 
and cabals of factious and designing persons, 
taken place between the Catholics and Protestants 
during the reign of Louis XIII. yet the Pro- 
testant religion continued to flourish under the 
protection of the crown, imtil Louis XIV. re- 
voked that celebrated edict; a measure equally 
cruel, impolitic, and unjust, and in the highest 
degree detrimental to the prosperity of his king- 
dom. In consequence of that revocation, and 
tlie expulsion of the Protestants, which imme- 
diately took place, m.any thousands of the best 
manufacture: s of France fled into England, 
where they established tlieir manufactures, and 



158 



tnet with the most liberal encouragenieiH. This 
circumstance v/as as beneficial to England, as it 
was detrimental to France ; and caused the 
commerce and manufactures of the former to 
flourish in proportion as those of the other de* 
clined. Religious persecution is, indeed, a mea- 
sure so unjust and unreasonable, that it is no won- 
der its effects should ultimately tend to the dis- 
advantage of the persecutors ; it is a just retri- 
bution to those who indulge a spirit of intole- 
rance, of whatever denomination they may be. 

The emigration of the Flemish manufacturers 
in the reign of Philip 11. and the expulsion of 
those of France in that of Louis XIV. rapidly 
improved the manufacturing system of Great 
Britain, and opened a mine of wealth more lu- 
crative to her, than those of ^Mexico and Peru 
to the Spaniards. The woollen manufacture 
alone employs a greater number of hands, and 
a larger capital, and, including all its various 
branches, produces a greater profit, than any 
other undertaking of the manufacturing kind 
in Europe. Those of cutlery and hard-ware 
may, perhaps, be reckoned to hold the second 
rank; and those of cotton are carried on in an 
extensive manner, besides many others too nu- 
merous to mention, which, taken collectively, 
are an inexhaustible fund of commerce and of 
vv^alth. 

It is evident that the manufactures of Great 



159 

Britain constitute the staple of her commercej 
and consequently the foundation and source of 
her wealth. If she had no manufactures, her 
exports would be comparatively of small value. 
She would, indeed, have a less quantity of mer- 
chandize for exportation than several other coun- 
tries. The raw materials, which she could produce, 
would not suffice for the carrying on of an ex- 
tensive commerce. Whoever is acquainted with 
the extent of Britain, and the nature and quan- 
tity of her productions, and compares these 
particulars with circumstances of a similar na- 
ture in some other countries, will readily per- 
ceive that she owes her commerce^ her wealthy 
and consequently her power, to the active in- 
dustry of her inhabitants, protected and encou- 
raged by an excellent political constitution, ra- 
ther than to any peculiar advantages which na- 
ture has bestowed upon Ijer, except her insular 
situation and extensive coasts. 

This enterprizing commercial spirit, which is 
become one of the distinguishing characteristics 
of the British nation, could not have been pro- 
duced, neither could it be maintained, if it was 
not encourged, and its acquisitions secured, by 
a constitution v/hich has long excited the admi- 
ration and envy of the world. It is highly un- 
reasonable to expect absolute perfection in any 
work of man, who is himself a limited and im- 
perfect being ; but the British constitution. 



l6o 

however defective it may appear in the eyes of 
such visionary theorists as require perfection in 
human estabhshmentSj is, beyond contradiction, 
the most perfect system of government that can 
be found in the history of human legislature. 

-Every man, who enjo}rs the benefits of the 
British constitution, ought to take into his serious 
consideration the excellence of that system of 
laws which protects his person and property, 
and affords to both a security which it is diffi- 
cult to find in the legislative system of other 
nations. Nothing but the want of duly appre- 
ciatino; those benefits can leave room for disaf- 
fection. If every Englishman had an opportu- 
nitv of observino* and examinino- the constitu- 
tion of foreign nations, all would coincide in 
one opinion of the excellence of that under 
which they live. Foreigners never fail of mak- 
ing a just estimate of its value ; and it is only 
by being accustomed to its blessings, and by 
having never experienced the effects of tyran- 
nical and oppressive government, that English- 
men can be insensible to the blessings they 
enjoy. It is, however, to be hoped, it may in- 
deed be confidently relied on as an indisputable 
fact, that a total change has taken place in the 
minds of numbers of formerly disaffected per- 
sons, within the last six or seven years ; and 
that the illusive theories of visionary politicians 
which had made such an alarming progress in 



161 



tlie nation about that time, are now almost en- 
tirely exploded. 

The subject of this letter being a display of 
the activity of British industry and commerce, 
fostered and animated by the excellence of the 
British constitution, you will contemplate with 
pleasure the charming scene ; and believe me, 
most affectionately, 

Sir, 

Your*s, Sec, 



l62 



LETTER V. 

3IR, ' ^ ^ 

It is impossible to offer to your contemplation 
a more agreeable subject than that of my last 
letter. It was there exhibited in a general view: 
a continuation of the same in detail will not, 
perhaps, be less agreeable. 

The commerce of Great Britain, favoured by 
a fortunate coincidence of circumstances, and 
fostered under a free and liberal constitution,. 
has, in the manner we have seen, arrived at an 
height to which that of no other nation ever at- 
tained. It may, perhaps, without exaggeration 
be asserted, that her foreign trade is equal ta 
that of all the rest of Europe; and it is an in- 
disputable fact, that her naval force, the natu- 
ral offspring of her multifarious and extensive 
commerce, is an equal, or an over- match for 
that of all the rest of the world. To illustrate 
this general picture, it "will not be amiss dis- 
tinctly to consider some of its principal and 
most striking particulars. 

We have observed, that the British manufac- 
tures are the basis of British commerce. We have 
remarked, that the manufactured goods of this 
3 



163 

country, exported to Spain and Portugal, en- 
able us to appropriate to ourselves a great part 
of the wealth of Spanish and Portuguese Ame- 
rica. On this account it is unnecessary to add? 
that the trade of Great Britain with those coun- 
tries is extremely advantageous, as it gives her a 
property in the mines of Mexico, Peru, and 
Brasil. Peace with Spain and Portugal, must 
consequently be always considered as a political 
and commercial advantage. The trade which 
England carries on to the Baltic, although not 
considered as of the most lucrative kind, is 
however not only necessary, as from that quar- 
ter we are supplied with great quantities of na- 
val stores, but likewise ultimately, if not im- 
mediately, highly beneficial to this country, as 
it contributes to support its population by tak- 
ing olF it manufactures. Her trade with Tur- 
key is not inconsiderable. Britain also carries 
on a very extensive and profitable traffic with her 
own settlements in different parts of the world. 
These having no manufactures of their own, 
are entirely supplied by the mother-country ; a 
circumstance which provides employment for 
many thousands of hands, and gives activity and 
vigour to British industry. This is, indeed, the 
principal advantage resulting from colonial pos- 
sessions. In the European settlements, as in all 
recently established colonies, and all newly 
Jeopled countries, it is evident that th^ cultiva:- 



104- 



tion of the soil must be the primary object of 
attention, and the first employment of the inha- ^ 
bitants. It would be absurd to think of esta- 
blishing manufactures while the land remains 
uncultivated and unproductive; for by drawing 
forth its rich produce, the colonists can readily 
supply themselves with manufactured goods of 
every kind from those European countries where 
manufactures are established and flourish. By 
this traffic the plantations of the colonies, and 
the manufactures of Europe, alternately supply 
arid contribute to support each other ; and in 
proportion as the colonies flourish, the industry 
of Europe is excited and her manufacturers em- 
ployed. This is the radical principle of the co* 
lonial system, and the main-spring of colonial 
traffic ; the natural tendency of which is to en- 
courage and promote agriculture, manufactures, 
and commerce, and to enrich the planter, the 
manufacturer, and the merchant. 

It is easy to perceiv^e that of all the European 
nations, Great Britain must clerive the greatest 
advantage from the general colonial system, as 
she supphes with her manufactures not only her 
own colonies, but contributes in a great tlegree 
to the supply of those of other nations ; and it 
has already been observed, that the mines of 
^!^Iexico, Peru, and Brasil, are a greater soiucc 
of wealth to Britain than to Spain and Portu- 
gal, This commercial and political parados 



105 

arises from tlie intrinsic energy of Britain, the 
industry of her people, and the excellent sys- 
tem of her government. 

The trade which Britain carries on with the 
United States of x\merica, is also of the most 
extensive and multifarious nature, and, in most 
respects, similar to the colonial trade ; for al- 
thouo'h those countries are no lono^er British 
colonics, they are principally supplied with 
British manufactures. Tlie American States, 
like all other European colonies, have no m^anu- 
factures of their own; or, at least, none of any 
importance ; and, from the circumstances of 
their country, they cannot, for a long time to 
come, have any inducements to establishing a 
Rianufacfuring system. While such immense 
tracts of land remain uncultivated, agriculture 
will be the grand object of industrious enter- 
prize, as it holds out a more promising and 
surer prospect than the estg.blishment of ma- 
nufactures can afford. It is supposed by many 
that Great Britain derives, at this time, greater 
advantages from the American States than she 
did while they were under her dominion ; and 
the supposition is not improbable, nor founded 
on unreasonable principles. Britain is free 
from the incumbrance and expense of govern- 
ing and providing for the protection of those 
colonies. The number of their inhabitants has 
rapidly increased, and is yet rapidly increasing ; 



106 



and, consequently, the demand for European 
goods increases, in proportion to the increase 
of population. The opulence of the Americans 
is already exceedingly increased: and, accord- 
ing to every appearance, will increase as fast as 
the population of their country ; and the con- 
currence of these two circumstances must ex- 
ceedingly increase the demand for European 
manufactures. As those of Great Britain have 
a decided preference throughout all America, it 
is not a matter of surprise that her trade with 
the United States should be more beneficial than 
it was before the revolution ; and it is certain 
that this progressive increase of the population 
and opulence of the American republic, which, 
apparently, must continue for ages to come, 
whatever its remote consequences may be, 
must, for a long time, powerfully operate in 
favour of the manufactures and commerce of 
this country. 

Of all the various branches of traffic which 
constitute the commercial system of Great Bri- 
tain, the East India trade is the most remark- 
able, the most curious, and the most compli- 
cated, that is any where to be foimd in the his- 
tory of commerce. 

The English East India company, although 
subjects of Great Britain, and the proprietors, 
for the most part, residing in this country, are 
possessors of a territory of greater extent than 



167 



the vvTiole united kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland, and not much inferior in population ; 
constituting a singular kind of imperium in im- 
perio, and exhibiting a commercial and politi- 
cal ph^enomenon, of which no example is 
found in the history of commerce, or of na- 
tions. Those merchants, whose commercial 
enterprises and exertions have so eminently 
contributed to the political greatness of Britain, 
and who were at first a company of traders pos- 
sessing nothing in India except their factories^ 
which they held by the permission of the sove- 
reigns of that country for the conveniency of 
their traffic, are now become a society of Asiali-C 
princes, possessors of a rich and extensive em- 
pire on that continent, with an absolute control 
over the politics as well as the commerce of 
India. Thus the extension of the British em- 
pire has been the consequence of the extension 
of her commerce. Britain now reigns over 
India, and rules the opposite extremities of the 
globe. 

To exhibit any more than a slight retrospect 
of those curious and interesting particulars 
would here be unnecessary, and would, besides, 
draw out this letter to a tedious length. I shall, 
therefore, beg leave to conclude with assuring 
you that, with unalterable respect, 



103 



LETTER VL 

SIR* 

A Yzz^ of the political situation of Great 
E I : : I : : : P : e, naturally leads us t o c on- 
sider that Ge : : :v. with the politics of which 
the intere f the two former powers are very 
much counected. 

Germany is a country of a great extent, and 
numerous population. In both these respects it 
exceeds France, even in her present enlarged 
state ; but it is not, like that country, united 
in one political system. If Germany, hke 
France, were united under one government, it 
would, undoubtedly, be the predominating 
power on the continent ; but divided, as we see 
it, into a number of small principahties and 
states, it has never been a match for the French 
monarchy. The Germanic constitution is a 
system totally different from any other in Eu- 
rope, and, in many respects, from any now ex- 
isting in the world. That empire consists of 
about three hundred independent states, of 
which the greatest number are monarchies, un 
der different names; and their sovereigns hav 
different titles, as those of prince, duke, mar 



169 

quis, count, inargrave, landgrave, ^c. There 
are also several ecclesiastical as well as secular 
p'overnments. In the ecclesiastical states the 
bishop or archbishop is the sovereign ; but, in 
some of them, his power is very much limited 
by the chapters, or canons. Not a few also of 
the German states are republics, under the dc- 
nomination of free imperial cities : such are 
Augsburgh, Nuremburg, and many others, of 
which the enumeration would, in this place, be 
to no purpose; these republics are rather of the 
aristocratic than the democratic form, and ^o- 
verned hy a senate and council of burghers ; 
pretty much resembling, in this respect, the 
different states of the Seven United Provinces 
before their subjection to France. The consti- 
tution of modern Germany bears a greater re- 
semblance to that of ancient Greece, than to 
any other political system spoken of in histor}-, 
being a confederacy^ of distinct and independent 
states. 

The German diets, generally held at Ratis- 
bon, are, in many respects, similar to the Am- 
phyctionic council among the Greeks^ v/heie 
all affairs of public concern, relating to the ge- 
neral interests of the difix^rent slates, were de- 
bated and determined. The states of Gcrmanv 
can form any alliances, or engage in any wars, 
which are not contrary to the general interests 
of the empire. The Emperor is the hc'vl of 



170 

this political confederacy; and, ^vhile each 
prince, prelate, &c. is the absolute sovereign of 
his own dominions, they all acknowledge the 
Emperor as sovereign of the ^vhole. The impe- 
rial dignity being elective, the right of election 
is vested in the archbishops of Mentz, Triers, 
and Cologne ; the kings of Bohemia and Prus- 
sia, and the electors of Hanover, Saxony, and 
Bavaria, with the Elector palatine. It cannot 
be needful to mention, that the king of Great 
Britain is elector of Hanover, and the king of 
Prussia elector of Brandenburg. These nine 
have the title of electors, and their principali- 
ties are denominated electorates ; but, although 
the imperial dignity be elective, it has been 
long attached to the house cf Austria ; and, in- 
deed, as that exalted dignity is rather an office 
of honour than of emolument ; and as the re- 
venues of most of the German princes are 
small, it is requisite that it should be conferred 
on some prince, whose dominions and revenues 
render him sufficiently opulent and powerful, to 
support the grandeur of his station. The Ger- 
man constitution also requiring that none but a 
catholic be elected, the choice necessarily falls 
on a prince of the house of Austria, as, in that 
family alone, all the different requisites are 
united. The respective quotas of money and 
troops, to be furnished by the different German 
princes and states, in case of a war, in which 



171 

the empire is engaged, are fixed and enrolled hi 
a book, called the matriculation book of the 
empire. These quotas, however, are often 
very slowly brought forward ; and it is to be 
observed, that the German princes and states 
are not obliged to have any concern in such 
wars as the Emperor may undertake on account 
of his hereditary dominions. They may also de- 
clare war against one another, or against the 
Emperor himself, in his capacity of duke of 
Austria, king of Hungary and Bohemia, &c. 
without violating the consitution of the empire. 
The Germanic constitution is, indeed, so intri« 
cate and complex, that it would require a vo- 
lume to delineate and explain it; but it may 
with propriety be defined a highly finished mo- 
del of the feudal system. It originated indeed 
from that system, which formerly prevailed 
throughout Europe. After the death of Char- 
lemagne, the nobles of his empire, which con- 
sisted of France, Italy, and the greatest part of 
Germany, encroaching on the power and autlio- 
rity of his successors, began to hold their so- 
vereigns at defiance, and to exercise little less 
than regal power in their respective districts. 
This was the state of France, under tl)e kings 
of the Carlovingian dynasty, as well as during 
a consideauble time under the descendants of 
Hugh Capet. The dukes and counts of Fiance 
coined money, made alliances with forei,ii;n 



i;2 ■ 

powers, and had their parhaments. Each pro- 
vince was an epitome of the whole khigdom. 
Hence originated the different parhaments of 
France, which, during the existence of the 
monarchy, continued to he the supreme pro- 
vincial courts of judicature. The feudal sys- 
tem, in that country, began to be depressed in 
the reign of Lewis the Xlth, who was its de- 
clared and irreconcilable enemy. Its depres- 
sion continued to be one of the great objects of 
the politics of the French monarchs ; and the 
feudal powers were, at last, finally crushed, by 
the vigorous administration, and decisive mea- 
sures, X)L Cardinal Richheu. In Germany the 
feudal system was, on the contrary, in a con- 
tinual state of progressive advancement ; and, 
in this respect, Germany exhibited a remark- 
able contrast, not only to France, but to all 
the other countries of Europe, except Italy. 
During the troublesome contests between the 
emperors and the popes, the nobles, perceiving 
their v/eight and consequence, in the scale of 
either party, found means to render themselves 
independent of both; and, from feudal lords, 
rendered themselves absolute sovereigns. Many 
of the great prelates of the church took the 
same advantage, and their example w^as fol- 
lowed by several of the large and populous ci- 
ties. All these independent sovereignties, how- 
ever, continued united in one great confederacy, 



electing an Emperor, whom they acknowledged 
as their common head and sovereign. Such 
was the origin of the Germanic constitution, 
and of the different ecclesiastical and secular 
states, archbishoprics, bishoprics, abbacies, im- 
perial cities, principalities, duchies, marquisates, 
&c. of which the empire is composed. This 
singular and complex political system has al- 
ways had a good effect in preserving tranquillity 
among this numerous assemblage of sovereign 
states which compose the Germanic body ; but, 
it may easily be perceived, that a nation so cir- 
cumstanced, and so governed, is not in a situa- 
tion very favourable to the exertion of its col- 
lective strength. Germany has, indeed, seldom 
or never made so distinguished a figure in fo- 
reign war^, or had such a preponderancy in the 
political scale of Europe, as, from her great ex- 
tent, her numerous population, and her vast re« 
sources, might have been expected ; especiahy 
as no people are more courageous or robust, or 
make better soldiers than the Germans. 

The empire, however, although thus divided^ 
and by such a division embarrassed in its exer- 
tions, forms, in conjunction with the hereditary 
strength of Austria, a political fabric difficult to 
destroy and which affords a prospect of perma- 
nency. With Austria at its head, if her re- 
sources were fully drawn out, and her force well 
concentrated previous to being brought into ac- 



1?4 

tioti, it would yet be abk to turn a formidable 
front towards France, and to present an insur- 
mountable obstacle to the extension of her do- 
minions and her power in that quarter. The 
conquest of Germany would, no doubt, be a 
desirable object to that domineering power; 
but, if the empire should be unable to make an 
effectual resistance, a case which can hardly be 
supposed, it is so evidently and so essentially 
the interests of all Europe to prevent the an- 
nexation of Germany to France, that the whole 
continent would find itself under a necessity of 
making the most vigorous efforts to render such 
a project abortive, which, notwithstanding the 
late disastrous events, must in all probability 
sooner or later yet be the case. 

Two of the German pov/ers are singly of great 
■weight in the political scale, and have often 
made a distinguished figure on the military the- 
cstfe of Europe. Austria and Prussia hold an 
equal balance on the continent, and without 
being in such a situation as might enable them 
to oppress their neighbours, or to aspire after 
universal empire, are, however, sufficiently pow- 
erful to resist aggression, and to maintain a re- 
spectable independence. Austria has not indeed 
been able, in neither of the two last wars, to 
maintain her ground against the armies of 
France; but in the first she made a glorious 
aiid lioble stand against tht gigantic force of 



17 S 

that repubiicj and may perhaps again do the 
same, or even more, especially if that enthusiasm 
which has of late animated the French armies 
begins once to subside. 

The dominions of the house of x'^iistria are 
extensive, fertile, and populous, and capable of 
furnishing vast resources of every kind. If wt 
examine the population of the Austrian domi- 
nions, we shall find them in that respect not so 
far inferior to France as to give her any de- 
cided superiority. 

Crome fixes the population of the Austrian 
dominions at twenty-five milhons ; but here we 
must make proper deductions for Belgium, the 
inhabitants of which can hardly amount to a 
less number than two millions ; after v/hich de- 
duction, twenty-three millions will remain. A 
considerable deduction must also be made for 
the loss of the Italian dominions of Austria ; 
and if we estimate their population at three- 
millions more, we shall not perhaps be very 
wide of the truth. Austria must, upon a justly 
balanced calculation, have lost not less than 
two millions arid a half of Italian subjects ; 
and, consequently, if we allow half a million for 
the increase of population since the time when 
these computation^ w^re made, we cannot at 
present estimate the fotacl p6pukti0n of the 
Austrian dorflinion^ at more thm twerity-6ft6 
million^. Mc HM^htt, boN^eVef, aSsigfis fd thm 



176 



no more than nineteen millions, and a half of in-* 
habitants, and of these he supposes Belgium to 
contain one million eight hundred thousand. 
According to this computation, when deduc- 
tions are made for the loss of the Belgic pro- 
vinces, there will remain no more than seventeen 
millions seven hundred thousand ; and a fur- 
ther deduction being made for the loss of the 
Italian territories, there will remain only four- 
teen millions seven hundred thousand, or per- 
haps about fifteen millions, for the aggregate 
population of the dominions of Austria, in their 
present defalcated state. Calculations of this 
kind, however, are almost always vague and er- 
roneous, given at random by travellers, and in- 
serted without examination in books of geogra- 
phy. Of this we have a remarkable instance in 
the different and contradictory accounts which 
have been published of the population of Hun- 
gary, one of the principal parts of the hereditary 
dominions of the house of Austria. 
The population of Hungary is, 

rBusching, - - - 5,170,000 
I Zimmerman, - - 5,040,000 
According to< Stelzen, - - - - 7,500,000 
I The conscription laid | ^ 
V before Jos. II, 1786,3 ' 
M. de Luca, however, makes this observation, 
that as conscriptive enumerations more fre- 
quently fall short than exceed the truth, we 



177 



may fix the population of Upper and Lower 
Hungary at 7,500,000. When we consider that 
the same author assigns 259,000 to Sclavonia, 
267,000 to Croatia, and ,1,500,000 to Transyl- 
vania, the aggregate population of those eastern 
appendages to the house of Austria, amounts 
to no less a number than 9,5^6,000* On this 
principle of computation, when we take Austria, 
Moravia, Bohemia, Styria, Carniola, Carinthia, 
&c. and at the same time make some moderate 
allowance for the probable increase of popula- 
tion since A. D. 1786, we cannot estimate the 
number of inhabitants in the Austrian domi- 
nions at less than twenty-one or twenty-two 
milhons* The population of the kingdom of 
France, before the revolution, was, by the best- 
informed writers, fixed at twenty-five, or rather 
twenty-six millions ; and that of the French 
empire, since the extension of its territories as 
far as the Rhine, is computed to be thirty mil- 
lions. When we consider the effusion of blood 
Qii the part of France, in the course of so long 
and destructive a war, carried on in so many 
different quarter?, and against so many differen^t 
nations, the extension of her dominions will 
h^r^ly authorise th^ supposition of sq great an 

* The diiference of these calculations from those in the first 
tdition, arises from the territorial losses of Austria by the last 
4isa9troTiS eontesV 

If 



17a 

increase in the number of her subjects. Ho^^- 
ever, as France can exact levies from the Itahan 
kingdom, the Swiss cantons, and other coun- 
tries under her influence, it is difficult to esti- 
mate her resources, or the number of troops she 
might bring into the field in case of emergency ; 
while powerful and successful she may unite 
Holland, Spain, Switzerland, and Italy under her 
banners ; but in case of a reverse of fortune, 
she would not perhaps find it so easy to exercise 
her domineering influence, and, in all-probabi- 
lity, would be left to her own exertions in an 
unsuccessful war. 

The superiority, which France appears to 
have gained over Austria, does not proceed so 
much from the superior number of her people, 
as from some other political and geographical 
circumstances. The dominions of France form 
one compact em-pire. Its resources are immedi- 
ately at hand, the mass of its people united in 
one compact political body, and its whole 
strength closely concentrated. The dominions 
of Austria are situated in an unconnected and 
disjointed position. A long time is necessary 
for the march of her levies from one extremity 
of her dominions to another, and very great 
cxpences must often be incurred before they ar- 
' rive at the place of tlicir destination ; whereas 
the armies of France, as soon as they are levied^ 
may be immediately, and with the greatest ce- 



179 



hrity, marched to the frontiers. If Bohemia 
be invaded, the whole country may be in the 
hands of the enemy before the troops of Hun- 
gary, Transylvania, Croatia, &c. can arrive at 
the scene of action ; or those eastern countries 
might be conquered before an army could march 
from Bohemia to their relief : but such, on the 
contrary, is the compact situation of France, 
that she can, in a very short space of time, march 
her army from the interior, for the purposes 
either of aggression or defence, and have them 
immediately ready, either to invade the domi- 
nions of an enemy, or to repel his attacks. on 
her own frontier. The Austrian dominions are 
not only geographically, but politically ill- con ^ 
nected, consisting of a variety of nations, of 
different manners, and opposite interests ; mu- 
tually strangers to one another, and speaking 
different languages. In all these particulars, 
the Hungarians, Sclavonians, Croats, and Tran- 
sylvanians, are as different from the Austrians 
and Bohemiians, and likewise those two latter 
nations from each other, as the English are from 
the French and Spaniards, This must necessa* 
rily weaken their union, and create much em- 
barrassment. 

It is not, however, solely in their social ha- 
bits, and moral circumstances, that the nations 
which compose the Austrian empire are dissimi- 
lar from one another. The difference of their 



political constitutions is not less striking tnan 
that of their other national characteristics. The 
government of Austria is an absolute hereditary 
monarchy ; the kingdoms of Bohemia and Hun * 
gary are constitutionally elective, although they 
have so long been annexed to the house of Aus- 
tria, that they may with propriety be reckoned 
hereditary appendages to that august family, 
and are indeed generally numbered among its 
hereditary dominions. The government of Hun-- 
gary is, however, entirely a Hmited monarchy, 
and every measure which the Court of Vienna 
may take against, or without, the consent of 
the States, is esteemed an infringement of the 
constitution, and is consequently apt to create 
disgust. The jarring interests of the states 
themselves, may very often retard their delibe= 
rations, and impede the execution of measures 
the best calculated for the public good. 

The cause from which proceeded the ill-suc- 
cess of the war, in whicli Joseph II. engaged 
against the Turks, is not generally known. The 
war was commenced with the most favourable 
appearances, on the side of Austria ; and the 
potent confederacy then formed between tlic 
two Imperial Courts of Vienna and Petershurgh, 
seemed to threaten the total subversion of the 
Ottoman empire. Joseph had an army, both in 
numbers, military discipline, and formidable 
equipment, equal to any then in Europe, anti 



181 

scarcely inferior to any that Europe had ever 
seen. He commanded in person, and he liad 
the soul of an hero. From this apparently au- 
spicious commencement, the most signal suc- 
cesses might reasonably have been expected. 
The event, however, did not realize the conjec- 
tures which appearances might have induced a 
politician to form. The cause which rendered 
abortive this grand military project of the Em- 
peror, is investigated and developed by Mr. 
Townson, who travelled into Hungary A. Do 
1793? and took great pains in exploring that 
country, whi-ch is as seldom visited by tra- 
vellers, and as little known perhaps as any in 
Europe. He tells us that the Emperor had dis- 
obliged the Hungarian nobility. The kingdom 
of Hungary is not only a limited monarchy, but 
its constitution is of a loose texture, and until 
Jately did not a little resemble that of an aristo- 
cratic republic. The feudal system prevailed 
there until A. D. 1785. The rio-hts of the 
Lords, and of the peasantry, had been defined 
by theUrbarium of Maria Theresa, A. D. 1764 ; 
but the adscriptio Gkbce continued until the 
reign of Joseph H. who abolished it in Bohe- 
mia and Moravia, A. D. 178 1, and in Hungaryj 
A. JD. 1785, The Hungarian nobihty have al- 
ways been exempt from taxes, and they claimed 
iJiis exemption as an inviolable privilege. Jo- 
seph, in prosecuting his plans of reform, had 



182 

alienated the affections of the aristocratic bodr, 
by attempting to establish an equal land-tax, a 
measure disagreeable to those who were to be 
the objects of its operation. The Hungarians, 
for that reason, neglected to furnish the sup- 
plies, which the Emperor expected, and which 
were necessary for carrying on the war. This 
was the rock upon which the grand enterprise 
of Joseph split ; for before new arrangements 
could be formed; the disaffection of the Nether- 
lands began to take place, and that illustrious 
monarch, who made the general good of his 
subjects the grand object of his political mea- 
sures, had. in more instances than one, the 
mortification of experiencing the ingratitude of 
mankind. 

The political discordancy of the different 
systems of government, in conjunction with the 
remarkable difference in moral and social cir- 
cumstances, which distinguishes the various na- 
tions of which the Austrian monarchy is com- 
posed, cannot fail of embarrassing and cramp- 
ing its exertions ; for not only the manners and 
languages of the Hungarians, Austrians, Bohe- 
mians, Sec. are totally different, but their na- 
tional interests, as well as their national preju-* 
dices, are sometimes diametrically opposite. 
Joseph's omission of his coronation at Buda, as 
King of Hungary, and his removal of the regal 
crowii from that place to Viemia, were circum^ 



183 



stances which mihtated, in the most decided 
manner, against the prejudices of the Hunga- 
rians, while they were in no respect disagree- 
able, but perhaps pleasing to the Austrians, and 
wholly indifFerent to the Bohemians. 

Accordins: to the different estimates of the 
extent and population of the dominions of Aus- 
tria, it evidently appears that they contain vast 
resources. The Court of Vienna can make nu- 
merous le^vie^, and the Austrian armies are ge- 
nerally as formidable by their bravery and dis- 
cipline as by their numbers. The inhabitants 
of the Austrian dominions in general are well 
qualified for a mihtary life, and seldom fail of 
making excellent soldiers. The Hungarians and 
Bohemians have always been brave and warlike 
nations ; and the Transylvaniaus, Croats, and 
Sclavonians, are not inferior to them in that re- 
spect. The mountaineers who inhabit the coun- 
tries of Carniola, Carinthia, Styria, &c. are re- 
markably strong, robust, and hardy, well formed 
for bearing every kind of fatigue, and in per- 
sonal courage not inferior to any people in Eu- 
rope. FrGrn tbese countries Austria can levy 
numerous armies of robust and hardy sokliers » 
and if that military enthusiasm, which has of 
late distinguished the French nation and its ar- 
mies, shall once begin to subside, the Imperial 
Eagle may yet soar aloft, and Austria may pro- 



184 



bably maintain a distinguished rank among the 
powers of Europe. 

It appears from a variety of circumstances, 
that there must be some deficiency in the finan- 
cial resources of Austria, that almost always 
cramps her exertions. Her dominions, although 
extensive and in general fertile, have but little 
trade, and that Uttle in many respects not well 
regulated, and consequently no very great ad- 
vantages can accrue from it to the state. Most 
of the Austrian territories being at a great dis- 
tance from^the sea, are disadvantageously situ- 
ated in respect to foreign trade ; and notwith- 
standino^ their fertilitv. their inland situation 
prevents, in a great measure, the exportation of 
their produce. There are few countries in Eu- 
rope which produce either a greater abundance, 
or a o:reater varietv of articles of commerce, 
than the Austrian dominions, and they might 
carry on a very great trade, if they possessed 
the advantage of a commercial situation. Hun- 
gar}*, in particular, may vie almost with any 
country in the world, of the same extent, in the 
abundance and excellence of its productions : 
its abundant crops of grain, its nmnerous herds 
of cattle, the variety of its metals and minerals, 
and the excellence of its wines, particularly 
that of Tokay, acknowledged to be the best in 
Europe, or perhaps io the world, would altoge- 



185 



ther constitute an inexliaustible source of com- 
merce and of wealth, if it had the advantage 
of a maritime situation. The want of that 
causes the country to remain poor, although, in 
other respects, sufficiently favoured by nature 
to be rendered extremely opulent. The extra- 
ordinary plenty and cheapness, as well as the 
excellent quality of all kinds of provisions, Sec. 
not only in Hungary and at Vienna, but in 
every other part of the Austrian donunions, are 
circumstances demonstrative of the abundance 
of their productions, and of the want of a more 
lively and extensive trade to carry this vast ex- 
uberance into wider circulation. It is, however, 
certain, that the wealth of those countries is in 
an advancing state, and likely so to continue, 
as the abolition of the feudal system, and other 
prudent measures adopted by the Imperial 
Court, are beginning to excite a commercial 
spirit in its dominions, and to stimulate the in- 
dustry of the people. 

The revenues of Austria are stated by M. 
Reisbec, at the annual sum of 215,000,000 of 
livres, or 10,700,0001. sterling. Crome, who 
fixes the population of the Austrian dominions 
at five millions and a half more than M. Reis- 
bec, states their annual revenue at 9, 100,0001 
sterling, a sum less by 1,600,000L sterling than 
is assigned to them by the latter author. These 
calculations, however, like the greatest part of 



186 



those we meet with relative to the population^ 
revenues, &c. of different countries, are little 
better than vague conjectures ; for it may he 
observed, that the statements of the public re- 
venues of kingdoms, as well as the estimates of 
the population of countries and great cities, 
made by different authors, almost always mate- 
rially disagree. The truth of those computa- 
tions depends on such documents as few tra- 
\Tllers or writers have the opportunity of exa- 
mining, and indeed sometimes none such can he 
found. It is besides to be considered, that ail 
governments, whether absolute or limited, whe- 
ther monarchies or republics, instead of being 
restricted to a certain annual revenue, advance 
that revenue in proportion to the public expen- 
diture, and the exigencies of the state. We must 
also observe, that these, and all the other state- 
ments that we have relative to this subject, were 
made prior to the dismemberment of Belgium, 
and the Italian Provinces, from the patrimony 
of the house of Austria ; an event which has 
not only caused a great decrease in the number 
of her subjects, but also a very considerable 
defalcation in her revenues. 

Whatever may be the actual state of the fi- 
nances of the court of Vienna, it is beyond all 
manner of doubt that the wealth of tlie Austrian 
dominions is of late considerably increased, and 
is capable of a still greater augmentation. Few 



187 

countries are more fertile, and agriculture is the 
basis of commerce as well as the support of ma- 
nufactures. If the exportation of the rich 
wines, and other productions of Hungary, were 
facihtated and encouraged, they would prove 
an inexhaustible fund of wealth. In proportion, 
however, as a commercial spirit increases among 
the people, new channels will be explored. Al- 
though the dominions of Austria are disadvan- 
tageously situated in regard to foreign com- 
merce, the Danube affords an excellent conve- 
nience for inland trade ; as by the navigation 
of that noble river, Hungary and Transylvania 
enjoy a communication not only with Austria, 
but with a very extensive part of the interior of 
Germany. The improvement and extension of 
commerce has, ever since the reign of Maria 
Theresa, been an object of the politics of the 
Imperial Court, and its measures have not been 
without success ; but if the dominions of the 
House of Austria could be brought under a 
more connected political arrangement, its power 
would be exceedingly augmented. When the 
extent and population of her territories, and the 
martial qualifications of her subjects are consi- 
dered, it is evident that Austria, although 
greatly debilitated, is far from being subdued ; 
and that although in the two last wars she has 
been very unfortunate, she may, notwithstand- 



188 



ing Ler recent losses, yet oppose a formidable 
barrier against foreign encroachment. 

The balance of power being now totally an- 
nrliilated, smaller states must inevitably depend 
an the will of the greater, be subject to their 
control, and swayed by their dictates ; but 
powerful monarchies are not overturned by the 
operations of a single campaign. In modern 
times, universal empire is not so readily esta- 
'blished as in the ages of antiquity, when mili- 
tary as well as political science was yet in its 
infancy, when the fate of a great nation fre- 
quently depended on the issue of a battle, and 
when the superior genius and enterprising cou- 
rage of one man were sometimes sufficient to 
decide the destiny of the world. These times 
are no longer, although it must be confessed 
that some features of them have in our days 
occasionally appeared ; but in an age when 
the sciences of politics and war are so well un - 
derstood, and when every country of Europe 
abounds in great talents, the space of a few 
years may be productiv^e of important altera- 
tions. The disastrous issue of the late conti- 
nental campaign is not to be considered as a 
standard, by which we must estimate all future 
contingencies. The misfortunes of Austria may 
easily be traced to their true source, to the pre- 
cipitancy of her first operations, and the tardi- 



180 

ness of her confederates. Whether any trea- 
sonable or pusillanimous conduct existed among 
any of her commanders, time and investigation 
will probably unfold. Bu t if the i^ustrian troops 
had carefully avoided coming to action 'until 
the Russians had arrived, and their vv^hok com- 
bined force had been concentrated, it is ex- 
tremely probable that the armies of France 
would have finished the campaign by retreating 
more precipitately than they had advanced. The 
gallant manner in which the Archdukes Charles 
and Ferdinand conducted their operations^ 
evinces what might have been done, if the 
whole force of Austria and Russia had, by its 
concentration, been enabled to display all its 
energy, and especially if the army of Swedeu 
had also advanced to the theatre of action. The 
want of adopting this plan, reduced the Enipe- 
ror, who saw himself the principal sufferer in 
the war, to the inevitable necessity of conclud- 
ing a pacification. The result of this unfortu- 
nate affair, however, while it leaves France at 
full hberty to renew against England her me- 
naces of invasion, indicates to the latter the ne- 
cessity of standing on her guard and relying on 
her own native strength, as in the present pos- 
ture of affairs, no continental measures can be 
expected to turn the attention of the French 
Emperor towards any other quartei'. 
It is the opinion of several persons, who have 



studied the politics of tlie Continent, tliat when- 
ever a war happens to break out bet^veen Aus- 
tria and the Porte, the former will find, on the 
side of Turkey, an indemnification for the loss 
of Belgium and the Italian Provinces ; and the 
conjecture is founded on strong probability, 
especially if Austria engages in such a war in 
conjunction with her great ally. The ill suc- 
cess of the war undertaken by Joseph II. owing, 
as already observed, to circumstances of a par- 
ticular nature, is not a precedent by which we 
can be enabled to judge of the probable result 
of any future war of the same description. To- 
wards that quarter,, indeed, political speculation 
must be chiefly directed, in order to form con- 
jectures on the future scenes of Austrian enter- 
prise. The most perfect harmony had long 
subsisted between Austria and the Ottoman em- 
pire ; and, during a considerable space of time, 
between the latter empire and Russia, when the 
famous personal interview took place between 
their Imperial and Czarinish Majesties in the 
Crimea. The particular negotiations which 
took place, and the particular subjects discussed 
in this personal interview of two of the greatest 
.sovereigns of Europe, as they were settled with- 
out the intervention of diplomatic agenc}^ never 
tt-anspired ; but -what soon followed is univer- 
sally known. What has happened may again 
happen ; and it i« net impossible that events 



IQl 

may yet take place in the eastern parts of Eu- 
rope, that may agitate a considerable part of the 
Continent. The aggrandizement of Austria, 
however, on whatever side it may take place, 
vAW serve to counterpoise the exorbitant power 
of France. 

While I take the liberty to range in the im- 
mense fields of conjecture, where the eye is not 
unfrequently amused with illusory scenes, I as- 
sure you, that reality is the characteristic of 
that respect with which 

I am. Sir, 



Your*s, &c. 



19* 



LETTER VII. 

SIR, 

After an investigation of the political, mo- 
ral, and local circumstances of Austria, those 
of Prussia naturally present themselves to our 
observation and inspection. Her power, like 
that of Austria, is not so great as to enable her 
to oppress Europe, but sufficiently formidable to 
secure her from foreign oppression, if her re- 
sources be managed to the bets advantage. Those 
resources we have seen drawn out in their full 
extent, in the last century, by the great Frederic, 
who astonished all Europe by his extraordinary 
efforts. In the commencement of the war be- 
tween the confederate powers and the French 
Republic, the Prussian armies were numerous 
and well disciplined, and France soon had rea- 
son to consider Prussia as no contemptible 
enemy. The conclusion of the peace with that 
power, was a circumstance which enabled the 
French to act with much greater energy against 
their other adversaries. If the w^ar with Prussia 
had continued, they would have found it no 
^asy task to conquer and keep possession of 



19S 

Holland, and at the same time to act with so 
much vigour in other quarters. 

The Prussian dominions comprise those coun- 
tries in the North of Germany, which were an* 
ciently occupied by the Vandals, who, in the 
declining age of the Roman empire, made so 
conspicuous a figure in History. Prussia is 
neither a rich nor a very commercial coun- 
try. The taxes, however, are high ; but the 
money levied in the country is generally ex« 
pended in it; and consequeiitly the kingdom 
cannot be said to be impoverished by taxation. 
The great Frederick was censured by some for 
loading his subjects v/ithhigh taxes. He was, 
however, one of the most able financiers of his 
time, and not less skilful in the management of 
his revenues than in conducting his armies/ 
Perhaps no prince ever maintained such a num- 
ber of troops with such limited means. He was 
an oeconomist, and he introduced a system of 
ceconomy into every department of the state. 
A judicious traveller develops the plan of that 
monarch's administration, as well as the effects 
of taxes, a subject so generally misunderstood, 
and illustrates those matters in the following re- 
marks : ''In order, says he, to form a just no* 
tion of the influence of high taxes upon the ne- 
cessaries of life, we should consider the con- 
nection which the industry of the citizen has 
%vith the productions of the country, before 

o 



m 

ofie allows oneself to think of its effects on fo^ 
reign trade. The king of Prussia (Frederick)^ 
who in every thing follows the order of nature, 
has not been so solicitous to procure money 
from foreigners as to stop the channels by 
which his own went out of the country. Con- 
sider things in this light, and you will find that 
the imposts on the necessaries of life h-ave been 
' no restraint on private industry; for the price 
of work has kept on a level with the price of 
the necessaries of Hfe, and the excise has ' only 
been a new and larger channel to assist the circu- 
lation of money. The king, who regularly pur- 
sued his plan of making the country independ- 
ent of foreign industry, took care that the 
money paid by the subject should flow back 
from the Exchequer by the surest channels. 
Thus all that was spent by the soldier, and all 
that the inhabitants of great towns spent for 
the comforts of life, flowed back again to the 
farmer, and encouraged internal agriculture and 
industry. In order that this might be so, the 
duties on foreign goods, such as cloths, linens> 
and the like, were always so high, that only 
the highest degree of luxury could prefer them 
to those made at home." These are tlie words 
of M. Reisbec, who seems to have had a very 
just notion of tJie operation of taxes ; for it 
is certain that, if the mon^y raised by taxation 
be f^xpended in the country where it is levier^, 



that country cannot be impoverished, but tli6 
circulation of the public wealth is accelerated 
and enlivened. Prussia has lately exhibited her- 
self a powerful mihtary state. Her standing 
army is always numerous, generally amounting 
lo about tNvo hundred thousand effective men ; 
and in the memorable seven years' war, that 
kingdom did not bring less than three hundred 
thousand into the field. The garrison of Ber- 
lin commonly amounts to not less than twenty- 
six thousand, and the Prussian troops are uni- 
versally acknowledged to be equal to any in 
Europe. The court of Berlin has long been re- 
markable for its judicious management of the 
pubhc revenues. The amount of those revenues 
cannot be exactly stated ; but it is certain they 
are very considerable. With so numerous an 
army, composed of as good soldiers as any on 
the continent, and with so oeconomical an ar- 
rangement in her financial affairs, Prussia ap- 
pears capable of asserting her own independence, 
and of maintaining a respectable rank among the 
continental powers. She seems at present to 
have adopted a system of strict neutrality, and 
few nations have a better opportunity of ad- 
hering to pacific measures, although her local 
situation does not seem calculated to afford her 
that advantage. In effect, it is not her geogra- 
phical position, but her political circumstances, 

in conjunction with those of the other conti- 

o S 



lg6 

2iental powers, that procure to Prussm the 
means of preserving her neutrality. Being al- 
most centrally situated between three great em- 
piresj Russia, Austria, and France, if any cou- 
test should happen between them it might be 
dangerous to any one of them to force her from 
her neutrality, and by such a procedure to 
compel her to throw her Aveight into the oppo- 
site scale. 

We may natumliy suppose Prussia and Aus- 
tria to be somewhat jealous of each other's ag- 
grandizement* In a political view, they may 
be considered as rivals. The whole effect! v" 
power of Germany may, with the greatest pro' 
priety, be said to be divided between them 
and consequently the too grea^t elevation of th 
one would necessarily iriyolve the depression o 
the other. The case is the same in the politica 
as in the mechanical balance. On this consi 
deration, vrhatever alliances may be formed be 
tween those two powers, they must seem in th 
eye of political speculation somewhat unnatural 
and in consequence can hardly be productive o 
any great effects, or be of any long duratio: 
unless Russia could form the connecting lin 
in the chain, an experiment which has of lat 
been unsuccessfully made. This circumstan 
constitutes the security of the French empir 
on that side. It has already been observe 
that if all Germany were united under one g 



m 

vernment like France, it would be an over- 
match for her; and it may be added, that i^ 
Austria and Prussia were united in a firm alli- 
ance, they would be able to frustrate all the as- 
piring views of that domineering power on the 
continent. The union of those two leading* 
powers might be considered as the union of all 
Xjrermany, as none of the German princes could 
avoid being implicated in so powerful a coali- 
lion. 

The dominions of Austria and Prussia, taken 
collective!}^, exceed those of France both in ex- 
tent and population, even in her present state 
<)f aggrandizement, since her acquisition of 
Belgium and the extension of her frontiers as 
far as the Rhine. It is also an unquestionable 
and well-known fact, that the Austrians and 
Prussians are at the least as good soldiers as the 
French. From these considerations it evidently 
appears, that the coalition of those two powers, 
if it could be carried into effect, would be suf- 
ficient to balance the weight of the French em- 
pire in the continental scale. When the politi- 
cal and geographical situation of Prussia, m 
respect of Austria and France, is duly considered, 
such an union, however, can only be ranked in 
the class of possibilities. No existing circum- 
stance indeed authorises an expectation that 
any such coalition will take place, or that Prus- 
sia can be induced to arm against a power whose 



198 

proximity of situation and military force give 
her so great an ascendency in that quarter. 

Towards the latter end of the last century, 
Prussia and Austria, in conjunction with Rus- 
sia, have considerably aggrandized tlieniselves 
by the partition of Poland, a kingdom which, 
during* several centuries, held a considerable 
rank among the European nations. The Polish 
monarchy, or rather republic, made a respecta- 
tle figure not half a century ago. At this time 
it is not to be reckoned in the class of inde- 
pendent states ; and its dismembered parts only 
serve to augment the wealth, the power, 
and the influence of its potent neighbours. 
The partition of Poland has been generally 
considered by political writers as the first in- 
fringement on the balance of power in Europe^r 
No opposition was, however, made against that 
measure by any of the European potentates. 
It has also been called a violation of Pohsh li- 
berty; but to consider it in that hght, the 
word liberty must be understood in a sense 
very different from its natural signification. 
The great mass of the people of Poland pos- 
sessed nothing that bore the least resemblance 
to liberty. Polish liberty consisted only in the 
rich having the liberty of oppressing the poor 
at discretion, and with impunity; and although 
Poland no longer ranks as an independent na- 
tiQD^ humanity inclines us to think that the 



too 

people have no reason to regret the change. 
They could not, indeed, by any political revo- 
lution, be placed in a worse situation than they 
had before experienced. How thankful ought 
Enghshmen to he to Divine Providence, that 
they could not by any change be placed in a 
situation which could afford them any greater 
share of pohtical and civil happiness than they 
at present ^njoy ? 

With a confident hope that our excellent con- 
stitution will stand firm against all the attacks 
of foreign and domestic enemies, and with 
rs^ry wish for your health and welfare, 

I am, &c. 



200 



LETTER Vlir. 

SIR, 

In continuing our view of the political situ- 
ation of Europe, after having considered the 
present state of Germany, and especially of 
Austria and Prussia, the two preponderating 
powers of that political confederacy, and the 
central points of its efficient strength, Italy, 
in the next place, presents itself to our view, 
and merits some observations. 

This once celebrated country, over-run and 
plundered by the armies of France, is now en- 
tirely at her disposal, and must be subservient 
to her views. There is but little probabihty 
that Italy can ever shake off the yoke without 
some powerful foreign aid; and tins none, ex- 
cept England and Austria, can give. The ar- 
mies of the one, seconded by the fleets of the 
other, might, perhaps, if no other object called 
for their exertions, effect the enfranchisement 
of a great part of Italy. This supposition, 
however, is nothing better than an excursion 
into the regions of possibility, as no existing 
appearances, at present, authorise a conjecture 
that any such effort will ever be made ; and the 



201 



Cisalpine kingdom, which seems fixed as a bar- 
rier against the attempts of Austria, will con- 
tribute to retain Italy in her dependence on 
France. 

In regard to the disunion of its parts, the 
same observations may be mad e on Italy, as 
have just been made respecting Germany. The 
political system of both these countries origi- 
nated from the same causes ; and the different 
governments and states into which both are di- 
vided, arose nearly at the same time. Italy is, 
however, destitute of the advantage of being 
united, like Germany, in one great political 
confederacy, which has always rendered her less 
capable of resisting hostile aggression, than she 
might have been if her different principalities 
and states had entered into a permanent confe- 
deracy like those of Germany. In speaking of 
that country, the disadvantages of its being di- 
vided into such a multiphcity of small and in- 
dependent states have been observed, which, 
notwithstanding the indissoluble political con- 
federacy of the whole Germanic body, must 
be acknowledged to be very great and conspi- 
cuous. Italy, however, has always been still 
more disunited in her political system, and di- 
vided into a great number of independent 
states, without any political adhesion; and to 
this, rather than to any other cause, must be 
attributed her debility. Had Italy been united 



202 



tinder one government, there is no reason to sup» 
pose that she would have been much inferior to 
France : some think lier nothing inferior to that 
country in extent and population ; but there is 
reason to believe this calculation erroneous. 
The difference, however, between the two 
countries, in regard to these circumstances^ is 
not such as could give the one any decided su- 
periority over the other; and it is certain that 
if Italy, like France, had been united in one 
vigorous political system, that country would 
never have been subjugated by the armies of 
the i^public. 

The multiplicity of political divisions into 
which Italy is partitioned, although it be the 
principal, is not the only cause of her inability 
to resist oppression. The unwarlike genius of 
the people contributes not a little to the weak- 
ness of the Italian states ; and, at the same- 
time, eminently displays the effects of political 
causes on moral habits. Every man of letters 

acquainted w^itli the Roman history, and can- 
not but have observed the superiority of the 
ancient inhabitants of Italy over the rest of 
mankind in military affairs. Their martial 
spirit, hovv^ever, is now entirely extingukhed, 
and no nation in Europe is less warlike. This 
change must proceed from m©ral, as it cannot 
from physical causes. The modern Italians live 
iinder the same climate, breathe the same air, 



^03 



and are nourished by the productions of the 
same soil as tlie ancient Romans^ those cele- 
brated conquerors of the world ; but having 
been so long divided into a number of petty 
states, of ^yhich none was sufficiently powerful 
to maintain a contest with any of tlie neigh- 
bouring nations, they have generally found 
their interest to consist in the preservation of 
peace. TH is circumstance, in conjunction with 
the subliuie and active genius of the nation, 
generated a new and pecuhar national taste. 
The Italian princes, possessing territories of 
a small extent, and very moderate revenues, 
found themselves destitute of the means of en- 
gaging, with any probability of success, in great 
mihtary enterprises ; and, consequently, reject- 
ing every idea of political aggrandizement, and 
renouncing every pretension to martial glory, 
they sought for another kind of fame, that of 
being the patrons of learning and the fnie arts, 
especially the latter; a glory indeed more ra- 
tional than any that can be acquired by the de- 
vastation of kingdoms, and the slaughter of 
the human race : and it would be a happy cir- 
cumstance for Europe, if some of our neigh- 
boufs would direct their aims to the embellish- 
inent, rather than to the desolation of the 
world ; and exert their abilities for the impove- 
ment, rathdr than for the destruction of man- 
kind. 



204 



Tiie genius of the Italians, encouraged by 
the patronage afforded by their princes to the 
study of the arts, procured to the nation the 
esteem of foreigners, and Italy was the great 
rendezvous of the virtuosi, and persons of dis- 
tinction, of ever}^ nation ; a circumstance 
which contributed^ in no small degree, to en- 
rich the country. The arts and embellishments 
of Italy were, however, inadequate to her pro- 
tection in an age when every point was carried 
by the sword, and when republican rapacity 
knew no bounds. The courts of several of 
the Italian princes might be considered as aca- 
demies of architecture, painting, and sculpture; 
and their effective patronage of these arts, with 
their munificence to those who excelled in 
them, determined the national taste. This cir- 
cumstance, together with a long continuance 
of peac€, produced a neglect of miUtary disci- 
pline, and completed the extinction of that 
martial genius which so eminently distinguished 
the ancient inhabitants of Italy. 

That the modern Italians are capable of be- 
ing rendered as good soldiers as the ancient 
Romans, if they were placed in the same cir- 
cumstances, and stimulated by the same mo- 
tives, is a truth which cannot be called in ques- 
tion, as it is both consistent with reason, and 
confirmed by experience. The Spanish armies 
so long employed in the Netherlands, and sue- 
3 



205 



cessively commanded by the duke of Ah% 
Don John of Austria, Alexander Farnese^ 
Prince of Parma, &c. were universally ac- 
knowledged to be the best troops in Europe ; 
and it is well known that a very considerable 
part of them consisted of Italians, Indeed, 
whenever the modern Italians have been properly 
trained to war, they have proved thernselves as 
good soldiers as those of any other country. 
They are not defective in courage ; their defi- 
ciency is in discipline. This defect cannot^, 
however, be rectified, nor the Italians rendered a 
warlike people, capable of resisting the oppres- 
SiOi: ^ ^ LacQ, without such a chang-e in their 
r..l'.. ^ ' svitem, and national spirit as no ex- 
ist'np- app earances authorize us to thin k probable* 
1 b'rg leave to conclude this dissertation on 
tpc pol'dcal circumstances of a country whicliy 
from hthio; once the domineering mistress of 
the world, has, after experiencing every vicissi-- 
tude of fortune, at last, sunk under the oppres- 
sion of France, by recommending to your at° 
tentioii the uncertainty of all sublunary things,- 
and the instability of human greatness, as well 
as by assuring you that, with every sentiment 
©'f I'espect^. 



206 



LETTER IX, 

SIR, 

A HE situation of Spain constitutes a principal 
feature in the political aspect of Europe. The 
affairs of that kingdom are so closely connected 
with those of Great Britain and France, as to 
claim, in an eminent degree, our observation 
and attention* 

The power and greatness of the Spanish mo- 
narchy at the accession of Philip II. as well as 
the tyrannical and ill-judged measures of that 
prince, which first occasioned its decline, have 
been already remarked. The consequences also 
of the declension of the Spanish power, so far 
as they regarded England and France, have been 
concisely investigated and developed, in deli- 
neating the present state of the British and Gal- 
lic empire. It suffices, therefore, to consider 
the existing circumistances of Spain, as poHti- 
cally connected at present With these two pre- 
ponderating powers. 

Since the subversion of the Roman empire, 
Europe has not exhibited a more remarkable 
instance of the fallacy of political appearances 



207 

'than we have seen exemplified iii the depression 
of Spain, from that domineering elevation in 
which she was placed about tlie middle of t])C 
sixteenth century. At the commenceeient of 
the reign of Philip 11. the wealth of the Spanish 
monarchy far surpassed that of all the rest of Eu- 
rope; and its power was not less formidable 
than its riches were enviable. At that time, the 
greatness of Spain, her commerce, her opuleiicej 
and her power, seemed to be fixed upon an im- 
moveable basis. Iler extensive and opulent do- 
minions ill Europe ; her immense territories, 
and rich mines of gold and silver in America 
her vast resources, of diflerent kinds, in the okl 
and the new world ; and, above all, lier appa- 
rent ability to preserve all these advantages b}^ 
her military and naval strength, in which she 
w^as so greatly superior to any other country m 
Europe, formed a combination of circumstances 
which seemed to place her above the caprice of 
fortune, and to promise her a permanency of 
greatness, if experience had not, even long be- 
fore that period, taught mankind, that inva- 
riable prosperity has never yet been the lot of 
empires. 

In observing that the political greatness of 
England and France arose from the decline of 
Spain, the causes which precipitated her from 
her enormous elevation has also been remarked. 
But besides the revolt of the Netherlands, the 



2oS 



destruction of the grand Armada, &c. other 
causes of a more latent nature, but of which the 
operation, though less conspicuous, was eqnailj 
certain and fatal, essentially contributed to the 
decline of her commerce, the wealth, and the 
power of that kingdom. After the revolt of 
the Netherlands,^ the Spanish empire was still 
sufficientl}^ extensive, and its resources siiffi* 
ciently great ; and the defeat of the Armada 
was not to be deemed an irreparable loss. The 
naval strength of a great maritime power is not 
to be considered as annihilated by the loss of a 
fleet. An active and commercial nation soon 
retrieves such losses ; and its energy, instead of 
being extinguished, is excited by such partial 
misfortunes. Great Britain sustained, by the 
revolt of her American colonies, a loss appa- 
rently of equal, or even of superior magnitude 
to that which Spain suffered by the revolt of the 
Netherlands ; but the energy of the British na- 
tion was not broken, its power was not weak- 
ened, nor its trade diminished by that great po- 
litical revolution. These had their source in 
the active industry and commercial spii it of the 
people ; and did not depend on the adventitious 
circumstances of casual victory, or territorial 
extension. The people of Spain, on the con- 
trary, actuated by a sort of indolent pri^e 
vrhich, at that time, constituted, in a pecu 
manner^ a distinguishing trait in their nations. 



209 

cliaracter, had no taste for the employments and 
pursuits of a commercial, or a manufacturing 
system. The new world was the great theatre 
of Spanish enterprise and exertion ; and num- 
bers of individuals resorted thither for the sake 
of acquiring wealth and honour by the hasty 
methods of conquest and spoil, in preference to 
the slower means of commerce and plodding in- 
dustry. This may be considered as one of the 
causes which militated against the establishment 
of a manufacturing system in Spain. While the 
other European nations, especially England and 
France, were establishing manufactures of vari- 
ous kinds, the Spaniards paid no attention to 
pursuits of that nature ; and, in regard to ha- 
bits of industry, the Spanish nation remained 
stationary in the midst of the general activity 
of Europe. Spain produces a greater quantity 
of the finest wool than any other country ; but 
so little of it is manufactured at home, that this 
valuable commodity affords very little employ- 
jiient to the natives, except that of attending 
the flocks. It seems, upon the whole, that the 
Spaniards have paid little attention to any thing 
but their mines, and their immense possessions 
in America, without considering, that wealthy 
and extensive colonies are of little advantage to 
a state, unless they excite the industry of the 
mother- country, and increase its wealth and po- 
pulation by providing employment and sub- 

p 



210 



sistence for its inhabitants. The Spanish colo- 
nies, on the contrary, have drained the mother- 
country of its inhabitants, by reason of the con- 
tinual emigrations from Spain to America, and 
do not appear to have much contributed to the 
augmentation of its wealth ; because the Euro- 
pean merchandise exported to Spanish America, 
as it has been before observed, consists chiefly 
of manufactured goods, the production, not of 
Spanish, but of foreign industry. The emigra- 
tions to America have no doubt tended very 
much to the depopulation of Spain* The ex- 
pulsion of the Moors was another circumstance 
which contributed very much both to the de° 
crease of population, and the extinction of in- 
dustry. Some authors assert, that not less than 
one hundred and fifty thousand Moorish fami- 
lies were expelled ; and if it be considered that 
those were the most industrious part of the in- 
habitants, it is easy to conceive how fatal a 
blow this must have been to industry, as well 
as to population. It is certain that the number 
of inhabitants in that kingdom had considerably 
decreased, between the conimen cement of the 

* ^Ir. Brougham controverts this general assertion of almost 
all writers on the subject, and adduces some strong arguments 
to prove that the colonial emigrations have not contributed so 
much to the depopulation of Spain as it is commonly supposed. 
■ Colon. Syst. vol. Ist. p. 382—389. 



211 



joint reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, and the 
accession of the family of Bourbon, a circum- 
stance that cannot be otherwise accounted for, 
than by ascribing it to the expulsion of the 
Moors, and the frequent and numerous emigra- 
tions to the colonies. 

Some writers estimate the present population 
of Spain at little more than seven millions. This 
calculation, however, must fall considerably 
short of the truth. Spain is a country that is not 
often visited by travellers ; and it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to procure any authentic docu- 
ments from which a statement, in any tolerable 
degree approximating to the truth, can be made. 
Although the face of the country be in many 
parts very mountainous, it contains many ex- 
tensive tracts of the most luxuriant fertility^ 
and a number of large and most populous cities. 
From these circumstances it might be conjec- 
tured that the number of inhabitants can scarcely 
be less than ten millions, especially as it is uni- 
versally acknowledged that the country is much 
improved, and its population considerably in- 
creased since the accession of the princes of the 
house of Bourbon. Admitting, however, the 
number of inhabitants in Spain to be not less 
than it is here conjecturally stated, it will not 
constitute half so numerous a population as the 
country might, from its extent, and the gene- 
ral fertihty of its soil, be supposed capable of 

p 21 



212 



supporting, especially as the Spaniards are the 
most abstemious people in all Europe. 

Spain is about equal' to France in extent, al- 
though so very far inferior in population. If^ 
indeed, her population were equal to that of 
her great neighbour, there is every reason to 
suppose that her power would be also the same ; 
for the Spaniards, when well trained, have al- 
ways been found excellent soldiers. They are 
irot defective either in genius or courage, and 
are endowed by nature with all the qualifica- 
tions requisite for making the greatest advance- 
ment in every thing that can improve and em- 
bellish a nation. Stupidity, or slowness of un- 
derstanding, has never been imputed to them by 
any intelligent traveller or writer ; on the con- 
trary, those who have the most accurately in- 
vestigated their national and individual charac- 
ter, have always bestowed the highest encomi- 
ums on the vigour of their intellectual powers. 
It is, however, not a little surprismg, that 
while a superior genius is universally allowed to 
to be a national characteristic of the Spaniards^ 
they are, notwithstanding, some centuries be- 
hind the French and Enghsh in national im- 
provements. It is evident that some powerful-i 
moral causes must fatally militate against theirJ 
advancement, and occasion the depression om 
the national genius. The most observabl|j| 
causes to which such calamitous effects can be 



gl3 

tiscribed are, that national and individual pride 
which has so long been considered as their dis« 
tinguished characteristiq ; their strong attach* 
ment to their own mannerSj customs, and pre- 
judices ; and the shackles with which their 
minds have so long been loaded by the tyranny 
of the inquisition. Their pride has prevented 
them from banishing their ancient prejudices, 
fr©m abolishing their ancient customs, and 
from adopting the improvements of other na- 
tions. In the commencement of Philip 11.'^ 
reign, Spain was certainly, both in power and 
opulence, both in naval and military strength, 
superior to any of the other European nations ; 
and the Spaniards, sensible of this superiority, 
looked down on them with a sovereign con- 
tempt. When their power and influence began 
rapidly to decline, their national pride, still 
unabated, induced them to continue in the same 
opinion, and to despise the fancied inferiority 
of their neighbours. While, therefore, the 
neighbouring nations were rapidly improv- 
ing in every art and science, establishing ma- 
nufactures, and extending their commerce^ 
-Spain remained, during the space of three cen" 
turies, in nearly the same state as at the ac- 
cession ofPhihp, still valuing herself on her na- 
tional superiority ; and very few improvements 
were made until the crown was transferred to 
the house of Bourbon, in the beginning of the 



214 



last century. A different arrangement had, 
however, taken place, and Spain was beginning 
to hold a distinguished rank am oner the Euro- 
pean nations, when the volcano of mischief 
burst out at Paris, and convulsed all Europe. 

Before that event took place, although Spain 
was often, in consequence of the family com- 
pact, induced to enter into the views of France, 
yet her engagements were Toluntary : and she 
was independent and powerful. In those better 
da3-s, Spain was not in a state to suffer com- 
pulsion, or implicitly to obey the imperious 
dictates of a foreign power; neither indeed would 
she at this time, if the energy of Europe were 
once roused. B\' sea she could hare nothing tc 
apprehend from France. It is the great military- 
force of that empire which depresses the spirits, 
and paraEses the exertions of Europe. Fron. 
this state of apathy the continent cannot: be 
roused, nntil the European nations shall nnd 
imposed spon them the necessity of resisting 
the farther encroachments of France, and perhaps 
the time may not be far distant. In case of an 
unsuccessful termination of the war with Eng- 
land, it is not improbable that France will, in 
the next place, seek to indemnify herself on the 
continent, for her losses and disgrace ; and if, 
on the contrary-, the war should terminate in 
any great degree to her advantage, a termi- 
nation which, we may confidently say, is little 



215 



to be feared, the consequences ' are obvious. 
In either case, it is extremely apparent, that 
combined Europe will once more be compelled 
to assert her independence, or sink with lethar- 
gic insensibility under the domineering sway of 
revolutionary ambitron. To suppose that France 
should be ultimately successful in her present 
contest with England, is impossible. The absur- 
dity of such a supposition must immediately 
present itself to the mind of every man who 
h^s considered the comparative circumstances 
of the two nations, and knows how to reason, 
from the operation of moral causes. There is 
not the least doubt but the French cabinet is 
already convinced of the impracticability of its 
designs against this country* 

Most respectfully, 

I am, Sir, 
Your's, 8cCo 

* In the 1st edition tliese words followed: " and is al- 
rea;ly looking round for more easy conquests. Already some 
parts of its (the French government's) conduct seem calculated 
to provoke the continental powers to undertake the contest/' 
The provocations repeatedly given to Russia, and the whole 
train of recent events^ shew the justness of this conjectural pre- 
diction.— Edit. 



216 



LETTER X. 

In Gontemplating those important scenes in 
which Great Britain is so essentially interested, 
and so deeply engaged, Portugal claims, in an 
eminent degree, the attention of an English 
observer. The political state of that country 
has a peculiar claim to our regard, on account 
of the multiplicity and importance of its connec- 
tions with England, its long and faithful alli- 
ance, and the benefits arising from their com- 
mercial intercourse. In the preceding remarks 
on the manufactures of Great Eritain, it ha5 
been observed that Portugal and her colonies 
constitute one of their greatest and best mar- 
kets. As Portugal has scarcely any manufac- 
tures, and Brasil is one of the richest, the most 
extensive, and the most populous of all the 
European settlements, the demand for the ma- 
nufactured goods of this country is always 
great from that quarter, and must be increased 
in proportion to the improvement, and the in- 
creased wealth and population of the Portuguese 
colonies. Portugal al^o, by means of her settle- 
ments in Congo, Angola, and otiier parts of 



Africa^ afrords a market to British goods, and 
opens a channel for their introduction into se» 
veral parts of the African continent. These 
considerations are both a powerful and a ra- 
tional inducement to Great Britain to interest 
herself in whatever relates to the safety and 
prosperity of such an ally. 

The extent of Portugal, and the number of 
her inhabitants, are inconsiderable, when com- 
pared with the corresponding circumstances of 
several other countries on the continent of Eu- 
rope. Her militaiy strength is consequently 
small, in comparison of theirs ; and she cannot 
be supposed able to maintain a contest with any 
of the great continental powers. Her only sure 
reliance is on Great Britain. To her alliance 
with this country, Portugal owes her independ- 
ence, and even her political existence. 

There was indeed a time when the enterpris- 
ing genius of the Portuguese reflected the 
highest lustre on their national character, and 
when the greatness of their achievements, as 
well as the extent of their discoveries, astonish- 
ed the world. The kings of Portugal, towards 
the latter part of the fifteenth century, seeing 
their dominions confined to a narrow slip of 
land on the continent, adopted a scheme for 
the aggrandizement of their power, the exten- 
sion of their dominions, and the enriching of 
their subjects. This plan was the most noble, 



218 



the most rational, and the best adapted to the 
circumstances of their kingdom, that could 
possibly have been conceived. Seeing them- 
selves precluded, by the situation and con- 
tracted hmits of their territories, from any 
effectual interference in the aifairs of Europe, 
and deprived of every means of aggrandize- 
ment on that side, the Portuguese monarchs 
turned their attention towards the ocean, which 
opened to them and their subjects an immense 
theatre of adventurous enterprise. The Cape 
of Good Hope was discovered by Bartholomew 
de Dias, in the reign of John II. and the pas- 
sage to India, round that southernmost pro- 
montory of Africa, was accomplished by Vasco 
di Gama, A. D. 1497. 

After that memorable event the Portuguese 
formed settlements almost quite round the west- 
ern, southern, and eastern coasts of Africa, 
and conquered, under the conduct of their fa- 
mous general Alphonso d'Albuquerque, most of 
the maritime parts of India, with Malacca in 
the farther peninsula, the island of Ormus in 
the Persian gulph, and many other places of 
importance. In a short space of time the spice 
islands, and others in the Indian ocean, were 
added to their conquests; and about A. D. 
1515, they had obtained the exclusive posses- 
sion of the trade of Africa, India, and the ori- 
ental islands. Portugal was then in the zenith 



2ig 



of her prosperity ; but her golden age was not 
of long duration. The romantic expedition of 
King Sebastian into Africa, which terminated 
in the death of that prince, as well as of the two 
rival kings of Morocco, all three of whom fell 
in one battle, threw the national affairs into 
confusion; and the weak administration which 
followed, having depressed the enterprising* 
genius of the people, the kingdom of Portugal* 
was seized by PhiHp II. of Spain, and annexed 
to that crown. This was the epoch of the 
downfal of Portugal, and her annexation to 
Spain was the fatal cause of that depression of 
her power, and that diminution of her com- 
merce, which continues even to this day ; for 
that kingdom being reduced to a province of 
Spain, the wealthy settlements of the Portu- 
guese, in the different quarters of the globe, 
became exposed to the attacks of the Dutch 
and other enemies of the latter power. The 
Dutch dispossessed the Portuguese of the spice 
islands, and almost all their opulent possessions 
in the oriental islands, and on the continent of 
India ; and scarcely any thing remained of all 
their vast acquisition, except the city and 
island of Goa. Brasil also fell into the hands 
of the Dutch, as well as several other settle- 
ments of inferior importance. Modern history 
does not afford a similar instance of so rapid an 
exaltation succeeded by so suddden and decisive 



220 

a fall. Portugal has never been able to retrieve 
the losses she suifered by this fatal event. That 
kingdom having remained about sixty years in 
subjection to Spain, recovered at last its inde- 
pendence. A revolution, one of the most ex- 
traordinary to be met with in history, was 
brought about by the unparalleled dexterity and 
prudence of Pinto de Ribeiro, steward to the 
duke of Braganza. This man, by a train of 
most masterly manoeuvres, expelled the Spa- 
niards, and placed his m. aster on the throne, 
A. D. 1 640. From that time Portugal has con- 
tinued an independent kingdom ; but it is sole- 
ly her alliance with Great Britain that supports 
her in that independence. Without this pro- 
tection Portugal must long ago have sunk un- 
der the power of Spain, especially since the 
coalition of the latter country with France, in 
virtue of the family compact. 

Although Portugal regained her independ- 
ence, she was not however able to recover her 
settlements in India and the oriental islands, of 
which she had been dispossessed by the Dutch 
during the time that, in consequence of her an- 
nexation to Spain, they had regarded her as an 
enemy. The rich and extensive country of 
Brasil was however recovered, with some other 
of her captured settlements ; and, in a short 
time, the political and commercial state of Por- 
tugal assumed the form in which it now appears. 



221 



When Portugal was in the exulting period of 
her splendour, and when her commerce was just 
attaining to its highest pitch, England did not 
derive from her commercial connections with 
that kingdom, the same advantages as she 
has done in latter times, for want of the means 
of furnishing the requisite articles of trade. 
The manufacturing system of Great Britain was 
then in its infancy. The Netherlands, at tha$ 
time, supplied Portugal with manufactured 
goods, for the use of her numerous and exten- 
sive colonies ; and the wealth which flowed from 
the Portuguese settlements in the mother coun- 
try, was drawn from thence to Antwerp, Brussels, 
Bruges, Ghent, and other commercial and ma* 
nufacturing towns in the Belgic provinces. 
The oppressive and tyrannical- measures of 
Philip II. in driving those provinces to revolt, 
and compelling their manufacturers and artisan^ 
to seek a peaceahle asylum in England and other 
countries, bereaved the Netherlands of this ad- 
vantage ; and while he shewed himself the im- 
placable enemy of this country, he injudici- 
ously, and unintentionally, conferred upon it a 
benefit of the greatest magnitude. Had not 
the despotism and tyranny of Philip obliged 
the manufacturers of the Netherlands to fly for 
refuge into England, and other foreign coun- 
tries, and at last caused the total separation of 
those provinces from the Spanish monarchy, the 

4 



222 



prodigious mass of wealth drawn from the Por- 
tuguese, as well as the Spanish settlements, 
would have been concentrated with his own do- 
minions, instead of being almost wholly dis- 
persed into foreign countries, and particularly 
into England, a kingdom against which he 
professed the most rancorous and determined 
hostihty. 

It is hardly possible, in considering these 
events, to avoid making some reflections on the 
wonderful dispensation of that all- controling 
Providence which over-rules the counsels of 
men, and determines the issue of all mundane 
affairs. The history of mankind abounds with 
instances of plans of aggrandizement, formed 
by the most powerful princes, and the most 
profound politicians, concerted with the greatest 
sagacity, and promising indisputable success, 
which have, by unforeseen causes, not only 
been totally disconcerted, but even converted 
to the ruin of the projectors, by the inscrutable 
decrees of Him who has declared, that he will 
confound the wisdom of the wise, (L e.) when 
acting in opposition to his will ; and who never 
fails of accomplishing his promise. 

Philip 11. has been generally esteemed a pru- 
dent and politic prince. He was, beyond all 
manner of doubt, superlatively ambitious, and, 
notwithstanding his injudicious measures, he 
might be well skilled in state affairs. He aimed 



223 



at uncontrolable power, and universal sway. 
Fascinated by his predominant passion, and led 
astray by that meteor of pohtical aggrandize- 
ment, which has dazzled the eyes and clouded the 
understanding of many first-rate politicians, his 
inordinate ambition drew a veil before the con- 
sequences of his conduct, which proved, in 
every respect, diametrically opposite to what he 
expected, disastrous in the extreme to his own 
kingdom, and equally advantageous to those 
enemies v/hom he most desired to depress, ^iay 
not Philip be in this respect denominated the 
prototype of a celebrated personage of the pre- 
sent day ? and might not the effects of his inju- 
dicious proceedings have operated as a salutary 
caution to the political Colossus of our times ? 
As the tyranny and ambition of Phihp laid the 
foundation of the greatness and power of Eng- 
land, the military preparations and menaces of 
the Emperor of France, instead of depressing, 
has raised that power to the highest pitch, and 
roused her energy in a manner unprecedented 
at any former period. The enterprising pro- 
jects, and formidable menaces of the French 
government, hasuuade Great Britain acquainted 
with her own strength^ beyond all former expe- 
riment, and caused her to exhibit a display of 
naval and military strength unexampled in the 
annals of the nation, and able to bid defiance to 
all the rest of the world. Thus, when the Su- 



224 



preme Ruler has decreed the fall of nations, or 
of individuals, a judicial infatuation pervades 
their counsels, turns their deep-laid and well- 
concerted schemes to their own disaster, and 
converts into foolishness the wisdom of the 
Ahithophels of every age. 

In observing the relative situation of Great 
Britain and Portugal, and the reciprocal advan- 
tages resulting from their political and commer- 
cial connections, from which those general but 
appropriate reflections had in some measure 
turned away our attention, it is not difficult to 
perceive that those two kingdoms are deeply 
and mutually interested in v/hatever concerns 
eacli other's safety. If Portugal should fall 
under the power of France, England would lose 
a profitable branch of her commerce in time of 
war; and in time of peace would be admitted 
to a participation of it, under such restrictions 
as would probably render it of small advantage. 
Although the French government has long been 
extremely desirous of excluding from Portugal 
the vessels and merchandise of Great Britain, 
there is one consideration v/hich cannot fkil of 
deterring it from taking any measures which 
might force Portugal into a war with her ancient 
ally, and still more from attempting to make a 
conquest of that kingdom. In the former case, 
England would have it in her power to seize on 
Brasil, as a cautionary step, in order to prevent 



225 



the wealth of that country from flowing into 
the coffers of France, by turning it into her 
own ; as also to have at her disposal an acquisi- 
tion of such importance and consideration* 
whenever a treaty of peace may take place. As 
it is certain that France would be very unwil- 
ling that so valuable an acquisition should re- 
main in the hands of Great Britain, that consi- 
deration would be of great weight in any future 
negotiation. In the latter case, if that power 
should make an entire conquest of Portugal, 
Great Britain would, in spite of every opposition, 
that France could make, have it in her power to 
conquer Brasil, the source of Portuguese wealth 
^nd commerce. These are measures which it i'^ 
certain that Great Britain would tak^ with ex- 
treme reluctance against the dominions of her 
ancient ally, and which no consideration would 
ever induce her to adopt, unless France should 
vashly and impohticly, by subjugating Portugal, 
compel her to act so directly opposite to her in- 
clinations. It is not, however, much to be ap- 
prehended that England will be reduced to this 
disagreeable necessity ; for the French govern- 
ment cannot be ignorant that if it should make 
a conquest of Portugal, such a step would com 
pel England to take possession of Brasil, the 
most valuable part of the Portuguese dominions, 
and without which Portugal itself would be afi 
acquisition of no great importance : especially 



225 

as it would eventually redound less to the ad- 
vantage of France than to that of her enemies. 
These considerations afford a ground of hope 
almost equal to certainty, that the ambition of 
France will not attempt to subjugate a kingdom 
which it is so much the interest and wish of 
Great Britain to protect; a kingdom. for the 
prosperity of which every Englishman must be 
solicitous. 

If, however, the ungovernable ambition of 
that Power should resolve on the conquest of 
Portugal, and Spain, allured by the promises, or 
awed by the menaces of France, should consent 
to the march of the invading army through her 
territories, the most sanguine speculator can 
hardly entertain a doubt of the eventual subju- 
gation of the devoted country, France would 
pour in so formidable a force, army after army, 
if necessary, that it would be impossible to the 
Portuguese, even with the assistance of England, 
to make a successful resistance against such an 
accumulated mass of invaders. Should such an 
evemt take place, Portugal has still one resource 
left, such as few of the kingdoms of Europe 
possess. In the very worst reverse of fortune, 
Brasil will afford her the means of securing her 
independence. That rich and extensive coimtry 
might be a safe retreat for the Portuguese go- 
vernment, the nobility, and principal inhabi- 
tants, ia the last extremity, and in the most 



22f 



desperate situation of national affairs. Tiiat 
colony extending from the equator to 35 de- 
grees of South latitude, and from the 35th to 
the 60th West longitude, being not less than 
2400 miles in length from North to South, and 
700 miles in breadth from East to West, affords 
room for more than ten times the number of in- 
habitants which Portugal contains, if they 
could all be conveyed thithen The seat of go- 
vernment and the wealth of the nation might 
be removed into that country, and a new Por- 
tuguese kingdom be established in America; 
which, in process of time, would unquestionably 
- become far more wealthy and powerful, as well 
as far more extensive, than the present Euro- 
pean kingdom. 

The removal of the seat of the Portuguese go- 
vernment from the old to the new Continent 
may, perhaps, seem a project of romantic spe- 
culation ; but it is not impossible that a period 
may arrive, when it will be found eligible, or 
even necessary. It would be a bold and deci- 
sive measure, and characteristical of an enter- 
prising spirit of independence. Such a migra- 
tion would certainly be attended with great dif- 
liculties ; but it would not be impracticable. 
History affords numerous instances of the mi- 
grations of vast bodies of men in the earlier ages 
of the world ; but it must be confessed that 
those took place principally, or solely, among 

Q2 



228 

tliose uncivilized nations and wandering trfbef^ 
who had not acquired any permanent establish* 
ment, or fixed property of considerable value, 
and who load no large and wealthy towns or 
rich possessions to leave behind. These valua- 
ble considerations stroBgly attach the inhabi- 
tants of a civilized nation to the soil ; and, on 
this account, the removal of such a nation as 
the Portuguese, or any other nation of modern 
Europe, would be far more difficult, as well as 
far more repugnant to the inclinations of the 
people, than the migrations of the Goths, the 
V andals, and other Northern nations in the times 
of antiquity, or those of the Tartar tribes in a later 
period. The migration of tlie Portuguese to 
America v/ould not, however, meet with such 
formidable obstacles as those adventurers had to 
surmount. When they migrated in numerous 
hordes, with their wives, their children, and 
their all, they had often a passage to force by 
the sword, without the prospect of any posses- 
sions of settlements, but such as they could ac- 
quire by desperate courage and uncertain war. 
In this respect the Portuguese, if reduced to 
the necessity of transfering the seat of govern- 
ment from- Europe to America, would have the 
advantage of retreating to a flourislnng colony, 
at present in their own possession, without the 
hazard of war or the trouble of conquest ; but 
r>hey would require ^hipping, which was ?iot ne- 



22Q 

cessary to the migration of the unclvilizecl na- 
tions of former ages ; for those were performed 
by land, and generally to neighbouring coun- 
tries, or at least to such as were not very re- 
mote. It is not, however, to be supposed pos- 
sible, that all the people in Portugal should 
transport themselves to Brasii : the supposition 
would be rom.antic. The seat of government, 
the most opulent of the inhabitants, and the 
greatest part of the wealth of the countr}/-, 
might be conveyed to that settlement; and it is 
not to be imagined that the whole body of any 
fiation ever emio-rated from its ancient seat. 

o 

When we are told of the migrations of the 
Goths, &c. we are only to suppose t]:jem to 
consist of the leaders and principal persons, 
with the warriors and the most enterprising and 
adventurous part of the people with their fami- 
lies, and must take it for granted that a very 
great number, perhaps even a considerable ma- 
jority, was left behind ; and a similar migration 
of the Portuguese into America might be ef- 
fected. All that is valuable in Portugal, ex- 
clusive of the landed property, might, under 
the protection of a British naval force, be con- 
veyed beyond the Atlantic, where a new king- 
dom miglit be formed, which, in alliance witii 
Great Britain, might bid defiance to European 
-iiostihty. 

The situation and extent of Diasil, the ini- 



230 



mense value of its productions, and its excellent 
adaptation to commerce, concur to render it fit 
for the seat of a great empire. Its extent, ac- 
cording to the most approximate calculations 
that can be made, is at least thirty times as 
great as that of England, and about twelve or 
thirteen times as great as that of the whole 
united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. 
The productions of its mines, as well as those 
of its soil, are of an incalculable value. It is 
computed, that the diamonds annually imported 
from Brasil, amount to the value of 130,0001. 
sterling. The quantity of sugar which the 
country produces is amazingly great. It is 
equally fertile in tobacco, as well as in a variety 
of valuable <lrugs ; and .if the population were 
sufiiciently great to stimulate agricultural im- 
provements, there is no doubt but almost every 
sort of grain might be raised in abundance. 
Some parts of Brasil abound so much in horned 
cattle that they are hunted for their hides, of 
which more than twenty thousand are sent an- 
nually to Europe; and the gold which it affords 
amounts to the annual value of nearly four mil- 
lions sterling. Fro7n this sketch of the natural 
wealth of Brasil, which might, by the exertions 
of an increased population, be augmented be- 
yond any calculations that can at present be 
made, it is evident that few countries possess 
equal advantages in that respect, or produce iu 



231 



equal abundance the materials for carrying on 
an extensive and flourisliing'trade. Its situation 
in respect to the Portuguese settlements in Afri- 
ca, is also advantageous to its commerce. It 
has some excellent ports, especially Pernatpbuco 
in the Northern part, Rio de Janeiro in the 
Southern, and the bay of All-Saints in the mid- 
dle ; at which last the Portuguese fleets rendez« 
vous on their return to Europe. All these, and 
many other advantages described by travellers 
and traders who have visited Brasil, point out 
its commercial importance. 

This wealthy and flourishing country is not 
better adapted for the seat of a great and opu- 
lent empire, than the city of St. Salvador,, its 
present capital, is for the residence of royalty. 
This city, situated on the bay of All- Saints, 
commands a noble, spacious, and commodious 
harbour. It is built on a high and steep rock, 
having the sea on one , side and on the other a 
lake, which, forming a crescent so as nearly to 
join the sea, almost wholly invests the city. 
The situation consequently renders it almost 
impregnable by nature, and it might be made 
completely so by art. Those who have visited 
Brasil, agree in describing the city of Bahia, or 
St. Salvador, as very populous, and extremely 
magnificent, gay, and opulent. 

From a consideration of the flourishing con- 
dition of this colony, an idea may be formed 



of what it might be, if it was converted iiitd 
an independent kingdom, and made the seat of 
the Portuguese government. One single cir- 
cumstance however exists, which tends in some 
measure to counterbalance the other advantages 
which Brasil possesses, and must in particular 
be considered as a great drawback from the fit- 
ness of St Salvador, in all other respects, for a 
royal residence. The climate of Brasil, as the 
greatest part of the country is situated within 
the tropics, is very hot, boisterous, and un- 
wholesome, subject to heavy rains, particularly 
^bout the equinoxes in the months of March 
and September, when there falls such deluges of 
rain, accompanied with storms and tornadoes, 
that the level parts are overflowed ; a circum- 
stance common to tropical countries. This in- 
convenience, however, chiefly affects the North- 
ern parts ; and the Southern part of the coun- 
try, which hes beyond the tropic of Capricorn, 
and extends to the Rio de la Plata, is temperate 
and healthy. The city of St Salvador in IT 
58' S. lat. is too near the equator, and is conse- 
quently subject to the inconveniences of a tro- 
pical climate, notwithstanding its lofty and airy 
situation. These inconveniences, it must be 
acknowledged, counterbalance, in no small de^ 
gree, the luxuriancy of the soil, and the rich^ 
ness of the mines of Brasil; and cannot but be 
considered as a formidable objection against the 



233 

removal of the seat of government into that 
country. These difficulties, however, have been 
encountered and surmounted by numbers of in- 
dividuals for the sake of acquiring wealth ; and 
in case of urgent necessity, the cause of inde- 
pendence certainly merits, not only the greatest 
exertions, but also the sacrifice of some conve- 
niences. The physical circumstances of climate 
and situation have not such an absolute power 
Over the human frame as some imagine. Those 
who remove to a climate the most contrary to 
their own, may, if they be not too much ex- 
posed to its ungenial influence, soon accustom 
their constitutions to its temperature. It is ob- 
served, that those who, from the nature of their 
employments, are much exposed to the intem- 
peiature of the climate, especially to the burn- 
ing heat of the sun in the day, and to the dews 
and damps of the evening, are the persons to 
whom change of chmate is the most generally 
fatal. On removing to a country where the air 
is of a very different temperature from that to 
which a person has been accustomed, great care 
is necessary at the first ; but, in a little time, 
the constitution begins to be formed to the cli- 
mate. The human body appears to be framed 
for every latitude, and for every situation; cus- 
tom adapts it more particularly to one than to 
another. Men exist in every climate, from the 
equator to beyond the polar circle, and find 



234 



nourishment and support in every country, from 
the tropical regions to Nova Zembla. The hu- 
man species, it must be confessed, appears very 
different in the countries within the polar circle, 
and perhaps extreme cold, cramping, at the 
same time, the powers both of the animal and 
vegetable system, may check the advances of 
the human species to perfection, by diminishing 
and almost extinguishing the vegetative powers 
of the soil, from which the inhabitants ought 
to derive their support, as well as from its im- 
mediate influence on the bodily frame. Both 
these causes may concur to produce that dif- 
ference, not only in the exterior appearance, but 
also in the intellectual powers, which exists be- 
tween the Laplanders, Samoides, and other in- 
habitants of the countries within the polar cir- 
cles, and the people who live in the temperate 
zones. It is also certain, that the intense heat 
of the tropical climates relaxes the body, and 
is consequently unfavourable to health ; yet in 
those climates, the inhabitants are sometimes 
found strong and robust ; and where they are 
otherwise, their weakness and pusillanimity 
proceeds, as much from their habits of life, 
as from the irresistible influence of the cli- 
mate. 

If we may be allowed to deduce arguments 
from facts, which must be acknowledged the 
surest mode of reasoning, the climate and soil 



235 



of Brasil appears far from being unfavourable to 
the human species ; for the original natives of 
that country have, by all who have given us any 
information on the subject, been invariably de- 
scribed as men of great stature, exceedingly ro- 
bust, fierce, and daring ; equal in courage, and 
considerably superior in strength and stature to 
any other of the original inhabitants of South, 
or even of North America, except the Patago- 
nians. This circumstance is a convincing proof, 
that the climate of Brasil cannot be ungenial to 
the human Coustkudon. 

. The great extent, the rich productions, and 
commercial situation of this supposed trans- 
atlantic kiiigdom, are considerations of incalcu- 
lable importance. The security it would afford 
is, however, an advantage of an equal, or evea 
of a superior magnitude ; for without this, pos^^ 
session is only a precarious blessing. In the 
supposition of the removal of the seat of go- 
vernment from Portugal to Brasil, the situation, 
the extent, the face of the country, and its dis- 
tance from Europe, all combine to secure it from 
the apprehensions of foreign invasion. If such 
an event could, in any case, be supposed proba- 
ble, the vast ridge of mountains, which, at the 
distance of Mty, or sixty, and, in some places, 
of eighty, or an hundred miles, runs ahiiost pa- 
rallel to the shore, extending nearly two thou- 
sand miles in length, would afford innumerable 



236 



. retreats and fastnesses, from which the forces 
of the country might annoy, and, in time, ex- 
terminate the invaders. This observation might 
however be well spared, as no European enemy 
could be supposed so rash as to attempt the 
conquest of so extensive an empire at so vast a 
distance. 

However vague these conjectures may appear, 
and however distant the prospects, scarcely 
any thing within the range of political specula- 
tion is more probable. It is, therefore, not in- 
appropriate to the subject to examine how far 
such an event would be favourable, or unfa- 
vourable, to Great Britain; and the circum- 
stances of the case are so clearly conspicuous, 
that the result of the inquiry may be easily an- 
ticipated. 

Should the seat of the Portuguese government 
ever be removed from Europe to America, it 
must be in consequence of the hostihty of 
France or Spain. This supposition necessarily 
involves another, viz. that, in such an emer- 
gency, Portugal must adhere to her alliance 
with Great Britain, and circumstances would 
render that alliance reciprocally, and equally 
beneficial to both ; necessary to the security of 
the former, and conducive to the commercial 
interests of the latter. Portugal could not, by 
any means, carry the measure into effect, with- 
out the support and co-operation of the British 



237 

fleets, and would, at least for some time, hav€ 
need of the same protection. It would indeed 
be at all times highly conducive to the interests 
of Portuguese America, to have Great Britain 
for her friend and ally. Its distance from Eu- 
rope and tiie protection of this country, would 
eifectually secure the BrasiHan kingdom, and its 
commerce, from being annoyed by an Euro- 
pean enemy. 

The advantages of an alliance between the 
British and Portuguese nations would, in this 
ease, be reciprocal and conspicuous. To the 
former it would be the basis of a lucrative and 
extensive commerce, while it would afford tran- 
quillity and security to the latter. It may in- 
deed be said, that Great Britain has at present 
the opportunity of drawing the same advan- 
tages from the trade of Brasil, through the me- 
dium of Lisbon ; since she furnishes the greatest 
part of the manufactured goods exported from 
Portugal to that colony. But if we consider 
the vast population which so extensive and fer- 
tile a country as Brasil is capable of supporting; 
if it should ever become the seat of an in- 
dependent Portuguese empire, estabhshed on 
such principles as might eucourage agrieulturaj 
improvements, and the resort of strangers, 
some conception may be formed of the im^ 
men?e market it would open for every kind of ; 
Jiuropeaji mQXchmdhQ, among which the imr ^ 



238 j 

nufactures of Great Britain would indisputably 
hold the principal place ; for it is certain, that 
the Portuguese who have estabhshed so few 
manufactures in the old kingdom, would not 
turn their thoughts to a manufacturing system 
in their American Empire. 

As Portuguese America is at present, in re- 
gard to its commerce, nearly in the same predi- 
cament as British America was before the revo- 
lution, the Brasihan kingdom would be circum- 
stanced in neai'ly the same manner as the repub- 
lic of the United States is at this time. Con- 
taining, like them, immense tracts of unculti- 
vated land, besides its rich and numerous mines, 
it would require the exertions of a very great 
number of inhabitants to make the most of 
those advantages. Mining and agriculture 
would be the principal pursuits of industry, and 
many centuries must elapse before the estabhsh- 
inent of manufactures would become an object 
of either national or individual attention. 

It is generally supposed, and the supposition 
appears extremely probable, that Great Britain 
derives greater benefit from her trade with the 
American States since they became independent, 
than she did previous to that event; although 
the North American trade, which, by the colo- 
nial system, was confined to the mother-coun- 
try, is now laid open to aU nations. The cans 
of this unexpected circumstance arises from the 



increased population and opulence of the United 
States, which, by occasioning a greater demand 
for European commodities, and particularly Bri- 
tish manufactures, overbalances the disadvan- 
tage of having other nations as sharers in the 
American trade. In Portuguese America the 
same causes would undoubtedly operate in the 
same, or perhaps in a greater extent, and still 
more decidedly in favour of this country ; for 
Great Britain does not possess the exclusive 
trade of Brasil Other nations, by contributing 
to supply its consumption, have a share in its 
commerce. Britain, indeed, possesses the 
greatest share of this lucrative traffic ; but this 
is in consequence of the superiority of her ma- 
nufactured articles, in conjunction with certain, 
commercial arrangements; and the whole is 
transacted through the medium of Portugal, 
and by the agency of Portuguese Merchants. 
If the seat of government sliould ever be trans- 
ferred from Portugal to Brasil, and there esta- 
bhshed on the liberal principles of sound policy, 
the population of that country would rapidly 
and continually increase ; and, perhaps/ in less 
than a century, be augmented in such a propor- 
tion, as no conjectural calculation can at pre- 
sent pretend to determine. The demand for 
European goods would consequently have a pro- 
portional increase; and Great Britain, tlie first 
of manufacturing and commercial nations, and 



240 



mistress of the seas, would, instead of an indi- 
rect eommerce through the medium of Lisbon, 
possess the advantage of a direct and uninter- 
rupted trade with Brasil ; while her navy would 
be able at all times; and on every emergency, 
to protect the coasts and the commerce of the 
Portuguese kingdom, as well as her own, from 
the attacks of France, or any other power. 
Mutual advantages; of such magnitude and im- 
portance, could not fail of producing a com- 
mercial connection and political aUiance of the 
most beneficial tendency. 

Spain and Portugal possess this peculiar ad- 
vantage, of having the means of withdrawing 
themselves, in the last extremity, from European 
oppression. In the greatest emergency, when 
every other resource should fail, the courts of 
Lisbon and Madrid might retire from Europe, 
and erect the standard of independence in Ame- 
rica. If Portugal possesses the vast country of 
Brasil, Spain possesses, in the new world, an 
empire of far greater extent. Mexico, Peru, 
and Terra Firma are extensive and wealthy 
countries. Each of them, taken singly, are 
larger than the kingdom of Spain; their mines 
are immensely rich, and tlie soil, in many parts, 
of the most luxuriant fertility. In regard to 
the means of resistance against European ag- 
gression, as well as of the advantages they 
would derive from an alUance with Great Bri- 
I 



241 



tain^ the very same ^observations may be made 
on Spanish, as on Portuguese America. If the 
courts, both of Lisbon and Madrid, should re- 
move from the old to the new continent, and 
translate the seats of the Spanish and Portu- 
guese empires from Europe to America, the ad- 
vantages of a British alliance would be equal to 
both, and Great Britain would derive the same 
benefits from their commerce. The removal of 
the seat of the Spanish government to Mexico 
or Peru, Vv'^ould be a circumstance perfectly si- 
milar to the translation of that of the Portuguese 
to Brasil. These might both be considered in 
the same political and commercial point of view. 
The cases would be almost exactly parallel, ex- 
cept that the American republic, from, the prox- 
imity of its dominions to the Spanish American 
empire, might probably, in process of time, 
come in for a greater share of its commerce, 
than of that of the Brasilian kingdom. 

One important consequence which would re- 
sult from the supposed dereliction of the ancient 
seats of the Portuguese and Spanish ' govern- 
ments, especially the latter, is too obvious to 
escape notice, and of too great a magnitude not 
to merit exaimnation. In the supposition of 
such a revolution, it is impossible not to sup- 
pose that Spain and Portugal, or at least the 
greatest part of those countries, would fall 
under the immediate dominion of France ; but 

R 



242 



even from that- event we might perhaps antici- 
pate consequences less disastrous than would at 
the first be apprehended. The annexation of 
Spain to the French repubhc could not take 
place without exciting the jealousy of all the 
continental powers. Such a nieasnre would, in 
all probability, lay the foundation of a new 
confederacy of all those powers against France, 
of which it w^ould be impossible to foresee the 
consequences; for although such a combination 
might, like the last, not prove ultimately suc- 
cessful, might not perhaps be able to prevent 
the annexation of the greatest part of Spain 
and Portugal to the French empire, the contest 
would exceedingly exhaust the resources of the 
latter; and the preservation of its extensive 
conquests would, by dispersing its military force 
in proportion to the extension of its dominions, 
diminish its real strength. Such is generally 
the consequence of too great an extent of ter- 
ritory. 

Spain and Portugal, without their commerce 
and colonial possessions, would not be so valu- 
able an acquisition as might be imagined ; and 
it can scarcely admit of a doubt that France 
may derive greater advantages from her ascen- 
dency over the Spanish monarchy, in the situa- 
tion in which it now stands, than she could from 
its entire subjug-ation. Whenever Spain in her 
present state can, by allurements or menaces, 



243 



be prevailed on to espouse openly, or covertly, 
the interests of France, as we see she now does, 
the wealth and commerce of Spanish America 
are virtually turned into the channels of that 
nation, and rendered subservient to its designs; 
but in case of the annexation of that kingdom 
to the French empire, the latter would lose all 
the support it can now derive from the Spanish 
empire in the new world. The wealth of 
Mexico, Peru, &c, would take a different di- 
rection. 

Whatever weight the annexation of the Eu- 
ropean part of the Spanish empire to France 
might throw into the balance on the side of 
that power, the scale would, notwithstanding, 
be found to preponderate on the side of Great 
Britain, which would unquestionably monopo- 
lize the greatest part of the trade with Spanish 
America, without seeing it so frequently inter- 
rupted by hostilities, and the wealth of the 
American mines so often converted to the use 
of her enemies. The aggrandizement of France, 
by the accession of so great an extent of terri- 
tory as the kingdom of Spain, would be fully 
counterbalanced by the commercial advantages 
that Great Britain would derive from such a re* 
vohition, as the removal of the scat of the 
Spanish government from Europe to America. 
At present, this country, 'as has been already 
observed, furnishes the greatest part of the ma- 
il 2 



244 



nufactured goods sent to the Spanish, as well 
as to the Portuguese colonies, and a consider- 
able part of the treasures brought from those 
countries is concentrated in Great Britain; but 
the whole of this traffic with Spanish America 
is carried on through the medium' of Spain, as 
that with Portuguese America is through the 
medjum of Portugal. Lisbon and Cadiz are the 
great marts of this traffic ; the central points ct 
all the trade carried on between Europe and the 
richest countries of the new world ; and the 
merchants of Spain and Portugal are the agents 
through whose hands the whole must pass. I 
the seat of government of those two kiDgdoms 
should ever be translated, the one to Brasil, and 
the other to Mexico or Peru, their commerciE- 
system would assume a new form. The tradin^ 
vessels of all nations would then visit the port; 
of those countries, from whence the colonial 
system now excludes them. The trade with the 
Spanish, as welb as the Portuguese empire in 
America, would be carried on without the in- 
tervention of a medium ; and in the event of 
such a revolution. Great Britain would derive 
more benefit from that commerce than anv 
other nation. Her manufactures would, b*«- 
their superior quality, command an estensivr 
sale : her tradiog vessels vrould crowd the port:, 
of those opulent countries ; and she would pos- 
sess this pecuhar advautage, that her urvbI s5i- 



periority over other European nations would, in 
time of war, preserve her trade uninterrupted, 
and annihilate that of France, or any othex 
enemy, 

1 am, Sir, 

Your'Si &c. 



246 



• ' LETTER XL 

SIR, 

We may, by some persons, be thought to 
expatiate at random in the boundless regions of 
the conjectural world, when we suppose a pro- 
bability of the removal of the seats of the 
Spanish and Portuguese governments to the other 
side of the Atlantic. Every one must, however, 
at the first view of the political world, allow 
the possibility of the event, and a little reflec- 
tion will make it appear far from improbable. 
Many of the revolutions which have taken place 
in the world, appeared far less consistent with 
probability, not long before they happened. 
Llistory informs us of the various and unfore- 
seen revolutions, vvdiich at different times have 
taken place in every quarter of the globe. Many 
of these happened contrary to all human expec- 
tation ; and a century, or even not so much as 
half a century before the event, could not be 
foreseen, nor scarcely thought possible. What 
changes may yet take place in human affairs, it 
is also impossible to foresee. The world is per- 
haps yet in its infancy, and revolutions may 



24 f 



yet happen as important, as wonderful, and as 
little expected, as any of those which have al- 
ready excited the admiration of past ages, or 
astonished the present generation. The revolu- 
tions of America and France had, half a cen- 
tury ago, less appearance of probahility, than 
the removal of the seats of the Spanish and 
Portuguese governments, from the old to the 
new continent. 

The conjecture may be carried yet farther^ 
and rejecting vague supposition, the alternative 
of two great and important events may be esta- 
blished on the basis of certainty, although no 
human foresight can fix the period marked in 
the volume of futurity for their accomphshment. 
The alternative, which is founded on the nature 
of things, pointed out by a view of the history 
of the world, and illustrated by a recent ex- 
ample, is this,' that either the colonial system of 
restrictive trade must one day he abolished, or 
that the conduct of the British- colonies, will, 
at some future period, be imitated by those of 
Spain and Portugal. We have in our days seen 
a new empire burst into existence beyond the 
Atlantic, which will soon vie in wealth and power 
with the greatest of the European states, as in 
extent of territory it surpasses any of them ex- 
cept Russia. Other trans-atlantic empires may 
yet arise,^ and America may become the theatre 
o*^ new revolutions. If a conjecture had been 



248 



made half a century ago, rdative to the ap- 
proaching future independency of Spanish, Poir 
tuguese, or British America, the probabilities would 
have appeared equal, at least the preponderancy 
would not have seemed to lie on that side of the 
scale where the event took place. Before the 
peace of Paris, A. D. 17^4, the independence 
of the British colonies was at the least as little 
expected, as that of Spanish or Portuguese 
America either was then^ or is at this time ; and 
if we consider the formidable naval power of 
Great Britain, the issue of the contest was still 
less probable than a similar event in the latter 
case ; for it is certain that the Spanish and Por- 
tuguese colonies possess a far greater proportioiii 
of strengtli, when compared with the parent 
states, than those of Great Britain did in com^ 
parison with this country. We hav'e, however^ 
seen the event, unexpected as it was, take 
place. We have veen the independency of Bri- 
tish America established, notwithstanding the 
naval and military force of the mother-country. 
The event was certainly unexpected, and when 
the contest began, was deemed highly impro- 
bable. It must, however, have happened at 
one time or another, whatever causes might 
Jiave accelerated or retarded its approach. In 
reasoning from uniforrii experience, founded on 
(he nature of things, and from the information 
afforded by history, we may readily be con- 



24g 

via ceil, that the separation of the British coIc5- 
nies from the inother-coiiiitry, \vas an event 
which must, at some period, have necessarily 
happened, although a diiierent comhination of 
circumstances might have prevented its accom- 
plishment at that particular juncture. The 
stamp act, the duty on tea, &c. were only sub- 
ordinate causes which contributed to bring it 
into existence. The whole scheme of American 
taxation was only a cause that precipitated the 
approach of an unavoidable event. 

If Yve examine the history of the world, we 
shall find that colonies have scarcely ever re- 
mained long in subordination to the parent 
state, seldom much longer than Vv^as necessary 
for obtaining protection or supplies. Had co- 
lonies always continued dependent on the mo- 
ther-country, the world would have formed only 
one vast empire ; for all nations were originally 
colonies one of another, although established on 
different occasions, and in a difierent manner. 
In the ancient systeni of colonization, a deter- 
mined chief, with a chosen band, or an exiled 
prince, with a few faithful adherents, flying 
from insurrection, usurpation, or foreign op- 
pression, erected the standard of independence 
on a distant shore ; or a barbarous people, des- 
titute of the arts of civilized hfe, which furnish 
employment and subsistence for a crowded po- 
pulation, sent forth colonies to countries unoc- 



250 



eapied, and aitording the means of support to . 
their superfluous numbers. On these occasions 
new kingdoms and states were formed, and ge- 
nerally on the principle of independence. In 
the modern system of forming settlements in 
distant chmes, subjects went forth with com- 
missions from their sovereigns, and their duty 
of allegiance remained in its full force. The 
colonists found their adherence to the parent 
state to be not less their interest than their duty. 
From the mother-country they received those 
supplies which were necessary to facilitate the 
execution of their projects, and that protec- 
tion, without which the fruits of their success- 
ful exertions could not be rendered secure. 
This was the case of the European colonists in 
America. None of these had any other means 
of ensuring their possessions, than submission 
to the governments whose subjects they were, 
and under whose authority they acted. Had 
not their subjection to Great Britain entitled 
them to her protection, the North American 
states would long ago have fallen under the do- 
minion of France. After the peace of Aix la 
Chapelle, A. D. l74<8, the French then possess- 
ino' the vast countries of Canada and Loui- 

o 

sianu, had constructed a line of forts from the 
mouth of the river of St. Lawrence to that of 
the Mississippi, and by that disposition of their 
military strength on the North American con- 



251 



tiiient, had completely enclosed the British colo- 
nies, and confined them to a stripe of land along 
the sea-coast. In this situation the colonists had 
no other resource than the protection of the 
mother-country, and Great Britaih armed in. 
their defence. This v/as the principal cause of 
the war which commenced A. D. l7o6, no per-" 
son at that period forming any conjecture of 
what was to happen in the course' of thirty 
years, divine Providence havino- wisely drawn a 
veil before the eyes of human penetration, and 
rendered the book of fate inaccessible to the in- 
spection of finite beings. 

The exertions of Great Britain in the de- 
fence of her colonies in North America having 
proved successful, the conquest of Canada, 
and most of the other French settlements on 
that continent, freed them from the apprehen- 
sion of any attack from a foreign enemy. They 
began then to reflect on the advantages of their 
situation, and to feel their own strength. They 
soon began to consider their own resources, in 
conjunction with their local circumstances as 
adequate to their protection ; and the first mis- 
understanding between them and the parent state 
excited them to think of independence. This 
was conformable to all historical experience, 
and to the nature of things. All the various 
political circumstances, which gave rise to the 
American war, and finally produced the esta- 



blishment of American independence, \rere no 
more than adventitious and accelerating causes. 
One great essential cause existed, which must 
at last have produced that effect. 

To whatever future period the separation of 
the North American colonies from the parent 
country might, in the eye of poUtical specula- 
tion, have been postponed, its arrival was cer- 
tain, as a necessary effect, proceeding from a 
cause inherent in the colonies, and interwoven 
with their essence. Possessing so vast an ex- 
tent of territory, in conjunction with so m.any 
circumstances favourable to population, they 
would, in process of time, have contained a 
far greater number of inhabitants than the Bri- 
tish isles. Asrriculture would not onlv have 
supplied their consumption, but have afforded a 
considerable surplus for exportation ; and the 
period must at the last have arrived, when they 
would have found themselves above all control, 
and enabled to carry on an unrestrained com-= 
merce with all parts of the v/orld. It is impos- 
sible to suppose that, in such circumstance?, 
they v.-Quld for ever have continued dependent 
on a country from which nature had so entirely 
separated them, by the interposition of the vast 
Atlantic Ocean. Such a supposition is diame- 
trically opposite to all that reason and experi- 
ence teach us, relative to the invariable order 
of things in the moral worla. i easoning, 



253 



therefore, from the analogies of moral experi- 
ence, it will be difficult to suppose the perpe- 
tual subjection of so extensive and opulent a 
country as Erasil to Portugal, under the com- 
mercial restraints of the colonial system ; or 
that Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, Chili, and the 
other vast regions v/hicli compose the Spanish 
empire in America, will, under the same restric- 
tions, remain for ever dependent on old Spain, 
Various circumstances may either accelerate or 
retard those events, or even postpone them for 
ages ; but their arrival at some future period 
must be considered as certain, unless prevented 
by judicious measures, by a system of politics 
adapted to existing circumstances, and proba- 
ble contino'encies. 

The system of politics which seems the best 
calculated for preventing this separation of the 
Spanish and Portuguese of colonies from the 
parent states, would be the abolition of tlie co- 
lonial system of restrictive trade, by opening 
the ports of Spanish and Portugnese America, 
to the traders of all nations. That this will 
sooner or later be the case, is a supposition that 
can hardly admit of a {U')ubt, although it may 
not be prrssible to foresee by v/hat means, or in 
what manner, it v/ill be effected. It is, how- 
ever, next to impossible that the colonial system 
should be perpetual. 

The Spanish empire in America is generally 
supposed to contain about three millions of 



254 



Spaniards and Creoles, and the original Ameri- 
cans are undoubtedly far more numerous. The 
whole collective number of inhabitants, how- 
ever, is certainly very disproportionate to the 
extent of territory. If w e may give any credit 
the estimates which that judicious w'riter, 
Dr. Robertson, makes of the number of inha- 
bitants contained in Mexico, Guadalafara^ 
Puebla de los Angelos, Lima, Cusco, and some 
other principal cities of Spanish America, they 
appear to indicate a greater population than 
most people are willing to suppose, in "that part 
of the world. In regard to this, however, as well 
as every other subject of a similar nature, au- 
thors materially disagree ; for while the gene- 
rality of our geographical writers assign no 
more than about eighty thousand inhabitants to 
the city of Mexico, Dr. Robertson estimates its 
population at one hundred and fifty thousand. 
How vague and uncertain soever these calcula- 
tions may be, the population of Spanish and Por- 
tuguese America must be considerable, and in pro- 
cess of time Vv^ill undoubtedly far exceed that of 
the parent kingdoms. It is therefore scarcely pro- 
bable, that those opulent and extensive countries 
will always rest satisfied under the exclusive re- 
strictions of the colonial system. Its abolition, 
and the placing of the colonists on the same 
footing as the other ssbjects of Spain and Por- 
tugal, will consequently be the only measure 
which can preserve tlie union of their trans- 



-255 



atlantic dominions with the parent-states. By 
such an arrangement it is possible that the Eu- 
ropean and American dominions of Spain, en« 
joying the same privileges, might remain united, 
as the constituent parts of one undivided em- 
pire ; and the same remark is equally applicable 
to Portugal and her colonies. 

The abolition of the colonial system in Spa- 
nish and Portuguese America, by whatever 
causes it might be effected, would produce a 
very important revolution in the commercial 
World, which could not fail of being attended 
with consequences the most favourable to Great 
Britain, and perhaps scarcely less beneficial to 
the Spanish and Portuguese empires, considered 
in their American as well as European branches; 
for the advantages necessarily resulting to the 
American part, would, according to every ap- 
pearance, more than counterbalance any detri- 
ment the European part might be. supposed to 
receive from such a commercial revolution. In- 
deed, as neither Spain nor Portugal are manu- 
facturing countries, and as their exports to 
America consist chiefly of foreign commodities, 
it does not appear that they could suffer much 
by throwing open the trade to their colonies. 

There is not, however, at present the least 
probability that the measure will speedily be 
adopted : it certainly will not, unless imperious 
circumstances should render it necessary, and 



255 



that necessity is not likely very soon to exist. 
In that respect much depends on the conduct of 
France, and not a little on that of Spain and 
Porto o'al themselves. A firm resistance to the 
ambitious politics of France would be the surest 
means of preserving the integrity of their re- 
spective empires. If those two kingdoms sub- 
mit to French oppression, it is uncertain how 
long their American dominions will be wiUing 
to take a share in that state of degradation ; 
and should that government ever resolve on the 
suljjugation of Spain or Portugal, and succeed 
in the attempt, it is not very probable that their 
American dominions would, at the distance of 
ahnost four thousand miles, tamely submit to 
be included in the conquest. It is far more 
likely, that those wealthy and extensive coun^ 
tries would break off all political connection 
with Europe, and erect the standard of inde- 
pendence'^ 

* In the first edition, which went to press before the com^ 
men cement of hostilities with Spain, the following passage is • 
found : — 

" 'Vhe. critical situation of Spain and Portugal forms an im- 
portant and interesting feature in the aspect of European poli- 
tics, it has undoubtedly been contemplated in every point of 
view i:y the Frencli cabinet, and found a ditlicult subject of 
political speculation. The difficult predicament in which those 
two kingdoms are placed, renders any. part they can take in 
the great affairs of Europe extrcmel}' dangerous, and certainly 



£57 

If France should carry her views so far ; if 
she should form the project of annexing Spain 
and Portugal to her dominions, a most embar- 
rassing circumstance again presents itself to her 
consideration. The French cabinet has pene- 

detrimental to their interests. In a contest with France they 
would be exposed to the risk of subjugation ; by a war with 
England they must hazard at least the temporary annihilation 
of iheir commerce; and they may perhaps sometimes find it diffi- 
cult to preserve a neutrality. The alternative, which such a si- 
tuation presents, cannot fail in producing considerable embarrass- 
ment in forming their decisions ; for the consequences of an active 
interference in any contest between Great Britain and the 
French empire, on whatever principles it may be founded, may 
be of the greatest magnitude and importance. If the nature of 
the Spanish and Portuguese commerce be well considered, it 
is not difficult to perceive, that a war with Great Britain is 
one of the greatest embarrassments it can possibly meet with^ 
as this country is in full possession of the means of intercepting 
their American trade, and entirely cutting off" the communica- 
tion between them and their colonies. 

" The political and commercial situation of Spain and Por- 
tugal, floating as it were, and agitated between the two great 
vortices of England and France, is little less embarrassing to 
the Cabinet of St. Cloud, than to those of Madrid and Lisbon' 
The French government cannot be ignorant that if its influence 
should prevail on those countries to commence hostilities with 
Great Britain, the latter could find an indemnification in Ame- 
rica, and, by cutting off their colonial resources, render them 
useless allies to that empire." 

These observations, with the subsequent events, shew the just- 
ness of the author's -views, and the sagacity of his conjec- 
tures. — Edit. 



258 



tration enough to perceive, that In case of sucfe 
an event, Great Britain would havx it in her 
power to counterpoise the weight vv^hich such 
an accession of territory would throw into the 
GaUic side of the scale, hy seizing on some of 
the richest and most important parts of their 
trans-atlantic dominions ; or, which would per- 
haps answer a better purpose, hy assisting Spa- 
Bish and Portuguese America to erect them- 
selves into independent states. This considera- 
tion will undoubtedly operate as a check on the 
aspiring views of France in that quarter, and 
contribute to th^ security of Spain and Portugal. 

Although Spain at present exhibits her- 
self the ally of France, it is not impossible 
that the latter may extend still farther her as- 
piring views, nor can we foresee v/hat changes 
of men and measures may canvert this alliance 
to enmity; and, therefore, the case here stated 
and examined, must be considered as far from 
ranking among impossibiUties. 

This delineation of one of the most interest- 
ing situations exhibited on the political theatre, 
naturally gives rise to a variety of conjectural 
views, which, how vague soever they may at 
the present moment appear, may, perhaps, at 
least some of them, be reahzed at no very dis- 
tant period. 

I am, &c. 



259 



LETTER XIL 

SIR, 

Having concisely, and yet, I presume, not 
inaccurately examined and delineated the poli- 
cal situation of France and England relative to 
each other, and also that of the other nations, 
which are implicated in their politics, and 
whose destiny appears to be dependent on the 
fate of those two paramount powers of the 
western part of the European world, it is requi- 
site to direct our view towards the East 

Russia must now be considered as the predo- 
minant power in the northern and eastern quar- 
ters of Europe, as England and France are in 
the south and west. This empire was little, 
known before the reign of the Czar, John 
Basilowitz, when the English captain. Chan- 
cellor, in his search of a N. E. passage to 
India, wintered at Archangel, then first visited 
by a western vessel, and from that port travel- 
led overland to Moscow, where he was favour- 
ably received by the Czar. This happened^ 
A. D. 1554 ; and from that epoch may be dated 
the commencement of the trade and intercourse 
s 2! 



260 



between Gieat Britain and Russia, which has 
been so happily cultivated, and so much ex- 
tended, to the mutual benefit of both nations. 
Russia, however, although so little known, and 
having so little connection with the western 
parts of Europe, was a very considerable em- 
pire at an early period. Novogorod, and KiofF 
in the Ukraine, are said to have been founded 
about the middle of the fifth century. The 
former of these cities was made the metropolis 
of the Russian dominions by Ruric, the Great 
Duke, who died, A. D. 879; but at his de- 
cease, the seat of government was removed to 
Kioif. After that event Suatoslos, great duke 
of Russia, created his son Valdimer or Wolodi- 
mer, duke of Novogorod. This city thus be- 
came detached from Russia, being at first sub- 
.ordinate, and afterwards independent, until it 
was captured by the Czar, John Basilowitz II. 
A. D. 1471, who deprived it of all its privileges 
about six years afterwards. Nov^ogorod, so 
long as it continued an independent state, was 
a commercial and flourishing city, and much 
frequented by the merchants of Sweden, Den- 
mark, and the north of Germany, as it was the 
emporium of the North, and the centre of all 
the commerce and communication then existing 
between the northern countries of Europe and 
those of Asia. The trade of that city must 
indeed have been very extensive if Mr. C^ox's 



261 



estimate be correct; as he supposes the number 
of its inhabitants, in its most flourishing state, 
to have amounted to 400,000; while he com- 
putes the population of Petersburgh, about 
A. D. 1780, to be no more than 130,000; and 
that of Moscow only 300,000 ; a statement very 
much indeed below the account given by most 
of our geographical writers of the population of 
those cities. 

The ancient splendour of Russia was however 
totally eclipsed, and its greatness annihilated, 
by the Tartar conquest under the successors 
of Zenghis Khan, in the 13th century; and it 
had only begun to resume its independence a 
little before the reim of John Bazilowitz I. 
It appears, by the riches it contained when sub- 
jected by that prince, that Novogorod had not 
fallen a prey to those invaders. Russia, however, 
was of little weight in the political scale, until 
the feign of the immortal Peter the Great, 
whose achievements as far surpass those of the 
heroes and conquerors celebrated in ancient his- 
tory, as it is more glorious to found than to 
subvert an empire, to civilize than to destroy 
mankind. That extraordinary man, born to 
rule and civilize an extensive empire, had a ge- 
nius calculated for every thing that was great. 
He raised from obscurity a nation before un- 
noticed, and gave it a decided influence in the 
political system of Europe, with which it had, 



200 



between Gieat Britain and Russia, which has 
been so happily cultivated, and so much ex- 
tended, to the mutual benefit of both nations. 
Russia, however, although so little known, and 
having so little connection with the western 
parts of Europe, was a very considerable em- 
pire at an early period. Novogorod, and KiofF 
in the Ukraine, are said to have been founded 
about the middle of the fifth century. The 
former of these cities was made the metropolis 
of the Russian dominions by Ruric, the Great 
Duke, who died, A. D. 879; but at his de- 
cease, the seat of government Avas removed to 
Kioff. After that event, Suatoslos, great duke 
of Russia, created his son Valdimer or Wolodi- 
mer, duke of Novogorod. This city thus be- 
came detached from Russia, being at first sub- 
. ordinate, and afterwards independent, until it 
was captured by the Czar, John Basilowitz II. 
A. D. 1471, who deprived it of all its privileges 
about six years afterwards. Novogorod, so 
long as it continued an independent state, was 
a commercial and flourishii^g city, and much 
frequented by the merchants of Sweden, Den- 
mark, and the north of Germany, as it was the 
emporium of the North, and the centre of all 
the commerce and communication then existing 
between the northern countries of Europe and 
those of Asia. The trade of that city must 
indeed have been very extensive if Mi\ Cox's 



261 



estimate be correct ; as he supposes the number 
of its inhabitants, in its most flourishing state, 
to have amounted to 400,000; while he com- 
putes the population of Petersburgh, about 
A. D. 1780, to be no more than 130,000; and 
that of Moscow only 300,000 ; a statement very 
much indeed below the account given by most 
of our geographical writers of the population of 
those cities. 

The ancient splendour of Russia was however 
totally eclipsed, and its greatness annihilated, 
by the Tartar conquest under the successors 
of Zenghis Khan, in the 13th century; and it 
had only begun to resume its independence a 
little before the rei^-n of John Bazilowitz I. 
It appears, by the riches it contained when sub- 
jected by that prince, that Novogorod had not 
fallen a prey to those invaders. Russia, however, 
was of little weight in the political scale, until 
the reign of the immortal Peter the Great, 
whose achievements as far surpass those of the 
heroes and conquerors celebrated in ancient his- 
tory, as it is more glorious to found than to 
subvert an empire, to civilize than to destroy 
mankind. That extraordinary man, born to 
rule and civilize an extensive empire, had a ge- 
nius calculated for every thing that was great 
He raised from obscurity a nation before un- 
noticed, and gave it a decided influence in the 
political system of Europe, with which it had. 



204 



stores, render her invulnerable. There is no 
point in which Russia could be attacked with 
the least prospect of success by any power ex- 
cept Great Britain. A war with this country 
would consequently be the most detrimental to 
Russia of any in which she could possibly be 
engaged ; as, by reason of the naval strength of 
Britain, the commerce of Russia would be to- 
tally interrupted, and the empire also exposed, 
in diiFerent points, to the attacks of the British 
fleets ; although it must be acknowledged, that 
there are few important points in which Russia 
could be attacked, even by the most powerful 
naval armament. A war, however, between 
Great Britain and Russia would be nearly as de- 
trimental to the former, as to the latter country ; 
^nd indeed it is so much the interest of both 
these powers to m.aintain a good understanding, 
that it may be presumed, we shall never see any 
rupture of importance, or at least of long conti- 
nuance, between them. 

There is no country with which Russia carries 
on so great a trade as with Great Britain. A 
greater number of British vessels visit her ports 
than of any other nation, or even of all other 
nations besides. This great commercial inter- 
course between the two countries is principally 
owing to the extensive trade of Great Britain 
with all parts of the world. The great quantity 
of shipping, which the trade of this country 



« 



205 



employs, is one of the principal foundations of 
her trade with Russia, and the other northern 
countries. Great Britain, while she takes off 
vase quantities of their hemp, iron, flax, and tim- 
ber, supplies them with her own manufactures 
and colonial produce, and thus, an in-iercourse 
is established, equally beneficial, and equally 
necessary to both parties, which constitutes a 
natural bond of friendship, and affords just 
grounds to hope, that peace between Great 
Britain and the northern countries will conti- 
nually subsist, or at least be seldom inter- 
rupted. 

In respect of commerce, it is certain that 
Eussia possesses many and considerable advan- 
tages, which, if well managed, must continually 
augment her wealth, and, consequently, her 
power and influence. She has almost the ex- 
clusive possession of the fur trade; her forests 
are inexhaustible, and the rivers which run from 
the interior, and fall into the Baltic and Euxine 
seas, afford an easy conveyance for the timber, 
iron, and other heavy merchandise, from the 
interior parts of the empire into those seas, and 
from thence into the Mediterranean, and the 
ocean, by which means the southern and the 
western countries of Europe are supplied with 
the produce of the inland parts of Russia. The 
Wolga opens a communication between the Cas- 
pian sea and the central parts of the Russian 



2u6 



empire ; and frcm the port of AstrachaD, near 
the mouth of that river, a trade is carried on di- 
rectly with Persia, and indirectly with many 
other parts of Asia. The Russian trade with 
China is carried on to a considerable extent, 
and on a very lucrative plan ; as the greatest 
part of the furs of Siberia are sold to the Chi • 
nese at high prices ; and the returns made in 
the merchandise of that country, which is well 
disposed of in Russia. The fur trade is indeed 
an important branch of Russian commerce, and 
constitutes a part of the financial systemi of the 
empire, as the inhabitants of Siberia, Kamschat- 
ka. &c. pay their tribute to the government in 
furs; and consequently, that part of the revenue 
depends on the advantageous disposal of that 
species of merchandise. The encouragement 
given to strangers, and the privileges granted 
them, especially the universal liberty of con- 
science estabhshed in Russia, contributes not 
only to the increase of population, but also to 
the civilization of the people, tlie improvement 
of the arts and sciences, and the advancement 
of tlie conmierce and opulence of the empire; 
objects which, ever since the reign of Peter tire 
Great, have occupied the principal place in the 
views of the Imperial Couit, and have been 
more conchicivc to its glor\', and the prosperity 
of tile empire, than the most splendid warlike 
achievements, and productive of more solid ad- 



257 

vantages than could have resulted from the 
most brilliant career of conquest. 

Peter the Great desiring to render his subjects 
a commercial people, and Russia a maritime 
power, this view induced him to direct his at- 
tention to the equipment of a fleet ; and his ef- 
forts succeeded beyond all expectation. The 
success of that monarch in raising, v/e may say 
in creating, a navy, and establishing a commer- 
cial system in so short a space of time, has ex- 
cited the admiration of his contemporaries and 
of posterity; and it v/ould almost cause inns 
some degree of astonishment that England and 
other maritime countries were so many centu- 
ries before they made any considerable progress 
in naval improvements ; but during the reign 
of our Norman kings, the world afforded no 
models of naval architecture. The ancients had 
to invent, in many respects the moderns have 
only to imitate and improve. In every art and 
science improvement is progressive. In tlie 
reign of Peter the Great, the arts of navigation 
and ship-building were brought to great perfec- 
tion in the m.aritime countries of Europe. Eng- 
land and Holland afforded liim models, and fur- 
nished him with skilful workmen. The exer- 
tions of that monarch for the introduction of 
the arts into Russia were extraordinary and 
without precedent. History afforded no example 
of the sovereign of a mighty and extensive em- 



2(38 



pile descending from bis throne, and making a 
long perigrination in foreign countries, in order 
to bring back with bim their arts and sciences. 
By this decisive measure, however, Peter intro- 
duced into his own dominions tlie arts of West- 
ern Europe, which have ever since been in a 
progressive state. His successors have acted 
upon his principles ; and the Russian navy is ge- 
nerally kept upon a respectable footing. 

There is no doubt but the naval force of Rus- 
sia will always be sufficient for the protection of 
her trade, and for every probable exigency ; but 
that empire does not possess so many local ad- 
vantages as several other maritime countries. 
Notwithstanding its vast extent of territory, it 
has only a small extent of sea coast. In Eu- 
rope, the dominions of Russia are open to the 
sea only in two narrow points, on the Baltic 
and the Euxine; and before the accession of 
Peter the Great, the empire was entirly shut up 
from all communication with the sea, the Swedes 
then possessing the provinces of Ingria, Livo- 
nia, and Russian Finland, and the Turks being 
at the same time in possession of all the coasts 
of the Euxine. The sea coasts and ports of 
Russia were acquired by the military efforts of 
Peter, so that he may with propriety be called 
the creator both of her trade and her marine. 
These coasts, however, are not sufficiently ex- 
tensive, nor their ports sufficiently numerous to 



209 

make Russia a first-rate maritime power. The 
port of Archangel on the White sea, in lat. 
64'' 34' N. and long. SS"* 50' East, is in too se- 
vere a chmate, as vv^ell as too remote from the 
scene of action, and from all European inter- 
course, to contribute much to her maritime 
strength; and Kamschatka, as well as the other 
North East coasts of Asia, are in a situation as 
little adapted to that purpose. From these cir- 
cumstances it appears, that the peculiarities of 
her situation, the contracted extent of her 
coasts, and the small number of her ports, will 
prevent Russia from attaining to the first rank 
among the maritime powers ; and, upon the 
whole, that empire seems better adapted to 
maintain or increase its predominating power 
and political ascendancy, by its military than 
its naval strength. 

The revenues of Russia are generally estimated 
at about seven or eight millions sterling, a sum 
exceedingly inferior to those of Great Britain 
or France, not indeed amounting to so much as 
one fourth part of the revenues of the former; 
but her national debt is proportionably small; 
and the high value of money in that country, 
enables the court of St. Petersburo-h to carrv 
into execution projects of the greatest magni- 
tude and importance, with a revenue which, to 
a person who is acquainted only with countries, 
where the price of labour and provisions is 



570 

iriucli higher, and consequently the relative 
value of money much less, appears inconsi-^ 
derable. 

Europe has witnessed the extraordinary exer- 
tions of Russia, in the two last wars, against 
the Turks ; yet, notwithstanding the vast ex- 
penditure which those efforts must have occa- 
sioned, the imperial court outshone in splendour 
and magnificence most of the courts of Europe j 
and a variety of plans, tending to the internal 
regulation and improvement of the empire, were 
projected and executed on an extensive scale, 
and at a great expense. If, indeed, we only 
consider the magnificence of the different impe- 
rial palaces, the munificence of the Russian so- 
vereigns tO¥/ards men of talents and merit, and 
the brilliancy of the court of Petersburgh, es- 
pecially since the accession of Catharine II, 
v/itli its formidable mihtary and naval arma- 
ments at different periods, it appears evident 
that great things can be performed in Russia 
with an expense that appears inconsiderable, 
when comipared with the cost of similar under- 
takings in many other countries. In regard to 
the levying and supporting of her armies, and 
the equipment of her navy, it may be observed, 
that the Russians are a hardy race of men ; and 
the peasantry are accustomed to poor living, 
and inured to hardships. This circumstance, in 
conjunction with the low price of provisions, 



271 

enables tlie Russia a soldiers to subsist on a very 
small pay ; and tlieir mode of recruiting* from 
the peasantry is attended with little expense. 
It is, therefore, no \yonder that Russia, with a 
revenue apparently small, is able to levy and 
support an army of four or five hundred thou- 
sand men. The great plenty also of timber, 
cordage, and other naval stores which the 
country supplies, and the low vahie of provi- 
sions and labour, are circumstances which render 
the expense of fitting out a fleet comparatively 
small 

The geographical position of Russia, and her 
immense resources, in conjunction with the po- 
litical and moral circumstances of the neigh- 
bouring nations, afford her at all times an op- 
portunity of aggrandizing herself on the side 
of Asia. If, renouncing all interference with 
European politics, she should direct her views 
solely towards Asia, there is little doubt but she 
might, in time, reduce a great part of that quar- 
ter of the globe under her subjection. That tliis 
will some time or other happen, is a conjecture 
supported by strong probability, if we com- 
pare the state of the Russian empire with that 
of the neighbouring nations. 

The Turks are by far tlie most powerful ene- 
mies Russia could be expected to meet with in 
that quarter ; but they are no more that v/arlike 



272 

people which they were two or tliree centuries 
ago. It is now more than century since 
the Ottoman empire began to decHne, and of 
late its power has not been in the least degree 
formidable. The two last wars between the 
Russian and Ottoman empires, have furnished 
evident proofs of the ascendancy which the 
former has gained over the latter, and which it 
will probably for ever maintain ; for the power 
of Russia is continually increasing under an 
active and vigorous administration. Her armies 
are well disciphned and ably commanded. Her 
marine is in a respectable and improving state ; 
every department of her government well con- 
nected with another, and well conducted ; and 
her power and influence increasing, while the 
Ottoman empire is in a great measure destitute 
of every one of these advantages. We have re- 
cently seen that, without the assistance of Eng- 
land, the Turks were unable to expel a handful 
of French out of Egypt ; and it is doubtful 
whether, without the co-operation of its allies, 
the whole force of the Ottoman empire could 
have accomplished that work. From these con- 
siderations it is more than probable that the 
Turks would not be able, without the inter- 
ference and assistance of some European power, 
to support a decisive contest with Russia ; un- 
less such an alteration should happen in the 



273 

'state of the Turkish empire and its armies, 
'as no existing circumstances authorize us to 
•expect 

On the side of Persia, Russia has the most 
fa\^ourabIe opportunities of extending her domi- 
'iiions, that country having long been in a dis- 
united and disorganized state, a prey to intestine 
divisioiis and contending parties. No political 
cause seems to exist that could'preveiit her ag- 
grandizement in that quarter. Some circuni- 
'stances of a physical nature inigbt however, 
render any great extension of her dominions on 
'that side more difficult than it would at the first 
- view appear. A Vvar carried on by the Wes'eni 
'nations against Persia has generally been at- 
'tended with great and often unfe^reseen diflicul- 
ties, arising from the nature of the country and 
its approaches. Obstacles of the most formid- 
•^ble kind have presented themselves to an inva- 
•sion of that country from the \¥est, by reason 
of tlie extensive deserts on this side of the Eu- 
plirates, which form a barrier against the ap- 
proach of an enemy. These difficulties have 
•been experienced by almost every invader who 
'made his attack from that quarter, except Alex- 
ander. Every one is acquainted with the catas- 
trophe of Marcus Craissus,- and those of the Em- 
perors Valerian and Julitin,* as' well as with the 
nil success of several expeditions 'of the Turl^s 

T 



'274 

against Persia, at a time when the Ottoman em- 
pire was far more formidable than it has lately 
appeared. i\]most all the transactions here al- 
luded to, however, exhibit notorious instances 
of mismanagement in the invaders, as well as 
of artful defence on the part of the people in- 
vaded. Persia contains many extensive and 
beautiful tracts, which display the most luxu- 
riant fertility ; but several parts of the country 
consist of little else than dry and parched de- 
sarts ; and the Persians have commonly had the 
address to allure, by the appearance of flight, 
the invading enemy into those -desolate regions, 
harrassing them with desultory attacks, and 
wearing them out by famine and fatigue. If 
Darius, with his numerous armies and immense 
treasures, had taken that method, and acted on 
the defensive, he would very probably have 
caused Alexander to repent of his undertaking. 
The capital error of Darius was his too great 
confidence in his own strength, and his reliance 
on his numerous but undisciplined forces. This 
mistake led him to risk the fate of his empire in 
open warfare, and the consequences proved fatal. 
The Caliphs, however, in the course of nineteen 
years began and completed the conquest of 
Persia ; and innumerable instances concur to 
shew, that no barrier can protect a pusillanimous 
or a disunited people against the attacks of ^ 



275 

Well-disciplined army, conducted by an enter- 
prizing and skilful commander. Persia has been 
conquered by the Greeks, the Saracens, and the 
Tartars ; and it is evident that Russia is in pos- 
session of greater advantages and more com- 
manding points of attack, in regard to a war 
with Persia, than any of the nations here men- 
tioned. She could convey her armies from the 
interior down the Wolga, and, by means of that 
river, into the Caspian sea. At Astrachan, she 
could construct a fleet capable of landing them 
in Persia in spite of all opposition : and there is 
little doubt but a Russian army would be able 
to penetrate from the shores of the Caspian sea 
into the centre of that country. 

The Chinese dominions border upon those of 
Russia ; but the frontiers of both empires con- 
sist entirely of immense and almost uninhabited 
deserts, so that no serious v/ar can be expected 
to take place between them. The immense dis- 
tance from the well-peopled parts of Russia to 
the frontiers of China, renders almost impossible 
the march of a great army, such as it would 
require to make any impression on that vast and 
exceedingly populous empire, which, accordiDg 
to the very lowest estimate tliat has ever been 
made of its population, contains tu-ice as many 
inhabitants as the whole Russian empire. From 
Moscow to V erchutaria, on the borders of Sibe- 

T 2 



^76 

lia, reckoning by tbe roads, the distance is riot 

less than - - 1773 

From Verchutaria to Tobolski 61 2 

From Tobolski to Yenesisky 5994 

Tf omYenesisky to Sehnginsky 1461 

Fi'otti Seingin ky to Sara-") 

tine, on the frontires of/ 104 

China - y 

From Saratine to the river Tola 467 
From tlie river Tola to the"j 

great wall of China, v 12 11 

across the Hungry desart 3 

S62 !^ lltsslan Versf s». 

The verst being exactly 11 66 yards and 2 feet 
English measure, it appears that the distance 
from Moscow to the wall of China, is not less 
than SO73 English miles, and a great part of the 
road almost impassable to an army, and lyiitg 
through barren and inhospitable countries, in- 
capable of supplying it Vv'ith provisions on its 
march. These considerations shew the absurdity 
of the conjecture, which some speculators have 
formed, that Russia may probably some time or 
other make a conquest of China. Separated 
from the rest of the world by imnfiense and 
barren deserts^ the Chinese empire can scarcely 



* Bell's itinerary. 



277- 

ev^r cpmc: into political contact with Europe ; 
an4 to, tlx'is circumstance the uninterrupted 
peace which it enjoys is to be attributed. 

If we cast our eyes on a map of Europe and 
Asia, and contemplate the geographical position 
of Russia, as well as the extent of her dominions 
in each of those, two quarters of the Globe, and 
consider at the same tim^e how much she excels 
her Southern neighbours in political energy and 
niihtary discipline, imagination m.ight, at the 
first view, form a picture of that empire, stretch- 
ing itself over the whole continent of Asia, and 
see no bounds to its extension, except the In- 
dian and Easter Ocean. Reason and reflection 
will, however, soon annihilate the romantic 
idea ; and shew that, certain moral and physical 
circumstances exist, which render it extremely 
improbable that the. Eastern countries of Asia 
should ever become a part of the Russian em- 
pire. 

The want of a population proportionate to the 
extent of her dominions, must powerfully mili- 
tate against any schemes of such extensive con- 
quests wdiich Russia might fOrm, and would 
even render their successful accomplishment fa- 
tal to her prosperity. Her territories are of a 
vast extent her political system vigorous and 
energetic, her armies numerous and well- disci- 
phned, lier soldiers hardy and robust, and her 
commanders brave and skilful; but her domi- 



278 

nions, extensive as they are, do not contain a 
much greater number of inhabitants than mo- 
dern France ; and these are thinly scattered 
over an immense extent of countr}'. Former 
documents relative to this subject, usually aS' 
signed the number of twenty-six or twenty- 
seven millions for the population of the whole 
Russian empire ; but Mr. WilUam Tooke, whose 
long residence in Russia, as well as his intimate 
acquaintance with the original documents con- 
cerning the affairs of that empire, stamp on his 
calculations the greatest marks of authority, ex- 
hibits the whole population of its European and 
Asiatic dominions as consisting of about thirty- 
six miUions, at the end of the last century. 
This number, however, spread over so vast an 
extent of country, does not exceed, by more 
than three millions, the most accurately esti- 
mated population of France, as comprised within 
her new boundaries. From those considerations 
it evidently appears, that it would b^ a great 
error to estimate the strength and resources of 
the Russian empire by the extent of its territo- 
ries. If the vast countries which constitute 
the dominions of Russia were fertile and popu- 
lous, they would contain a number of people 
sufficient to subdue the whole world ; but when 
we consider their population, we shall readily 
perceive, that although that empire, by the 
well-regulated system of its government; and 



279 

the superiority of its military establishment, 
might possibly effect the conquest of Asia, she 
could not preserve her acquisitions beyond a 
certain extent. 

In Europe we have, during a whole century, 
seen the power and influence of Russia in a con- 
tinually progressive state, and of late rapidly in- 
creased. The annexation of so considerable a 
part of Poland to her empire, has very much 
augmented the number of her subjects ; and all 
her internal and external circumstances have 
contributed to increase her preponderancy in 
the scale of European politics. Her weight and 
influence on the continent of Europe are now 
so great, that she has it always in her power to 
check the ambitious views of other states, when- 
ever she perceives them to militate against her 
own interests, or those of her aUies, and to cast 
the balance in any continental contest. Had 
not an unfortauate misunderstanding arisen be- 
tween the courts of Vienna and Petersburgh, 
which v/as followed by the withdrawing of the 
Russian army under Marshal Su war row, the Cisal- 
pine republic would, in all probability, not 
have been established, nor Italy have been left 
in a state of subserviency to France. If Russia 
had at that juncture continued to act in concert 
with Austria, all the military skill and bravery 
of the French would scarcely have been able to 
prevent their expulsion from Italy ; and if those 



280 



two powers had taken the salutary -preeatitiosr 
of uniting their whole strength/ before they • 
came to any engagement with the enemy, in thev 
campaign of the last year, 1805, the. armies of • 
France would probaMy have been drivea with 
])rec]pitaEiOa out of Germany. 

Notwithstanding the opportunities of agr-. 
grandiziug herself, which the debilitated and 
disorganized state of som.e of her Southern- 
neighbours seems to afford, it will, from an ex- 
amination of her internal circumstances, mani- 
festly appear, that the m.ost substantial interest 
of Russia consists in adhering as much as^px)s-» . 
sibie to a pacific^ system ; from which, indeed, 
scarcely any consideration except that important- 
object of universal concern to all the continental 
powers, the support of European independence 
against revolutionary tyranny, ought to induce 
her to deviate. This grand object would indeed 
justify her hostilities and crown her with glory; 
in almost all other circumstances, peace must 
procure her the most solid advantages. This 
must be the case in every country of a great ex- 
tent and small population. In this respect, 
Russia and the United States of America are in 
nearly the same .predicament. Until a nation . 
has a sufficient number of bands for the culti- 
vation of its ovv'n territories, it will derive more 
solid and permanent advantages from a strict' 
attention to agriculture, than from the most siic-» 



281 



cessful military enterprizes, and the most exten- 
sive conquests. The Russian dominions migh 
undoubtedly be rendered capable of supporting 
more than four times their present population ; 
and that those countries have formerly been far 
more populous than at present, appears from the 
numerous monuments of large towns and mag- 
nificent edifices discov^ered in the most desolate 
parts of those vast regions ; a circumstance that 
naturally points out the advantages which must 
result to that empire from adhering to a pacific 
system. 

The example and conduct of Peter the Great 
may, indeed, be adduced in opposition to this 
mode of reasoning;, Peter is acknowledo-ed to 
have been the founder of the Russian greauiess. 
The population of that empire had, in his time 
at least, as much need of being increased by. 
peace, instead of being diminished by war, as. 
at any period since ; and yet his was a martial 
reign. A very considerable part of that prince's 
life, it is true, was employed in war, but the 
circumstances of the empire were then peculiarly 
disadvantageous and embarrassing. Blocked 
up on every side, completely shut up in the in- 
terior of the Continent, and precluded from all 
communication with the sea, Peter found it ab- 
solutely necessary to open a passage by the 
sword, before he could render Russia a com- 
mercial ^nd maritime power. The wars in which 



232 



Peter engaged against the Swedes and the 
Turks, were burdensome and bloody; but the 
object was great and important. To dispossess 
those nations from some of the provinces, which 
the former occupied on the East of the Gulph 
of Finland, and the latter on I he North of the 
Euxine sea, was a constituent, and indeed a ne- 
cessary part of that monarch's plan; for with- 
out the attainment of that object, the whole 
must have been disconcerted, as in that case 
Peter's commercial and maritime empire would 
have existed only in idea : recourse to the 
sword was absolutely requisite, in order to bring 
it into real existence. This consideration may 
apologize for the belligerent measures of that 
prince, at least it will shew their political pro- 
priety. Russia was, by Peters mihtary exer- 
tions, set free from that embarrassing situation, 
which vras then so great an obstacle to her poli- 
tical and commercial aggrandizement, that with- 
out its removal all his vast projects must have 
fallen to the ground. 

Sweden and Denmark, by their local situa- 
tion, and by a variety of other circumstances, 
are intimately connected with Russia, and im- 
plicated in her politics. These tvro kingdoms 
may be reckoned among those continental 
powers which are not placed under the control 
of France. Their pohtics tend towards a dif- 
ferent centre. They might, indeed, consider- 



283 

ably annoy France, in case of a rupture witli 
that power ; buc this is a circumstance scarcely 
to be expected, except in the case of another 
combination of the European powers with Russia 
at their head ; as those kingdoms are, by a con- 
currence of circumstances, placed in a particular 
manner within her pohtical vortex. 

As I have so long trespassed upon your lei» 
sure, I shall not at present add any particular 
considerations on the political circumstances of 
those Northern nations, but conclude by assur* 
ing you that, with unfeigned respect, 

I am, 



Your's, &c» 



284^ 



LETTERXIII. 

SIH, 

>vIO^I|LNTrof leisitraJiaviiig encouraged me 
to-imiew •our -correspondence, I shall take the 
opportunity of pursuing the delineation of the 
political system by more particular observations 
on the interests and resources of the two North-' 
ern powers. 

Sweden and Denmark, countries which, to- 
gether with Norway, an appendage to the lat- 
ter kingdom, constituted the ancient Scandina- 
via, when collectively taken, are of a very con- 
siderable extent ; but by reason of the severity 
of the climate, thinly peopled, especially in the 
Rortliern parts. The Danes are a hardy race of 
people, and formerly v/ere foimidable to the 
marlthiie parts of Europe, particularly to the 
British isles. Every one who is conversant in 
English history is acquainted with their ravages 
and their conquests, both in Great Britain and 
Ireland. It is, however, to be supposed, that 
those Danes, who in the timiCs of our Saxon 
kings made these depredations, were not solely 
the inhabitants of those countries which are 
now properly denominated Denmark, but that 



^3 

the people of Siyedeii and Norway, and perhaps 
those of the northern parts of Germany, joined 
in those expeditions. The Normans also, 
who conquered that part of France from them 
called Normandy, and hy their valour rather 
than their numbers carried their arms into dif- 
ferent countries, formed permanent establish- 
ments in Italy and Sicily, and at last made a 
com.plete conquest of England, Vv^ere originally 
a band of adventurers from Norway, Indeed, 
of all the northern people, the Norwegians are 
the most robust and hardy. Both tlie Sv/edes 
and Danes are v/ell calculated for soldiers, but 
no people in the world are better qualified for a 
military life than the Norwegians. The Danes 
have not, however, in several centuries past, 
made any great figure on the military theatre; 
but the Swedes, in the martial rei, g-n of Gus-=> 
tavus Adolphus, were esteemed the best soldiers 
in Europe. In the reign of the famou Charles 
XII. they also made a conspicuous figure. 
Since that period, the Svvedish history displays 
but few instances of military talents and hero* 
ism. The late king seemed by his great abili- 
ties qualified to give Svv^eden a considerable in- 
fluence in the political system, and would pro- 
bably have rendered Swedish valour as remark- 
able as it had Been at any former -period, - liad 
he not fallen by the hand of an assassin, at the 
moment when he was goirig ' to t-feik-e ihe com- 



285 



niand of the combined force of Europe against 
France. 

Sweden and Denmark, like other nations, 
have had their periods of elevation and depres- 
sion. This has been the lot of almost every 
state of any long duration. When we consider 
the revolutions of empires it plainly appears, 
that their destiny, like that of individuals, is 
determined by a chain of causes which it is 
very often impossible either to prevent or fore- 
see ; and subject to the absolute control of 
that Providence, which, by the intervention 
and agency of second causes, rules and governs 
the universe. 

The interests of those nations are, in many 
respects, in unison with those of Russia, andfor 
many reasons that empire must find it necessary 
to afford them its protection. Russia, Swe- 
den, and Denmark, are all nearly alike inte- 
rested in the free navigation of the Baltic. If 
any one of these three powers can be said to 
have a greater interest than the others in that 
grand object of their politics, it is Russia as 
the blocking up of that sea would almost anni- 
hilate her commerce, and be to that empire 
such a degradation in the eyes of Europe a» 
could not fail of diminishing exceedingly, and 
almost destroying her influence on the conti* 
nent, if she suffered such a measure to be car- 
ried into execution with impunity. This is the. 



287 

grand obstacle which 'must for ever prseent 
itself to the aggrandizement of France on 
that side, and of any attempt she might form 
for distressing the trade of this country, by ex- 
cluding British vessels from the Baltic sea. If 
France did not expect a more powerful resist- 
ance than Denmark alone could make there is 
not the least doubt to be made but she would 
adopt the measure of invading that country, 
and of taking possession of the Sound. But that 
government neither is nor can be ignorantj 
that such an infringement of the rights of neu- 
tral nations, and a measure so hostile to their 
commerce, could not fail of drawing down 
upon the aggressors the vindictive and effective 
resentment of Russia, of which the conse- 
quence could be nothing less than a combina- 
tion of the Northern powers against France, 
To such a coalition Prussia herself would, from 
her situation, peihaps be obhged to accede ; so 
that, should France ever have the temerity to 
extend so far her system of violating the rights 
of neutrality, as to attempt to occupy and 
block up the Sound, she might immediately 
prepare to engage in a contest with as formid- 
able a confederacy as she saw formed against 
her immediately after the extinction of the mo- 
narchy. 

Immediately after the conquest of Hanover^ 
and the arrival of the French army in the vici-, 



2S8 

nity of Hamburgh, several of our news-writers 
expressed their sus])icions that France would, 
in the next place, pour her armies into Den- 
mark, and, by the occupation of the Sound, 
exclude our vessels from the Baltic, and thus 
interrupt a very extensive and a very necessary- 
branch of the trade of this nation. ^lany, 
also, of our nevrs-paper politicians were of opi- 
nion that this would be the case; but if they 
had maturely considered the circumstances of 
the Northern powers, tkey would have perceived 
their apprehensions to be groundless. No oiie, 
who has ever contemplated the a^airs of Eurojie 
in a general view, and examined their connec- 
tions and combinations, could ever have ima- 
gined such an attack on the commerce of -Great 
Britain to be. practicable, so long as she con- 
tinues on amicable terms with Russia. Those 
Yv'ho entertained such apprehensions, or who 
even supposed the possibility of the event-, 
were alarmed at the consideration of its pernici- 
ous eifects on the trade of Great Britain ; with- 
out considering, at the same time, that its cdn- 
sequences m.ust have been equally destructive 
and fatal to that of Russia. ^Ve have already 
observed, that the trade which Russia carries-ou 
with Great Britain is -nearly equivalent, or even, 
perhaps, more than equivalent, to that which 
she carries on wdth all the rest- of Europe. It 
is also not less worthy • of - observation; - tkat - if 



289 

Great Britain were excluded from the naviga- 
tion of the Baltic, she could at least resort to 
the measure of shutting up its entrance against 
other nations; a measure which her naval supe- 
riority would enable her to carry into execu- 
tion, in spite of all opposition. These two im- 
portant circumstances jointly considered amount 
to nothing less than a demonstration, that the 
blockade of the Sound by an enemy would, in 
embarrassing and diminishing the trade of 
Great Britain, annihilate that of Russia, besides 
being almost equally fatal in the same respect to 
Sweden and Denmark. It would be impossible, 
on the part of France, to make an adequate 
compensation to those powers for the loss they 
would sustain from such a procedure. If, 
therefore, the French government should ever 
adopt such a measure, the consequences are too 
obvious to require any comment. 

After the most comprehensive view that can 
be taken of the political situation of Europe, 
after the most accurate and impartial examina- 
tion of every existing circumstance, and after 
the most probable estimate of the effects of vi- 
sible causes founded on reason and historical ex- 
perience, the power of Great Britain appears to 
be fixed upon a far more permanent basis, than 
that of any other nation, unless we may except 
Russia; and it is somewhat problematical whe- 
ther the internal circumstances of that empire 

u 



2Q0 

authorise such an exception : in respect to ex- 
ternal aggression, it is certain that Russia en- 
joys a security of which no other nation, 
perhaps, not even Great Britain herself can 
boast. 

It may be said that men are naturally in- 
clined to partiality in making a comparison be- 
tween the circumstances of their own country 
and those of others, as they likewise often are 
in comparing their own individual abilities or 
advantages with those of their neighbours. 
The case may, perhaps, not be uncommon; 
but it is an error of an extremely pernicious ten- 
dency. In every estimate of things ,v in every 
view, either of pubhc affairs or private con- 
cerns, it is highly detrimental to flatter our- 
selves with fallacious assurances, and to deceive 
ourselves with groundless hopes. To nations 
and to individuals, such a conduct has always 
been detrimental, and frequently fataU In this 
speculative delineation of the political state of 
Europe, not a single fact is advanced which is 
not well authenticated ; not a single observation 
brought forward that w^ill not bear examina- 
tion; not a single advantage attributed to 
Great Britain that does not possess, nor any 
conjecture formed that does not rest on the 
foundation of strong probability. 

On these principles, and according to these 
rules, the political picture here exhibited, what- 



291 

ever mav be the merits or the defects of the 
execution, is dehneated and the general repre- 
sentation cannot fail of being in the highest de- 
gree pleasifig to every subject of Great Britain, 
who loves his sovereign and his country, and 
knows how to appreciate the blessings con- 
ferred by the British constitution. To exhibit 
in one general and comprehensive view the 
great outlines and most prominent traits of the 
political picture, France presents herself in a 
gigantic state of aggrandizement under* a mili- 
tary system, and animated v;ith the remains of 
a declining enthusiasm, v/hich has indeed 
wrought wonders in her favour ; her colossal 
power, of which that enthusiasm was the basis, 
appears now to be in its meridian. At present 
she is the undoubted mistress of Italy and Hol- 
land. In those countries, however, although 
her power be absolute, it rests on a precariotis 
foundation. Over Spain and Portugal she has 
a decided, but, perhaps, only a temporary in- 
fluence. Austria and Prus.^^ia, in the centre of 
Europe, powerful, independent, and possessing 
vast resources. Austria has, it is true, suffered 
in the late contest a considerable l(;ss of terri- 
tory, and consequently a considerable defalca- 
tion in her revenues : but she is still powerful; 
her dominions are in an improving state, and 
the deficiencies necessarily occaiioj*; d by the, 
loss of Belgium and the Italian provmces, may 

u ^ 



292 

probably be more than fully made up in a few 
years. Her military establishment is also on a 
respectable footing; and notw ithstanding the un- 
favourable issue of the two last wars, every one 
who considers her political and military circum- 
stances, and the greatness of her resources, will 
see the probability that Austria may in some fu- 
ture contest display her importance in the conti- 
nental system, and exhibit herself formidable to 
France. In an age like the present, when mi- 
litary discipline and tactical science are so ge- 
nerall}^ understood throughout Europe, a great 
nation is not subdued by a Tew years of unsuc- 
cessful war, nor the fate of empires so suddenly 
decided as in the times of antiquity. 

After contemplating the poHtical and mih- 
tary circumstances of Austria, we likewise ob- 
serve Prussia exhibiting herself in nearly a pa- 
rallel point of view, except that she has hitherto 
seemed more decidedly attached to a neutral 
system, or more inclined to the interests of 
France. In her commercial, military, and fi- 
nancial affairs, Prussia is an improving state, 
and her revenues and resources rapidly increas- 
ing. The Ottoman empire, so long formidable 
to Europe, appears to be on the decHne. That 
vast structure seems now verging towards a 
state of dilapidation. To the eye of pohtical 
speculation, the state of that part of the world, 
contemplated in a relative view with the inte- 



293 

rests and views of other powers, appears preg- 
nant with consquences of no small magnitude 
and importance. 

Russia constitutes another very conspicuous 
and prominent object in a view of the pohtical 
world. Mistress of the North, she sits in per- 
fect security ; and, comparatively speaking, 
can be but little affected by the conv^ulsions 
which agitate the other parts of the globe. 
Notwithstanding her late ill-success, she is at 
all times able to determine the course of conti- 
nental politics, to check the aggrandizing sys- 
tem of France in any stage of its progress, 
and effectually to maintain the independence of 
Germany, and the balance of power on the 
continent. Sweden and Denmark, united in 
a great measure in the same interests, form in 
connection with Russia a distinct system, inde- 
pendent on the influence of France, and able to 
counterbalance her political ascendency. 

In the grand and important display of human 
affairs, which the present age exhibits to the 
eye of contemplation. Great Britain holds the 
most conspicuous place, distinguished as the 
indisputable mistress of the ocean, and arbitress 
of the commerce of the world. The eyes of 
all Europe are now turned towards the affairs of 
Great Britain and France, and expecting the 
issue of the important contest in which they 
are engaged. On that, indeed, the fate of 



2g4 

Europe is, in a great measure, suspended. Per- 
haps, in the course of some years, the colossal 
power of France may no longer appear in so 
imposing a point of view. 

It is not, however, to be expected that so 
important a cha;Tge should speedily take place, 
or that France should be soon precipitated from 
her towering elevation. The recent disasters 
on the continent, leave no room for such an ex- 
pectation. The whole series of political con- 
jecture, founded on an estimate of the resources 
of the different estates, which constitute the 
iTiCmbers of the great European system, and 
their possible application, must therefore be 
considered as pointing to a period, somewhat 
distant, and of which no human foresight can 
fix the arrival. It cannot be dissembled that 
the power of France appears to rest on a basis 
which no continental confederacy is likely to 
overturn, or even to shake ; and that Britain is 
now left during the remainder of the war to de- 
pend on her own exertions, which will under 
Divine Providence undoubtedly be sufficient for 
her preservation. Her situation, however, in. 
this respect, is only the same as that in which 
she stood towards the end of the last war; and 
instead of tending to her discouragement, will 
rather give fresh animation to her efforts until 
a secure and honourable peace can be effected, 
this desirable event indeed cannot be very far 



295 

distant. Every measure has been adopted that 
seemed Hke to give a decisive turn to those 
great transactions^- on the issue of which the 
destiny of Europe seemed to depend. The 
event iias not, indeed, answered pubUc expecta- 
tion; and the result seems to indicate that no- 
thing of any great importance now remains to 
be performed by arms. On the continent no- 
thing can at present destroy the ascendency of 
the GaUic empire. Russia is too far removed 
from the scene of action to perform alone any 
thing effective. France and England present 
to each other an invulnerable front, without 
being able to strike any decisive blow, as the 
former has now but few colonial possessions, 
and her foreign commerce is almost annihilated, 
while the latter untcrrified by the scarecrows of 
camps and flotillas on the Gallic coast, laughs 
at the threats of invasion. In the whole bel- 
ligerent system, Spanish colonies in America 
present the only vulnerable points. Such being 
the case, it is not improbable, that a change of 
measures will on both sides be found necessary. 
Spain brought into the war with reluctance, 
and already a great sufferer in its progress, will 
be v/eary of its ^Volongation. France, the mov- 
ing spring of the hostile machine, has placed 
herself on the summit of continental greatness, 
and has no higher degree of glory or power to 
expect, or desire, than she has already acquired. 



2q6 



She must by this time be convinced that all her 
projects against Britain are visionary, and that 
all the attempts she can make for her overthrow, 
must end in her own discomfiture and diso-race. 
Britain at the same time seemiS to have accom- 
phshed every salutary purpose. She has pre= 
served her national independence with her ex- 
cellent constitution and extensive commerce, 
and exhibited fresh proofs of what was indeed 
already unquestionable, her uncontrolable do- 
minion of the seas, and her naval superiority 
over all the rest of the world. All these cir- 
cumstances collectively and com.paratively con- 
sidered seem to indie ate, that the general state 
of things is naturally tending tovrards a pacifi- 
cation. 

These reflections may, perhaps, at the sight 
appear to some persons coiitradictory to several 
things before advanced ; but it is a great sole- 
cism in political reasoning to suppose, that 
measures once necessary must be always the 
same. We cannot but believe, that Britain, 
for the sake of her own security, was under the 
necessity of opposing the revolutionary tem- 
pest; but in acknov-rieclging the expediency of 
the measures then adopted, we must not infer 
that war shoidd be perpetual. The political in- 
terests of nations being influenced by an incal- 
culable variety of contingencies, the business of 
a wise politician is to form his views from exist- 



297 

ing circumstances, and adapt his measures to 
the exigencies which arise from the fluctuations 
of affairs. If in conformity with these obser- 
vations, we take a retrospect of the state of 
things at the recommencement of hostihties, 
after the peace of Amiens, we shall find that 
France was aiming at still further aggrandize- 
ment, while Britain required greater security. 
Both these objects seem now to be already at- 
tained, at least so far as they are attainable by 
war. While Britain has exhibited herself the 
bulwark of liberty and independence, impreg- 
nable to every mode of attack, the Emperor of 
France must be convinced that he can gain no 
laurels in the contest, and that after his recent 
successes on the continent he has much more 
glory to lose than to gain in any future enter- 
prize. 

This country has now to deplore the loss of 
three distinguished public characters : Mr. Pitt, 
Marquis Cornwallis, and Lord Nelson ; — their ta- 
lents will long be remembered, and their names 
give an additional lustre to the national annals^ 
The loss however, though great, will not, we 
may hope, be irreparable. Britain is not in 
want of either commanders or statesmen of 
consummate talents. Equal abilities will be 
found for national services^ of equal magnitude 
in future as theirs have been in past exigencies. 
If the late ministers can claim the merit of 



2QS 

having saved the country at the tremendous 
crisis of revolutionary confusion, to the present 
administration is probahly reserved the glory of 
completing the national prosperity by pacifica- 
tion, and we may hope that the remainder of 
his majesty's reign may be as peaceable as 
its course has been glorious. These consider- 
ations will not, however, invalidate a number 
of observations, estimates, applications, and 
inferences in the preceding as well as the re- 
maining part of our correspondence. Those 
are not exhibited as prophetic predictions of 
"what must inevitably happen, but as conjec- 
tures founded on observations and estimates of 
existing causes, pointing to probable conse- 
quences. Notwithstanding the apparent ten- 
dency of European affairs to pacification, some 
of these conjectural views may yet be realized 
at a future, and perhaps no very distant period, 
for all past experience shews that the duration 
of peace, like that of war, is never perpetual ; 
and the testimony of history proves that the 
spirit of enterprising ambition is seldom ex- 
tinguished by treaties. 

With every wish for 3'our happiness which, 
next to the public welfare, is the object of my 
most fervent prayer, 

I am, dear Sir, 

Your'S; See. 

3 



29Q 



LETTER XIV. 

SIR, 

The politics, as well as the commerce of Eu« 
lope, have in those latter times become so com- 
plicated and extensive, as to involve in a consi- 
derable degree the interests of the other quarters 
of the globe ; and their influence operates in so 
many and so various directions, that few parts 
of the world can be considered as wholly ex- 
empt from its effects. In surveying the com- 
plex and intricate scenes which those effects 
have lately exhibited, and anticipating others 
which they may yet produce, our attention is 
strongly attracted towards a country which, 
since the time of the crusades, has had no poli- 
tical, and, during a long time, but little com« 
mercial connexion with the Western parts of 
Europe. The unsuccessful expedition of St. 
Louis, A. D. 1250, terminated the interference 
of the Europeans in the political and military 
affairs of Egypt, until within a few years ; and 
the discovery of the passage round the Cape of 
Good Hope to India, A. D. 1498, put an end to 
that monopolizing and lucrative trade carried 



300 



on from the port of Alexandiia, between that 
countiy and various parts of Italy, especially 
Venice and Genoa. From that period, Egypt 
lias had so little connection with Europe, th^it 
it has seldom been mentioned, except in speak- 
ing of its ancient history, and its stupendous 
monuments of antiquity, until the revolutioniz- 
ing system of France extended its effects to that 
distant and once celebrated country. 

The geographical position of Egypt was un- 
doubtedly the circumstance which principally 
attracted the attention and the arms of the re- 
public towards that quarter. Situated nearly 
ia the centre of the old continent, and almost 
in a direct line between France and hidia, it ap- 
peared an advantageous post from whence the 
former might annoy the oriental possessions and 
commerce of Great Britain. So fertile a coun- 
try might indeed, of itself, have been no in- 
considerable acquisition to France, and have 
counterbalanced the eventual loss of her West 
India colonies ; but it is beyond a possibility of 
doubt, that this was not the primary object of 
the republican government in the invasion of 
Egypt; the annoyance, if not the conquest of 
the territorial possessions of Great Britain in 
India, and the annihilation of her commerce in 
that quarter, were undoubtedly its principal 
views. The success of the expedition was ulti- 
mately such as so unprovoked an aggression. 



301 



and so flagrant a violation of neutrality, de- 
served ; and such as, from the nature and cir- 
cumstances of the enterprize, might indeed 
have been expected, disastrous to the republic, 
and glorious to Gr^at Britain. 

The views of the republican government, in 
this unprincipled invasion of a neutral country; 
being such as are here described, and it being 
more than probable that the same considerations 
may, whenever a fit o])portunity occurs, again 
influence its counsels^ it cannot fall of being 
equally entertaining and instructive, to investi- 
gate the probable consequences of the annexa- 
tion of Egypt to the dominions of the Gallic 
empire, and to consider in what extent they 
might be detrimental to Great Britain. To 
enter upon this interesting inquiry, it will be 
necessary not only to consider the geographical 
position of that country on the globe, but also 
to bring forward to distinct inspection, some of 
the peculiar and most important circumstances 
of its topographical situation. Some appropri- 
ate remarks on the soil and climate, and a short 
sketch of the Egyptian history, will also contri- 
bute to the illustration of the subject. 

Egypt, extending from 23° to N. lat. 
and from 28° to 36° E. long. 600 miles iu. 
length, and about 250 miles in breadth, is com- 
monly computed to contain nearly 140,700 
square miles ; but more than four- fifths of this 



302 

extent consists of nothing else but barren sandy 
clesarts. From Cairo, at the head of the Delta, 
as far as Syene, the southernmost border of 
Egypt, the whole habitable part of this country, 
so famous in times of antiquity for its luxuriant 
fertility, the abundance of its productions, and 
its crowded population, as well as for the num- 
ber, the magnificence, and the opulence of its 
cities, is only a narrow valley along the banks 
of the Nile, extending from S. to N. the whole 
length of the country. This valley, not less 
than four hundred mWes long, is of a very irre- 
gular breadth, in some parts being not above 
eight or nine miles wide, in others twenty or 
twenty-five, but in no place extending to the 
breadth of thirty miles. On each side it is 
bounded by sandy desarts and steep rocks, 
many of them of the finest granite, from whence 
were hewn those stupendous obelisks and other 
monuments, which have excited the admiration 
of all ages down to the present time. These 
rocks, which are chiefly on the Eastern side in 
the desart of Thebais, extend in some places 
close to the river, and in others recede from it 
to a very considerable distance, so that the ha- 
bitable vale of Egypt lies in some places almost 
wholly on the W. side, in others chiefly on the 
E. side of the Nile, and in some parts is divided 
almost equally in the middle by that celebrated 
river. It is, however, certain, that the rich and 



503 



v/ell-cultivatecl lands of this valley, formerly 
extended somewhat farther on each side of the 
river than at present ; for the sand brought 
from the desart by successive tempests, has de- 
stroyed the fertility of the adjoining parts of 
the level, and, by raising them above the reach 
of the inundation, has converted them into dry 
and barren tracts, so that tlie breadth of the 
fertile plain of Egypt must, by that circum- 
stance, be somewhat contracted. Indeed, if 
we give any credit to the concurrent testimonies 
of writers, relative to the fertihty and popula- 
tion of ancient Egypt, we must believe that the 
cultivated part of the country was both more 
extensive and much better managed than at pre- 
sent. In both these respects this seems actually 
to be the case. Mr. Irwin, who travelled across 
the desarts from Cossire to Cairo, says, that he 
passed over several valleys and plains which, al- 
though now consisting entirely of barren sands, 
evidently appeared to have a communication 
with the great valley, and to be capable of re- 
ceiving, by proper management, the inundations 
of the Nile. It is, indeed, very probable, that 
several vallies, which run from the great plain, 
and extend a considerable way into the desarts, 
may formerly have been by that method fer- 
tilized, as it is well known that the ancient 
Egyptians spared no pains in cultivating, to the 



304 



best advantage, every spot of ground that ap- 
peared capable of improvement. 

So early, however, as the time of the Pha- 
raohs, as well as in every period since the ex- 
tinction of that ancient race of Kings, the 
Delta, or Lower Egypt, was the principal store- 
house, and most valuable part of the whole 
country. The tract which bears this name, is 
almost wholly included between the easternmost 
and westernmost branches of the Nile, and in- 
tersected by the other branches of the same ri- 
ver, as also by a number of canals running in 
various directions. The Delta is of a triangular 
form, and vs as so called by the Greeks from the 
resemblance of its shape to that of the letter of 
that name in their alphabet. The perpendicular 
is about eighty-six English miles, and the base 
of the triangle next to the Levant Sea, about 
an hundred miles in length ; but as the sea- 
coast is somewhat protuberant in the middle, its 
extent is somewhat greater than that of the base 
of the triangle, taken in a direct line from Da- 
mietta, on the Pelusian, to Rosetta, on the Cano- 
pean branch of the Nile ; and the whole extent 
of the coast of Egypt, from Damietta to Rosetta, 
may, by a calculation nearly approximating to 
the truth, be computed at about an hundred an^l 
thirty miles, and from Damietta to Alexandria 
at about an hundred and fifty mile?. 



305 



The Delta is supposed, by the most intelli- 
gent ancient writers and modern travellers, to 
have been originally a bay of the sea, and pro- 
bably interspersed with small islands ; and this 
conjecture is founded on strong probability, in- 
dependent of the positive assertions of some an- 
cient authors. Mr. Savory says, on the authori- 
ty of Herodotus, and other ancients, that the Nile 
meeting formerly with an obstacle to its direct 
course, from the mountains v/hich approached 
close to it, changed its direction from North 
to West, about twelve miles South from Mem- 
phis, and, after winding throagh the deserts of 
Lybia, discharged itself into the Lake Mereotis, 
which is now dry, but was then a gulph of the 
sea, and that one of the ancient kings of 
Egypt caused a strong dyke, or dam, to be 
constructed quite across the river, ana by that 
method turned its course again between the 
mountains into the Delta, then a vast gulph, 
but since filled up and formed into firm land, 
by the mud of the Nile. 

That such has been the original formation of 
the Delta evidently appears from this circum- 
stance, that not a single stone of any kind, 
except such as have been brought thither for the 
purposes of building, &c. can be found in all 
that part of the country, the same being ob- 
servable in all warped lands. It is also observ- 
able, tint the isle of Pharos, which helps to form 

X 



3cr6 

the harljolu of Alexandria, and on wliich 
Ptolemy Phlladelphus built that celebrated 
watch-tower, denominated, from its altitude, 
and the magnificent singularity of its construc- 
tion, one of the wonders of the world, appears 
from certain expressions of Homer, to have 
been not less than fifty or sixty miles distant 
from the coast of Egypt, although he does not 
mention the exact distance. It is to be observ- 
ed, that most of the low countries towards the 
mouths of great rivers, and especially those 
tracts which are inclosed within their different 
branches, have he{:n formed in the same manner. 
This is evident from the observations which 
have been made on the Deltas of the Indus and 
the Ganges, both of which almost exactly re- 
semble the Delta of Egypt, formed by the Nile. 
The principal difference is, that the two former 
are of a somewhat greater extent, and less fertile. 
The Delta of the Indus is, according to that 
excellent geographer M. Rennel, 150 miles in 
length along the sea-coast, which forms 'its 
base, and about 115 in depth, and that of the 
Ganges about £20 miles in depth, and 180 
miles in breadth, at its base on the Bay of Ben*- 
gal, exclusive of the width of the two outer- 
most branches of the Ganges, which, taken 
into the computation, would make the breadth 
not much less than 200 miles. Their inferiority to 
the Egyptian Delta in fertility is very probably 



307 

owing, in a great measure, to the want of cul- 
tivation ; for the Delta of the Indus is describ- 
ed as covered with brush-wood in the drier 
parts, while the remaining and far greater part 
consists of noisome swamps and muddy lakes. 
Some parts of the Delta of the Ganges are ex- 
tremely fertile and well-cultivated ; but the 
southern part towards the sea-coast, comprising 
a tract of country equal in extent to the prin- 
cipality of Wales, consists of a labyrinth of 
rivers and creeks, and is so completely enveloped 
in woods, and infested with tygers, that any 
attempt to clear it would now be found ex- 
tremely difficult. And if the Delta of Egypt 
had not been so assiduously cultivated in an- 
cient times, it might perhaps have exhibited a 
landscape nearly similar; but the Egyptians^ 
who far excelled all the other nations of anti- 
quity in the study and practice of agriculture, 
cultivated to the best advantage every foot of 
their country, the habitable part of which be- 
ing of a narrow extent, rendered such a proce- 
dure peculiarly necessary for the support of its 
crowded population. There is no doubt, there- 
fore, but the Delta M^as, at various times, as 
fast at it was formed, embanked and brought 
into cultivation, as the marshes left in some 
places on the sea-coast, and towards the mouths 
of rivers, are in England, and other well peo- 
pled countries. 

X 2 



308 



Observations of a similar kind have been 
made by Mr. Iinlay and others, concerning the 
formation of the io\\^ country towards the 
mouths of the i\Iississippi ; and the same might 
be made on those adjoining to the great rivers of 
Oronoko, Amazons, and la Plata in South Ame- 
rica, the Wolga in Russia^ and several others in 
different parts of the globe. The foregoing re- 
marks, however, are sufhcient to prove the 
manner in which the celebrated Egyptian Delta 
was formed; and it is presumed that the di- 
gression they have introduced will not be 
thought disagreeable or inappropriate. 

The climate of Egypt has generally been con- 
sidered as very unhealthfuL It is certainly un- 
favourably to European constitutions. In this 
respect, however, different persons who have 
resided in that country disagree very much in 
their descriptions. M. Volney says, that dur- 
ing eight months of the year, from the middle 
of March to the middle of November, the heat 
is almost insupportable to an European. Dur- 
ing the whole of this season," says he, ^' the air 
is inflamed, the sky sparkling, and the heat op- 
pressive to all unaccustomed to it." Mv. x\ntes, 
who resided in Egypt the space of twelve years, 
from A. D. 1770 to 1782, and consequently 
must have been well acquainted with the cli- 
mate, says, that the intense heat does not 
commence until about the 24:th of June, and 



309 

continues only to the end of September; that 
the North wind blows constantly from the end 
of May to the end of September ; and that on 
the whole it does not blow a less time than 
three-fourths of the year; that the South wind 
is hot in the spring, but cold in the winter; that 
that the South-east winds bring clouds of sand 
from the desert ; that it never blows directly 
from either the East or West ; that the South 
wind never blows before November, and seldom 
constantly above three days ^ that there are 
storms and rain near the coast, but scarcely 
ever at Cairo, or in the Upper Egypt; that in 
the month of November, 1771, heavy showers 
of rain fell at Cairo five or six nights success- 
ively ; and that there is scarcely ever any 
thunder or lisi'litnino; there. These observations 
on the climate being the result of twelve year$ 
experience, and constant residence, appear 
more worthy to be relied on than any casual re- 
marks made by travellers, who have paid only 
a short visit ; for as seasons often vary in the 
same country, it is certain, that it requires 
some length of time to acquire any considerable 
knowledge of the peculiarities of climate. The 
heat of Egypt is, however, at certain seasons^ 
excessive ; and the hurricanes, which some- 
times rise in the desert, are a very disagreeable, 
and sometimes, a very calamitous circumstance 
in this country. Mr. Savary gives the follow- 



310 



ing animated description of one, which hap^* 
pened during his residence at Alexandria, 
When I was at Alexandria," savs he, " ahur- 
ricane arose, in the month of May, rolling be 
fore it torrents of burning sand. The firma- 
ment was involved by a thick veil, and the sun 
appeared of the colour of blood. The dust pe? 
iietrated into the very apartments, and burned 
the face and eyes. At the end of four hours 
the tempest abated, and the sky resumed its se- 
renity. Some wretched travellers, who hap- 
pened to be in the desert, were suffocated. I 
saw several dead brought in, and some, who 
were thought to be of the number, restored to 
life by immersion in cold water. The inhabitants 
of Cairo, situated farther up the country, suffer 
more from this calamity, and a French mer- 
chant, a very lusty man, died there suffocated 
with heat. Similar phasnomena have buried 
whole armies and caravans.'' Tliis description 
of an Egyptian hurricane by an eye-witness, 
may give us an idea of its dreadful effects, of 
which ancient history likewise affords several 
instances. It is a "well known fact, that an 
army of fifty thousand men, sent b}^ Cambyses, 
king of Persia, to plunder the temple of Jupi- 
ter Ammon, was buried in the sand by a tre- 
mendous hurricane; and another numerous 
army, conducted by tliat prince in person, and 
destined for tlie invasion of Ethiopia, met \y\tl\ 



an almost similar fate; for he himself, with a 
very small number of his men, had the good 
fortune to escape the destructive eifects of the 
storm, which overtook them in crossing the de- 
sert, and totally frustrated their enterprise. 

The accounts given us by travellers who have 
visited Egypt, or resided some time in the coun- 
try, disagree considerably in several particulars 
relative to the climate^ which, from a variety of 
circumstances, must, indeed, be expected; somt 
having had a longer residence than others, and 
been more exposed to its effects. From their 
concurrent testimonies, it may however be ga- 
thered, that the air is at certain seasons exces- 
sively hot ; although they do not exactly agree 
in respect to the length of time that the intense 
heat generally continues. If we contemplate 
with attention the local circumstances of Egypt, 
the degree of heat in that country will appear 
to be as great as it can be any wliere on the 
surface of the globe. Several countries are in- 
deed situated mu.ch nearer the Equator, as the 
southernmost extremity of Egypt reaches only 
a little to the South of the Tropic of Cancer ; 
but the heat is, notwithstanding, as intense as 
in any of the countries between the Tropics, and 
even more insupportable than in several of 
them. The temperature of the climate in dif- 
ferent countries is not to be estimated solely by 
the parallels of latitude, Their situation, in rcr- 



312 



spect of seas, mountains, marshes, sandy de- 
serts, kc. is to be taken into the account. The 
degree of heat .or cold, w hich prevails at dif- 
ferent places, is often more decidedly determined 
by those topographical circumstances, than by 
their geographical position, in respect of the 
equator and the poles. The situation of Egypt 
thus considered, is peculiar and singular. The 
hot and sandy deserts of i\rabia he on the East, 
the Red Sea alone intervening between that 
country and Egypt. That sea is too narrow an 
expanse of water to have any great effect ia 
cooling the inflamed south-easterly winds, espe- 
cially as the whole atmosphere of those regions 
is so exceedingly heated : and when the winds 
fram Arabia enter Egypt, they gain a fresh ac- 
cession of heat in sweeping over the burning 
sands of the Thebais, which extend from the 
shores of the Red Sea to the plain of Egypt, and 
in some places reach within a few miles of the 
Nile. On the South lie the sandy deserts of 
Nubia, which are of a great extent, and reflect 
the heat of the sun's rays as forcibly as the 
sands of Arabia. On the West and the South- 
West also, Egypt is bounded by the immense 
deserts of Lybia, which, under different names, 
extend across the whole continent of Africa, 
from Egypt to the Atlantic ocean, a distance of 
above two thousand three hundred geographi- 
cal or nearly tv;o thousand six hundred Eng- 



313 



lisli miles ; so that on every side, the country is 
environed by vast tracts of burning sandy de- 
serts. When it is considered that the Upper 
Egypt consists only of a narrow valley in some 
places, not above nine or ten, in no part, thirty 
miles in breadth, and closed in on every side by 
deserts of burning sand of an immense extent; 
and that the Delta, the breadth of which, in the 
widest part, does not exceed 100 miles, is, on 
every side, except its 'base on the North, in- 
closed by the same deserts, it is easy to account 
for the excessive heat which is found to prevail 
throughout the whole country, especially at 
Cairo, and more southward in the Thebais. It 
seems, indeed, on considering the local cir- 
cumstances of the country, that if the atmo- 
sphere was not cooled, and the human frame re- 
freshed by the northerly winds, which so ge- 
nerally prevail, Egypt would be scarcely ha- 
bitable. 

The climate of Egypt has been differently de- 
scribed, and its effects on the human frame va- 
riously represented by different authors, ancient 
and modern. Those effects have been generally 
esteemed exceedingly pernicious, and, in a su- 
perlative degree, inimical to European consti- 
tutions. It does not however appear, from the 
experience of either the French or English ar- 
mies during the last war, that the malignancy 
of the Egyptian atmosphere is such as it has 



514 



often been represented. It seems, however, 
from several passages of the Old Testament, 
that the Jews considered it to be unhealthful ; 
for, in the denunciation of the calamities which 
should fall on them, in consequence of their dis- 
obedience, ^' the evil diseases of Egypt" are 
mentioned, Deut. chap, xxviii. 60 ; and the 
botch of Egypt," with which they are threat- 
ened, in the same Book, chap, xxviii. 67, seems 
to have been no other than the plague. This 
has, indeed, been represented as the native 
country and nursery of the pestilence. It seems 
to jiave been so esteemed by Mr. Gibbon, and 
1 Ahh6 Raynal ; the Jatter of whom attributes 
Its linwliolesomeness, in a great measure, to the 
cultivation of rice, which requires the ground 
to be kept so long flooded, that the \vater stag-^ 
nates, grows putrid, and contaminates the air 
with noxious exhalations. Tiie dreadful pesti- 
lence v. liich broke out in the 15th year of the 
reign of Justinian, and during the space of fifty 
rears, ravaged almost every part of the then 
known v/orld, and caused a greater destruction 
of the human species than ever proceeded from 
any calamity of a similar nature, before or 
since that period, made, according to the con- 
current testimony of all historians, its first ap- 
pearance in Egypt, in the neighbourhood of 
Pelusium, on the easternmost branch of the 
Nile; and it is certain, that hardly any part of 



315 



the Turkish dominions is now more frequently 
visited by the plague, or suffers more from that 
dreadful calamity. Mr. Antes, however, whose 
long residence in the country, as well as the 
apparent accuracy of his observations, entitle 
him to a very great degree of credit, describes 
the climate of Egypt in a manner flatly contra- 
dictory to the xepresentations of the generahly 
of writers. That gentleman positively asserts, 
that the plague is not a disease natural to 
Egypt ; that it is never known to originate in 
that country, but is always imported from 
Constantinople, Smyrna, or other parts of 
Turkey; that whenever it breaks out, its ra- 
vages always begin to decrease as soon as the 
excessive heat commences; and that the dis- 
temper entirely ceases about the 24th of Jene^ 
i^nd never is known to make its appearance 
while the hot season continues. Is is a circum- 
stance not generally known, and which indeed 
appears somewhat extraordinary ; but Mr. Antes 
positively asserts it as an indisputable fact, that 
extreme heat produces the very same effect in 
causing the cassation of the plague in Egypt, 
as extreme cold does at Constantinople. The 
assertion of the same gentleman, that Egypt is 
a^healthful a country as any in the world, ap- 
pears no less astonishing,- after so many travel- 
ers and geographers have exhibited so very dif- 



316, 



ferent a representation of the effects of its in- 
flamed atmosphere. 

In seems, however, that the pestiferous in- 
fluence of the Eygptian chmate has been some- 
what exaggerated. The French and Enghsh 
armies suffered very httle from the plague, al- 
though that dreadful m^alady raged with great 
violence, during a great part of the time that 
the former were in possession of the country; a 
circum.stance which seems to verify the observa- 
tions of both Mr. Antes, and other travellers, 
that the frequency and violence of the plague 
in Egypt, as well as in every other part of the 
Turkish dominions, is chiefly to be attributed to 
the dirty manner of living of the lov/er classes 
of the people, the prejudices of the Turks, and 
their unskilful treatment of the disease. The 
doctrine of predestination, or unavoidable fa- 
tality, being a leading and principal tenet of 
the IMahometan religion^ the Turks take no pre- 
caution against infection, nor adopt any mea^ 
sures in order to prevent or stop the contagion. 
And all travellers agree, that the Christians in 
different parts of Turkey suffer very little trom 
it, in comparison of the Mahometans. Mr. 
Antes says, that in the most infected places, 
Europeans, if they use proper precautions, have 
little to apprehend from this calamity, and that 
European families, by using the necessary care,. 



317 



have lived in the midst of Cairo and Alexan- 
dria, in times of the greatest contagion, with- 
out being infected. The principal precau- 
tionary measures which that gentleman recom- 
mends, are these, to receive nothing into the 
house which is not previously purified by im- 
mersion in cold water, or by fire, when the 
things are of such a nature as to be able to bear 
the action of that element ; to keep within 
doors as much as possible,* or, if going abroad 
be necessary, carefully to avoid touching the 
cloaths of any person in walking in the 
street ; for he totally rejects the commonly re- 
ceived opinion, that the plague is owing to a 
pestilential miasma in the air. On the contrary, 
he says, that the contagion is not in the air, 
but that it is communicated solely by contact; 
and that a person may live as safely in the midst 
of the most infected city, as in a place quite free 
from the contagion, provided he can avoid 
touching any infected person or things. Many 
of these remarks of Mr. Antes are very con- 
tradictory to the generally received notions. 
If the plague be communicated solely by con- 
tact, and not by any pestiferous contamination 
of the air, it m.ay reasonably be asked, from 
what cause does it then originally proceed, and 
why is it endemial in some particular countries, 
and entirely unknown in others ? And may not 
the contagion originate in the air, although it 



318 



be the most speedily, the most perceptibly, and 
the most extensively communicated by contact. 
The only plausible answer that can be given is, 
that the disease may probably have been origi- 
nally produced by causes totally unknown, and 
the infection, as in some other diseases, kept 
alive and communicated by infectious contact, 
thtough a succession of ages, down to the pre- 
sent day. 

The frequent ravages of the pestilence are 
not the only calamity that is supposed to result 
from the glowing atmosphere of Egypt. The 
disorders of the eyes, which often terminate in 
the total loss of sight, exhibit a proof that the 
air of that country is unfavourable to the 
human frame. This was fatally experienced both 
by the English and French troops in the last 
war. Mr. Antes, however, says, that this ca- 
lamity may be easily avoided, and that none 
are affected by it, in any considerable degree, 
except those who are either ignorant, or careless, 
or destitute of the means of preventing its at- 
tacks ; and that such as suffer from its effects are 
only those who are very much exposed to the 
%veather, especially to the night-air, or who 
carelessly indulged themselves in sleeping on 
" the ground in the open air, a practice not un- 
common among the lower sort of the Egyptians. 
In almost all hot countries it is dangerous to be . 
exposed to the night-air^ and many of the dis- 



31Q 

orders contracted by Europeans in the tropical 
and other warm climates, are often the effects 
of such exposure. However, as not only sol- 
diers, but many others in various employments 
and situations, cannot avoid being frequently 
exposed to the variations of the atmosphere in 
the night, as well as in the day, the dangerous 
effects of the air of Egypt on the eyes, shew 
that the climate is not very desirable. 

Notwithstanding the unfavourable representa- 
tions of the generality of travellers, and the 
unquestionable existence of several disagreeable 
peculiarities in the climate, Mr. Antes, after 
the most accurate observations, and the expe- 
rience of a residence of twelve years, does not 
hesitate to pronounce Egypt one of the most 
healthful countries of the world ; and in cor- 
roboration of his arguments asserts, that many 
of the inhabitants live an hundred years, and 
that he knew one who had attained to the very 
advanced age of an hundred and thirty. These, 
it must be acknowledged, are facts which make 
the climate appear not inimical to health and 
longevity. He also adds, that the water of the 
Nile, which, as there are scarcely any springs, 
is generally drank .in Egypt, is the best a^nd the 
wholesomest in the world ; and that it never pu- 
trifies, but will remain good, although kept for 
several years. 
From these different representations of the 



320 



nature and effects of the climate of Egypt, it is 
certainly difficult to draw any just conclusion. 
The general opinion of its insalubrity may very 
probably be carried too far ; and the represen- 
tations of the generality of travellers seem, in 
this respect, to be exaggerated. From their 
disagreement, however, and particularly from 
the observations of Mr. Antes, several interest- 
ing problems arise^ which merit the investiga- 
tion of the naturalist; and if Egypt should ever 
come into the possession of a poHshed and en- 
lightened people, they will .undoubtedly becom.e 
an object of political as vvell as philosophical at- 
tention, as they were v;hen the country was 
under the government of the Pharaohs, the 
Ptolomies, and the Romans. The effects of cli- 
mate have always a considerable influence over 
the moral circumstances of a country, and 
consequently ought, as well as those of soil and 
situation, to be intimately and essentially con- 
nected with its political and civil organization. 

The effects of the climate on the human 
frame ought to be an object of serious consi- 
deration in the establishment of colonies. This, 
however, is in general overlooked, or esteemed 
of httle weight, when put in the scale of com- 
parison with political or commercial advantages. 
Had not views of this nature overbalanced every 
other consideration, Batavia would not have 
been a colony and a grave of Dutchmen, nor 
2! 




would so many Europeans, sacrificing their lives 
to lucrative expectations, have fallen victims to 
the malignant climate of several of their settle- 
ments. 

In regard to the establishment of a colony^ 
the fertility of the soil is another important 
consideration, and often indeed the primary ob- 
ject of attention. In this respect the great im- 
portance of Egypt is universally kno#n. The 
intense heat of the atmosphere, co-operatmg 
%vith the fertihzing inundations of the Nile, 
causes that luxuriance of vegetation, which be- 
ing improved to the greatest advantage by the 
ancient Egyptians, excited the admiration of all 
who visited their country. The fertility of 
Egypt even at this day, notwithstanding the 
oppressed and miserable condition of its inha- 
bitants, and the imperfect state of its agricul- 
ture, indicates the excellence of the soil, and 
the exuberance of which it would be productive 
in the hands of an active and industrious people^ 
As the situation of Egypt is singular, so is also 
its agricultural system, which is in a great mea- 
sure peculiar to that country, and originates from 
the peculiarity of local circumstances. Every 
one knov/s that its fertility depends entirely on 
the annual overflowings of the Nile, and not in 
the least degree on rain, of which none ever . 
falls in the Thebais, and so httle in the Delta as 
scarcely to contribute any thing to its fertility., 



322 



The cause of those annual floods baflSed for s 
long time the researches of naturalists; but 
since the knowledge of geography has been so 
much improved and extended, the tropical coun« 
tries so often visited, and the nature of the tro- 
pical chmates so well known, it has been disco- 
vered that this phsenomenon, which to the an- 
cients appeared so extraordinary, is caused by 
the annual rains falhng in Abyssinia, and that 
those overflowings are not peculiar to the Nile, 
as the other rivers, which have their source in 
the tropical regions, overflow the adjacent flat 
countries in the rainy season. As Egypt owes 
its fertility to those annual inundations, one of 
the principal considerations in Egyptian agri- 
culture, is to dispose the water in such a man- 
ner as not to be wholly deprived of its benefits 
^luring the hot season. For this purpose, a great 
number of canals are cut in every part of the 
country, and in every direction, as it is requi- 
site, for the perfection of agriculture, to have a 
conveyance of water to every farm. Several 
vast lakes, or reservoirs, among which the lake 
Moeris was the largest and the most celebrated^ 
were likewise made by the ancient Egyptians, 
for the double purpose of receiving the super- 
abundant waters w-hen the flood rose too high, 
.and of keeping them in readiness to fill their 
numerous canals, when the country had need of 
moisture. A great number of engines, wrought 



32S 



by oxen, v/ere also used by the ancient, as they 
yet are by the modern Egyptians, for raising 
the water, and conveying it into the lands that 
were a httle more elevated than the rest. This 
complicated process constitutes so essential a 
part of Egyptian agriculture, that the judicious 
disposal and management of the waters of the 
Nile, by means of reservoirs, canals, and engines, 
was one of the principal objects of the attention 
of government under the Pharaohs, and after 
them under the Ptolemies, as also while Egypt 
was a province of the Roman, and afterwards 
of the Eastern empire. The absolute necessity 
©f such a mode of cultivation has caused its 
Continuance to the present time ; and some mo* 
dern travellers suppose that not less than two 
hundred thousand oxen are now employed in 
conveying the water to the grounds, by means 
of their numerous engines. The agriculture of 
the modern Egyptians, however, is very far in- 
ferior to that of their ancestors. Among the 
ancient Egyptians the disposal of the waters, 
and the cultivation of the soil, were the primary 
objects of public attention. The adaptation of 
their agricultural system to the local peculiari- 
ties of their country, constituted an essential 
branch of their politics. It was even interwoven 
with their religion, and a considerable part of 
their allegorical mythology, and hieroglyphical 
representations, consisted of allusions to the 

y 



324 



circumstances of their soil and climate, to theii' 
agricultural process, and the various produc- 
tions, as well as the diiferent phaenomena of na- 
ture. By this unremitted attention to agricul- 
tural improvement, Egypt supported a nume- 
rous population, and was at the same time the 
granary of the neighbouring countries. Com- 
merce uniting its effects to those of agriculture, 
in process of time rendered Egypt wealthy, 
magnificent, and powerful; and during many 
ages gave it, in these respects, a decided supe- 
riority over all the countries of the ancient 
world. In after- times the fertihty of the soil, 
and the perfection of agriculture, rendered 
Egypt the granary of Rome,^ and afterwards of 
Constantinople. 

We have hitherto considered the advantages 
and the disadvantages of Egypt, solely as in the 
view of a peaceable country, the seat of inof- 
fensive industry. If it was always to continue 
in that state, it would not be a matter of much 
consequence to us in v/hose possession it should 
be, or who might be the cultivators of its soil. 
As this is not likely to be the case, v>'e shall, in 
the next place, consider it as a magazine of 
commercial monopoly, and a post of military 
annoyance. In the mean while, I beg leave to 
suhscrike myself, most respectfully, 

Sir, 

Your>, &c. 



LETTER XV. 

SIR, 

TThE nature of the Egyptian soil and climate 
constituted the principal subject of our last cor- 
respondence. The situation of Egypt, as a 
commercial and military station, must be the 
principal object of consideration to an English 
or a French politician, and consequently that 
which must the most forcibly attract the public 
attention. If any great revolution should pro- 
duce a dismemberment of the Ottoman empire, 
an event which, on a view of the situation, the 
interests, and the military force of some of the 
continental powers, appears far from impossible, 
it is beyond a doubt that Egypt must fall under 
the dominion of either France or England. As 
it cannot be supposed that Great Britain would 
suffer any exertions to be wanting to prevent its 
becoming a colony of France, as in the last war 
the expulsion of the French was entirely owing 
to her efforts, and as it is extremely probable 
that the late transactions in that country were 
only a prelude to a more important and decisive 
contest, which is yet to take place, perhaps at 



S£6 

no very remote period, how far it might be ne- 
cessary to prevent the annexation of E^^ypt to 
the dominions of France, and how far that 
event, if not prevented, might be detrimental 
to Great Britain, are considerations which form 
an interesting subject of inquiry. 

The general supposition relative to this affair 
does not seem to be well founded. It has been 
conjectured, that the plan of general Bona- 
parte's expedition into Egypt was to facilitate 
the conquest of the territorial possessions of 
Great Britain in India. It is beyond all possi- 
bility of doubt, that the design of the repubUcau 
government in that enterprise, v/as to annoy in 
time of war, and to supplant in time of peace, 
our trade in that quarter; but whether it could 
seriously intend to equip and send out from 
Egypt, an armament sufficiently formidable to 
effect the conquest of India, appears somewhat 
problematical. If the project was really such, 
it was certainly romantic, and the difficulties 
attending its execution insurmountable. Was 
the fleet which conveyed the army to Egypt 
to proceed forward to India, or was a new 
fleet to be constructed for that purpose in 
the Red Sea? If the former plan was to be 
adopted, how, or by what means, was the fleet 
which sailed from Europe to be conveyed across 
the Isthmus of Suez from the Levant, or across 
the deserts from the Nile into the Red Sea? 



327 

Whether it be practicable to cut a canal across 
the Isthmus, adequate to the purpose of con- 
veying ships of the line into the Red Sea, can 
be determined only by an actual survey. A 
project of that kind might, perhaps, be sup- 
posed less difficult to execute by means of a 
canal passing from the Nile through some of the 
low parts of the desert ; but such an under- 
taking would not only be a very expensive, but 
a very difficult work, and meet with such ob- 
stacles as might eventually frustrate the design. 
Several canals have been made, and more at- 
tempted, in order to facilitate the communica- 
tion between the Nile and the Red Sea, but 
they seem to have been calculated merely for 
commercial purposes ; and it does not appear 
that any of those which were finished, com- 
pletely answered tlie expectations of the pro- 
jectors, or the ends for which they were de- 
signed. 

The project of opening a communication be- 
tween the Nile and the Red Sea engaged, at an 
early period, the attention of the Kings of Egypt. 
About six hundred and ten years before the 
Christian ssra a canal was begun by Pharaoh 
Necho, who was cotemporary with Josiah, 
King of Judah. It was not, however, finished 
neither in his reign nor in that of his successor, 
Pharaoh Hophra. The political troubles in which 
Egypt was soon after involved, tlie wars with 



328 



the Babylonians, and its subjugation by that 
people, probably put a stop to the undertaking. 
When Egypt was under the Persian monarchy, 
Darius Hystaspes formed the design of finishing 
this canal, but was deterred by the report of 
his engineer, who informed him that the Red 
Sea was much higher than the Nde. This 
Prince having relinquished the design, it does 
not appear that it was ever resumed by any of 
the Persian monarchs. At the last Pro emy 
Philadelphus completed the work about A. A. C. 
2 SO. This canal was cut from the easternmost 
branch of the Nile, and joined the Red Sea at 
Aggerroud, six miles above Suez; for it must 
be observed, that the Red Sea has, since that 
time, retired the space of six miles, and 
left a marshy tract of land between the two 
above-mentioned places. This canal was forti- 
fied with strong sluices and high banks, lest the 
Red Sea, supposed to be so much higher than 
the Nile, should overflow the country. This 
apprehension, however, appears to have been 
groundless, for other canals, which have been 
made for the purpose of effecting the same com- 
munication, have not been productive of any 
inconvenience of that kind. Although Ptolemy 
Philadelphus finished this canal, it does not, 
however, appear to have answered the commer- 
cial purposes for which it was intended. He- 
afterwards built the town of Berenice, on the 

4 



329 

Bed Sea, nearly in the latitude of Syene, (/. e.) 
under the tropic of Cancer, and constructed 
reservoirs of water for the convenience of the 
caravans, in crossing the deserts, from that 
place to Cophtus on the Nile. As Berenice had 
no harbour for shipping, the trade is now car^ 
ried on by way of Cossire. A canal from 
Cophtus to Cossire was in existence in the time 
of Strabo. The distance across the desert is 
ninety-nine miles, and a deep valley runs all the 
way between the two places, x^notlier canal 
was also cut from the Nile a little above Helio- 
polls, which likewise also extended to the Red 
Sea. This is supposed to have been a work of 
the Emperor Adrian. Amrou, the Arabian ge- 
neral, and conqueror of Egypt, under the 
Caliph, Omar, also cut the canal which passes 
from the Nile directly through Cairo, and once 
extended to the Red Sea ; but is now choked up, 
reaching only twelve miles beyond Cairo. This 
must have been a difficult and expensive work, 
as it was cut for a great many miles through 
vast rocks, of which almost the whole tract of 
country between Cairo and the Red Sea is one 
continued mass. 

Notwithstanding these repeated attempts to 
facihtate the communication between the Nile 
and the Red Sea, it does not appear that any 
of the canals cut for that purpose were produc- 
tive of any great commercial advantages; for 



33Q 



the trade was always carried on chiefly by ca- 
ravans. This failure proceeded from some 
causes at present unknown, and which none of 
our historians or travellers can fully ascertain ; 
and it is the more extraordinary, as the canal 
from the Nile to Alexandria appears to have an- 
swered every commercial purpose. 

It is to be observed, that these canals v/ere 
made with no other view than the facilitation of 
commerce, and not for the conveyance of ships 
of war, or indeed of any kind of large vessels, 
and yet after all the labour and expense bestow- 
ed on them, it does not appear that they an- 
swered the expectations which had been formed 
of their utility. From this circumstance may 
be conjectured the difficulty and expense of 
cutting a canal adequate to the purpose of con- 
veying ships of war across the country from tha 
Nile to the Red Sea. 

Another difficulty presents itself to the view 
of a person who examines the practicability of 
the undertaking. The mouths of the Nile are 
so blocked up with bars of sand, as totally to 
preclude the entrance of large vessels. The ri- 
ver, at certain seasons, rolling along with impe- 
tuosity a vast quantity of turbid and muddy 
water, and meeting with a strong opposition 
from the >vaves of the sea, the conflict of the 
waters forms, at the different mouths of the 
river, huge banks of sand and mi^d; which 



render the entrance very difficult, and to large 
vessels impossible. When Mr. Irwin was at 
Cairo he saw there a Turkish frigate, which 
carried twenty guns : this vessel had entered by 
the mouth of Damietta, but he informs us that 
vessels of that size cannot enter, except during 
the time of the inundation. This branch of 
the Nile is, however, of an easier entrance than 
that of Rosetta, which, according to th^ in- 
formation of Mr. Irwin, is so obstructed by a 
bar, or bank of sand, that no vessel which draws 
more than nine feet of water can enter. From 
these observations it appears evident, that no 
canal could answer the purpose of conveying 
large vessels from the Levant into the Red Sea, 
unless it was cut quite from sea to sea ; for if 
cut from any part of the Nile, it would in that 
respect be useless, unless the sand banks at the 
mouths of the river were cleared away, which 
in all probability would be impracticable. 

Since the observations of all travellers who 
have visited Egypt make it appear, that the 
conveyance of ships of war across the country 
into the Red Sea, must be obstructed by ob- 
stacles, v/hich, in all probabihty, can never be re- 
moved, it may be concluded that the execution 
of such a project borders nearly on impossibi- 
lity, or that, if not absolutely impossible, it 
must be so great and expensive a work, that no 
nation which has not the strongest assurance of 



332 



being able to maintain itself in the possession of 
the country, would engage in such an under- 
taking. Canals, however, sufficiently wide and 
deep for the conveyance of transports, might 
be made with much less difficulty ; and it seems 
that if the French really had a design of pene- 
trating from Egypt into India, they must have 
intended to convey their troops thither in 
transports, v^^ithout a fleet of ships of war. It 
would, however, have been necessary to cut a 
canal across the country for the execution of 
this plan, or else to have constructed the vessels 
at Suez. But it is easy to perceive, that of all 
the ports in the world, Suez is one of the Xvorst 
adapted to the purposes of ship- building. The 
part of the country in which it is situated is 
one of the most destitute of timber that can be 
found upon the surface of the globe ; and, in- 
deed, every part of the coast of the Red Sea, 
both on the Egyptian and the x4.rabian side, is 
entirely unprovided with the materials requisite 
for the construction of vessels ; so that ob- 
stacles of the greatest magnitude present them- 
selves against the execution of any plan tiiat 
might be form.ed of equipping a naval arp^.ament 
in that sea. 

Another circumstance, in the present state of 
things, forms an insurmountable obstacle to the 
invasion of India by any armament that can be 
sent from Egypt. It is well known that the 



333 



Red Sea has no communication with the Indian 
Ocean, but through the Straights of Babelnuin- 
dei ; and a very small British squadron aald 
suffice to block up that passage, which is oalr 
about twelve miles Vvdde, A French fleet mi.^ht 
remain in the Red Sea from the commencement 
of a war to the end, without ever being able to - 
pass that Straight. The only ground of appre- 
hension of an attack on India from that quarter, 
would be the possibility of a surprize at the 
commencement of hostilities, if Egypt were in 
the possession of an enem.y. 

From a distinct view of circumstances it 
rather appears, that the design of the republican 
government, in the invasion of Egypt, v/as to 
establish a powerful and numerous colony in 
that country, and afterwards to seize any fa- 
vourable opportunity of invading India that 
might present itself at a future period, mther 
than immediately to attempt the conquest of 
our territorial possessions in that part of the 
globe, which it could not but perceive to be at 
that time absolutely impracticable. 

Several reasons, however, of the most weighty 
and important nature, concurred to render it 
incumbent on the British government not to 
suffer Egypt to remain in the hands of an ene- 
my. That country would, on account both of 
its fertility and situation, have been a valuable 
acquisition to France; and it is ^one of the 



334 



granA principles of political science to prevent J 
any accession of weight to the scale of an ene^ j 
my. But a consideration still more interesting 
presents itself Although an attack on India, 
by an armament from Egypt, was impracticable 
at a time when Great Britain, fully aware of 
every design which the republican government 
could possibly form, was equally prepared both 
in Europe and Asia for either offensive or defen* 
sive measures, yet if the French had been left 
in possession of their new acquisitions, the con- 
sequences might have eventually proved disas- 
trous to our Asiatic empire, or at least to our 
commerce in that quarter of the globe. j 
The central situation of Egypt, which renders * 
it a key of communication between Europe and 
Asia, necessarily gives to its possessors very 
great advantages, in respect both of war and 
commerce, over any European nation that may 
have possessions in the East. The short time 
required to sail from Egypt, either to Europe or 
India, is an advantage in both military and 
commercial affairs, which scarcely any thing 
can counterbalance. An armament collected at 
Suez might, in the course of a month or five 
weeks, reach the coast of Malabar. Capt. Con- 
nor sailed from Suez to Bengal in twenty days ; 
and from that port the distance to the mouth of 
the Ganges is, by the most direct course, nine 
hundred miles farther than to any part of the 



335 



^lalabar coast, the bottom of the bay of Bengal 
being 13 degrees of lat. to the N. of Cape Co- 
morin. The voyage from the southern parts of 
France to Egypt is also very short ; and Italy 
being entirely subservient to the republic, it is 
easy to perceive with what celerity the commu- 
nication may be carried on between France 
and Egypt, and between the latter country and 
India. 

On this view of the geographical position of 
Egypt, and its facility of communication with 
the East and West, let us suppose it annexed to 
the dominions of the Gallic empire, and endea- 
vour to make the most rational estimate of the 
consequences of such an arrangement. The 
country would undoubtedly be not only brought 
into a high state of cultivation, and rendered 
rich, commercial and flourishing, but would 
also be converted into a grand military station. 
A considerable force would always be stationed 
in the country, and it might at any time be 
speedily augmented to any degree of strength, 
by reinforcements from France. Whenever a 
war might be in contemplation, this might be 
performed before Great Britain could possibly 
take any effectual measures to prevent it, or 
even before she could be apprised of the design. 
A formidable army thus collected in Egypt, at 
the very moment of the declaration of war in 
Europe, might embark at Suez, if transports 



335 



could be procureclj and sail from the Red Sea 
on an expedition against India, -before the Eng- 
lish in that quarter could be prepared for de- 
fencCj or even informed of the commencement 
of hostihties. The French might besides hav^e 
ships of war at the isles of Mauritius and Bour- 
bon, ready to co-operate in the enterprize, and 
the situation of Egypt would afford the means 
of a ready communication with those islands. 

From this concise statement, the danger that 
might result to the i^siatic possessions of Great 
Britain, from the annexation of Egypt to the 
French empire, appears clearly perceptible to 
any one who takes a comprehensive view of the 
subject The commercial advantages which 
might accrue to our great rival, from the pos- 
session of that country, are, however, apparently 
of greater magnitude and importance, than the 
opportunity it might give her of extending her 
military operations from thence to India. They 
are more certain, and of a more permanent na- 
ture. If, by the decisiveness of her measures, 
and the celerity of their execution, she should 
effect an invasion of our Asiatic empire, as the 
first stroke on the commencement of hostilities, 
before Great Britain could block up the Straights 
of Babelmandel, or take any other defensive 
precautions, yet even in this case the success of 
such an attempt would be exceedingly doubt- 
ful. To make a conquest of the British posses- 



337 



sbns in India would, according to every pro- 
bability of conjecture, require a more powerful 
armament than could ever be equipped from 
Egypt, even supposing it to be seconded by the 
most favourable concurrence of circumstances. 

If, on the contrary, the commercial advan- 
tages which the possession of Egypt would pro- 
cure to an enterprizing, active, and mercantile 
nation, be judiciously and fairly estimated, we 
shall find them to amount to little less than a 
monopoly of the Indian trade. The history of 
the ancient Avorld informs us, that Egypt was 
in all ages the centre of commercial intercourse 
between Europe and India, During some ages 
the Tyrians appear to have had sLcansiderabie 
share of this traffic, and at certain periods Tyre 
has seemed to rival Egypt in the commerce of 
the East. It is not, however, improbable^ that 
the Tyrians and Egyptians had some commer- 
cial arrangements, calculated for the mutual be« 
nefit of both nations. The Tyrians seem to have^- 
had the principal share of the trade with Baby- 
lon, and there does not seem to have subsisted 
any direct intercourse of this kind between 
Egypt and Babylon, which were rival, and often 
hostile states. The svstem of ancient commerce 
is at this time but little known ; but it is a cer- 
tain fact, that a great part of the Tyrian trade 
with the eastern parts of the world, was carried 
on by the Red Sea, When Solomon engaged in 

z 



338 



this trade, in partnership with the Tyrians, and 
fitted ouj: a fleet of merchantmen, manned with 
mariners of that nation, the ships were built at 
Eziongeber, a port on the Arabian side of the 
Red Sea, at no very great distance from Suez, 
which could not easily have been done without 
the consent of tlie Egyptians. It is not impro- 
bable that Solomon's marriage with the King of 
Egypt's daughter might contribute to procure 
this indulgence ; and it is also extremely pro- 
bable that some arrangements, grounded on po- 
litical or commercial interest, might also subsist 
between the Egyptians and the Tyrians, which 
might ensure to the latter the privilege of car- 
rying on tliek trade.: by the most commodious 
channels ; for- Egypt so completely commands 
the navigation of the Red Sea, that an active 
and enterprizing .people might, by the posses- 
sion of that country, effectually monopolize all 
the trade carried on through that channel 



330 



LETTER XVL 

■SIR) 

To attempt a circumstantial history of Egypl^ 
in those ages of remote antiquity, would 
tqually useless and impracticable. Notwith-^ 
standing the plausible and well-compacted re- 
lations of historians, we know extremely little 
of the affairs of so early a period ; and the 
Egyptian historiesj in particular, are exceed- 
ingly obscured by fabulous narrative and alle- 
gorical representations. The political events of 
those ages have lost their effectSj their conse* 
quences have long ago been exhausted, and all 
their influence dissipated by the successive re-^ 
volutions which have taken place in human af- 
fairs, A detail of the transactions of so remote 
a period, and of which the effects have long ago 
subsided, would be inconsistent with the present 
design, even if the obscurity in which they are 
enveloped could be removed, and an accurate 
delineation of thern be at this distance of time 
rendered possible. A transient glance on the 
commercial state of Egypt, through a long suc- 
cession of ages, may, however, offer some usefuF 

z % 



340 



hints to our consideration, and afford us a 
view of circumstances illustrative of the present 
subject. 

It is evident, from the concurrent testimony 
of writers, both sacred and prophane, that 
Egypt continued, during the dynasty of the 
Pharoahs, to be the focus of the commerce of 
the ancient world. About a year after the cap- 
ture and destruction of Jerusalem byNebuchad- 
nezzar, it was subjugated by the same conque- 
ror; and as ancient history often excites our 
curiosity, without proceeding to afford it the 
wished-for and expected gratification, we have 
no correct information relative to the particulars 
of the change effected by this conquest. We 
have, however, in the representations given ])y 
the Prophets, who foretold this revolution, and 
delineated some of its effects, sufficient grounds 
to conclude that they were extremely disastrous. 
That remarkable and mysterious prophecy of 
Ezekial, chap. xxix. ver. 11. who, speaking of 
Egypt, says, No foot of man shall pass through 
it, nor foot of beast shall pass through it, nei- 
ther shall it be inhabited forty years," can bej 
no otherwise understood than as a figurative, 
not a literal prediction, hyperbolically expres-j 
sive of the temporary annihilation of the Egyp- 
tian commerce, which was carried on by cara- 
vans of camels, across the deserts between the 
li^d Sea and the Nile, as well as between some 



341 



parts of the country and Ethiopia. After the 
subversion of the Babylonian empire by the 
Persians, A. A. C. 5^8, Egypt, which had once 
felt the oppression of the former, experienced 
the gaUing yoke of the latter, being conquered 
by Cambyses, son and successor of Cyrus. It 
revolted, but was again reduced by Darius 
Ochus. It afterwards remained a province of 
the Persian empire, and shared its fate when 
conquered by the Macedonians and Greeks un- 
der Alexander, A. A. C. 330. This event, 
however, was followed by consequences of a 
very different nature, as they respected Egypt^ 
from those which resulted from the Babylonian 
and Persian conquests. 

It appears almost certain, that by the last- 
mentioned subjugations, the trade of Egypt 
was nearly annihilated. The Babylonians would 
undoubtedly endeavour to exhaust the wealth, 
and- depress the power of a kingdom which had 
so long been their rival and their enemy. Af- 
terwards, when Cambyses conquered the coun- 
try, he plundered and desolated it in the most 
merciless manner, and its commerce probably 
remained in a depressed state during the whole 
period of its subjection to Persia; although it 
appears that some of the Persian monarchs^ 
particularly Darius Hystaspes, endeavoured to 
restore it to its former flourishing state. What 
was the success of those attempts history does 



342 



not, however, afford us the means of satisfac- 
torily ascertaining. From the number of ships 
or galleys furnished by Egypt for the grand ex- 
pedition of Xerxes against Greece, there, is, 
however, reason to believe that her commerce 
had considerably revived. 

The Grecian conquest of Egypt, instead of 
destroying, re-established the trade of that coun- 
try, and restored it to its former splendour. 
After the death of Alexander, and the seizure 
of his dominions by the Macedonian generals, 
Egypt fell to the share of Ptolemy Lagus, in 
the general partition of the empire, and was by 
him erected into an independent nionarchyi 
Ptolemy was endowed with all the qualifications 
requisite in a great Monarch, in which he was, 
notwithstanding, excelled by his son Ptolemy 
Philadelphus, one of the greatest promoters 
and patrons of literature and commerce that 
ever adorned any age or country, and one of 
the most illustrious characters exhibited in the 
history of royalty. This Prince collected the 
celebrated Alexandrian library, and caused 
the Jewish scriptures to be translated in the 
Greek language. He also finished the ca-* 
nal begun above three hundred years be- 
fore by Pharaoh Necho, which connected the 
Nile with the Red Sea ; and at the same time, 
or at least a little afterwards, built Berenice, in 
the Upper Egypt, in which arrangement he ap^ 



343 



pears to have had in view a plan for carrying on 
the exportation from Aggerroud, near the mo- 
dern SueZj and the importation down the Nile 
from the Upper Egypt. Alexandria had been 
founded by Alexander the Great, on account of 
its excellent situation for trade. Being made 
by Ptolemy Lagus the metropohs of the king= 
dom, its commercial importance soon became 
conspicuous, and fully justified the views of it$ 
great founder. In a short time the commerce 
of Egypt regained its former state, and even in 
all probability flourished more under the twelve 
kings of that Grecian dynasty, than it had 
done under the Pharaohs, its native princes. 
Alexandria was the great emporium of the ori» 
ental trade, and soon became one of the largest 
and most opulent cities of the world. The 
commerce and navigation of Egypt were at 
their ftdl height in the reign of Ptolemy Ever- 
getes, the fourth prince of that race. Plutarch, 
in describing one of the Egyptian war gallies 
fitted out from Alexandria, in the reign of that 
prince, says, that it was manned with 4000 
rowers, 4000 sailors, and 3000 soldiers. Vide 
Plutarclfs Life of Demetrius. This account, 
however, bears such evident marks of exagge- 
ration, as render it absolutely incredible ; and 
we must suppose some mistake arising from the 
carelessness of transcribers, or some error of 
the press, a circumstance which is too common, 



344 



and which too often disfigures the works of the 
most correct writers. It is, howevev, evident, 
from the most authentic historical evidence, 
that the marine of the port of Alexandria was, 
at that period, and during some time afterwards, 
nearly equal to that of the whole world besides* 
After the extinction of the race of the Ptole- 
mies, which ended in the celebrated Cleopatra, 
Egypt, being reduced to a Roman province, still 
continued to be the centre of communication 
between Europe and the eastern parts of Asia, 
and Alexandria was the emporium of the In- 
dian trade. The immense opulence and en- 
creased luxury of Rome were favourable to the 
commerce of Alexandria, as the latter caused 
an increased demand for the rich productions 
of the East, which the former afforded the 
means of obtaining ; and Egypt w^as one of the 
most flourishing provinces, as Alexandria was, 
next to Rome, the largest and most opulent 
eity of the empire. After the subversion of 
the western empire, and the conquest of Rome 
itself, by the northern barbarians, this country, 
not being within the reach of their depreda- 
tions, still remained an appendage to the eastern 
empire, and Egypt w-^as accounted the granaiy, 
and Alexandria the storehouse of Constantino- 
pie, as formerly of Rome, when the latter was 
the imperial residence. In this prosperous and 
flourishing state, Egypt continued until its sub- 



345 



jugation by the Saracens, under the command 
of Amrou, lieutenant of the Cahph Omar. 
After this period its trade began to dech'ne. 
The prejudices of the first race of Saracens, 
and the frequent hostihties between them and 
the eastern empire, prevented the estabhshment, 
or at least the continuance, of any commercial 
intercourse between Alexandria and Constanti- 
nople. That wealthy and luxurious ihetropolis, 
as well as the other large and opulent cities of 
the empire, was consequently obliged to con- 
trive the means of opening a commxunication 
with India by a different, although a circuitous 
route. This traffic between Constantinople and 
the eastern parts of Asia, was for some time 
carried on by the Euxine and Caspian seas, and 
the river Oxus, the merchandize being trans- 
ported by land-carriage across the inland parts 
of the provinces which separate the two seas 
above-mentioned. Egypt being thus deprived 
of its commercial intercouse with the most opu- 
lent and luxurious part of the world, her trade 
Was necessarily reduced to a very diminished 
state. Although the Caliphs seem to have been, 
sensible of the favourable situation of the coun- 
try, and to have formed the design of restoring 
it to its former commercial importance, their 
almost unremitting hostilities with the eastern 
empire deprived it of its principal markets. 
The building of the city of Cairo, and the cut- 



346 

ting of a canal from the Nile to the Red Sea, 
seem indicatory of this design, which ^vas, 
however, frustrated by the causes aheady men- 
tioned, and the commerce of Egypt was ahiiost 
annihrtated by succeeding troubles. The Cah- 
phate, experiencing the fate of many other great 
empires, fell a prey to intestine commotions. 
Egypt revolted from the authority of the Caliph 
of Eagdat, and at length a triple division of the 
extensive empire of the Saracens took place. 
The Crusades afterwards suceeded, in which ro- 
mantic but sanguinary contests Egypt Vv^as ge- 
nerally involved. At length the government 
fell into the liands of the Mamaluke guards, a 
mWitsirf corps composed of Christian slaves 
trained to arms, resembling the Turkish janissa- 
ries. This corps had been instituted by the 
great Saladin, whose name is so famous iai the 
history of the Crusades. About A. 
these military adventurers seized on the sove- 
reign authority, and having advanced one of 
iheir own officers to the throne, the government 
continued in that body by military election 
during the space of two hundred and seventy- 
iive^years ; until, after many noble struggles 
against the Turkish power, the Mamaluke king- 
dom was at length conquered by Sultan Selim IL 
A. D. 1517, and Egypt, being reduced to a pro-? 
vince of the Ottoman empire, has ever since re-s 
Biained in that state. 



347 



This long continued succession of calamitous 
events, could not fail of being extremely unfa- 
vourable to the commerce of Egypt. However, 
the Venetians and Genoese discovered amidst 
those scenes of anarchy and tumult, the means 
of establishing an almost exclusive trade with 
that country^ and during the reigns of the Ma- 
maluke princes had, through the medium of 
Alexandria, monopolized the commerce of the 
East. From this source those states had de- 
rived their opulence and power, which began 
immediately to decline when they lost that lu- 
crative monopoly, by the discovery of the pas- 
sage round the Cape of Good Hope to India. 
Another circumstance also contributed to divert 
the oriental trade from its ancient channel. 
Not only the Mamaluke kingdom of Egypt, but 
almost all the rich countries in the East of Eu- 
rope and the West of Asia, which had formerly 
composed the Saracen and Constantinopolitan 
empires, had fallen under the dominion of the 
Turks, between whom and the Italian states, 
especially the Venetians, there generally sub- 
sisted the most rancorous hostility. The long 
and frequent wars between the Turks and the 
Venetians could not fail of being unfavourable 
to the trade of Egypt, and especially to the 
monopolizing commerce of the latter with that 
country. These circumstances duly considered 
make it appear extremely probable, that even 



348 



if tlie passage round the Cape of Good Hope 
liad not been discovered, the trade with India 
by the way of tlie Red Sea would have been 
transferred to other nations, or else it must 
have suffered frequent interruptions. 

Although the passage round the Cape must 
be considered as the event whijch turned the 
oriental trade into a new channel, yet one cir- 
cuiiistance at that time existing merits particu- 
lar attention. The Venetians and Genoese, in 
the most prosperous times of their monopolizing 
commerce with the East, were subject to the 
imposts and restrictions which the governors of 
Egypt thought fit to lay upon their trade, and 
to purchase exclusive privileges, by submitting 
to whatever those barbarians were prompted by 
interest or caprice to impose. The discovery of 
the passage round the continent of Africa, freed 
the European trade with India from those extor- 
tionate imposts and disagreeable incumbrances ; 
but if the Venetians had been in possession of 
the sovereignty of Egypt, the central situation 
of that country would still have enabled them 
to retain the greatest share of that lucrative 
trade, by the commodious and expeditious com- 
munication it would have afforded them, in 
which they would have had a very great ad- 
vantage over those nations who must have made 
their voyages round the southernmost promon* 
tory of the African contiaent. 



349 

Aitiioiigh the discovery of the passage round 
the Cape to India took the oriental trade out of 
the hands of the Venetians, and transferred it 
first to the Portugueze, and afterwards to other 
nations, it is not from that circumstance to be 
supposed, that the trade carried on between 
Europe and Asia by the Cape of Good Hope, 
could support a competition with that which 
might be carried on through Egypt, if that 
country should fall into the hands of a commer- 
cial and enterprizing people, especially of a na- 
tion that has ports upon the Mediterranean, 
There is no nation which, in this respect, could 
turn the possession of Egypt to greater advan- 
tage than the French, or render the acquisition 
of a country so situated more detrimental to the 
trade of Great Britain. The convenient distance 
of Toulon and Marseilles from Alexandria, de- 
monstrates the facihty of communication be-* 
tween France and India by that route ; and the 
power which the former has acquired over the 
countries situated on the Mediterranean, would 
also be productive of many additional and very 
considerable advantages. 

In order to estimate the advantages of a com- 
mercial intercourse with India by the way of 
Egypt, let us for a moment cast a look on the 
geographical position of the countries on the 
globe, and we shall readily perceive that the 



350 

distance from the South of France to India k 
considerably less than the distance from any 
part of Englandj or even of France, to the Cape 
of Good Hope, The direct distance from Tou= 
Ion to Alexandria, as nearly as it can be mea-^ 
sured on the globe, or ascertained by geogra- 
phical calculation, does not exceed 1600 English 
miles • from Suez the whole length of the Red 
Sea to the Straits of Babelmandel is about 1390 
iniles ; from these Straits to Cape Comorin in 
India, it is not more than 2370 miles of the 
same measure, and considerably less to the 
nearest part of the coast of Malabar. From 
England, or even from the Western and Southern 
coasts of France, the distance to the Cape of 
Good Hope, round the continent of Africa, 
which extends as far as to 17° 20' West longi- 
tudCj is not less than 5790 geographical, or 
6700 English miles, being about 1300 miles far- 
ther than the whole distance from the South of 
France to India, by the way of Egypt: and the 
distance from the Cape of Good Hope to Cape 
Comorin in India, is not less than 3200 miles. 
If we make a just estimate of those geographi-* 
cal circumstances, and consider the expeditious 
performance of Capt. Connor's voyage from Suez 
to Bengal, together with the short space of time 
required for the comtnunication between Alex-' 
andria and Toulon or Marseille?i we may form 



S51 



E judgment of the dispatch with which business 
might, through this channel, be transacted be- 
tvv'cen Europe and India. 

The direction of the course of the Nile, al-^ 
most parallel to the position of the Red Sea, h 
admirably adapted to remedy the inconveniences 
occasioned by the long continuance of the 
Northerly windSj which blowing from that 
quarter the greatest part of the year, and fre- 
quently during the space of several months to- 
gether, render the navigation of that sea very 
tedious and troublesome^ and the port of Suez, 
during that time, of difficult access. To obviate 
the inconveniency and retardment arising from 
this circumstance, it is necessary that the out- 
ward-bound trade to India should be carried on 
from Suez by the Red Sea, as the strong North- 
erly winds, which so frequently blow in those 
parts, exceedingly facilitate and expedite the 
navigation from that port to the Strait of Babel- 
mandel ; but the homeward-bound trade, on the 
contrary, ought to be carried on by the way of 
Cossire, across the desert to the Nile, a distance 
of about ninety miles. The merchandize being 
then embarked on that river, would, with tlie 
greatest facility and dispatch, be transported to 
Cairo and Alexandria ; for the strong current 
of the Nile, counteracting the effect of the 
Northerly winds, renders the navigation froro 
the Upper Egypt down to the Delta easy and 



S52 



expeditious. This appears to have been, in a 
great measure, the ancient method of carrying 
on the trade with India. Ptolemy Philadelphus 
seems to have had this object in view* in build- 
ing tlie town of Berenice on the coast of the 
Red Sea> in the Southern part of Egypt, after 
having completed the canal begun by Pharaoh 
Necho in the Delta ; and the French had formed 
the same plan. These remarks have been made 
by a judicious traveller, who resided a long time 
in Egypt in a high mercantile situation ; and 
their propriety may be easily perceived by any 
person who is acquainted with the geography 
and physical circumstances of that country. 

It is evident that for the completion of this 
plan it would be necessary, or at least extremely 
convenient, to have two canals from the Red 
Sea to the Nile, one in Upper Egypt, and ano- 
ther somewhere in the Delta, We have had oc- 
casion to remark, that the canals formerly made 
do not appear to have fully answered the pur- 
pose for which they were designed ; but this 
disappointment must have proceeded from some 
failure in the execution, and not from the na- 
tural impracticability of the plan. Canals suf- 
ficiently wide and deep for commercial purposes, 
might undoubtedly be cut across the desert in 
several places, as the distance between the Nile 
and the Red Sea is hardly, in any place, an hun- 
dred miles. The whole undertaking would not 
4 



be greater dr more expensive than several public 
Works which may be seen in European countries I 
it would not in either of these respects equal 
that great work of Louis XVI. the canal of 
Langucdoc. 

While the political state of figypt remains 
Such as it is at present, that country can havt 
little or iio influence on the commercial system 
of Europe, It can never more be ah emporium 
of trade, nor the channel of oriental commerce^ 
unless a total revolution should take place in its 
political system^ and the moral circumstances 
of its peoplcj which are no less singular than 
its situation and other natural peculiarities. The 
state of society is as unfavourable to commerce^ 
as the local circumstances of the country are 
advantageouSi 

The political system .of £gyt)t is hotninally 
luonarchical, but actually aristocratical ; the 
Grand Signor being the ostensible, but the Ma- 
maluke Beys the real sovereigns. The adminis- 
tration of public affairs is vested in a Divan, or 
council of twenty-four Beys, or Lords, each of 
whom is an arbitrary sovereign in his own terri- 
tories. The Pacha, or Viceroy, appointed by 
the Grand Signor, is no more than a pageant of 
authority ; and his principal office is to send the 
resolutions of the Divan to Cbnstantinople for 
the Grand Signor s ratification, which is seldom 
Refused, This form of government was esta- 



354 



blished when Egypt was conquered by Selim 11. 
and the Beys possess an authentic grant of their 
privileges accorded by, or rather extorted from, 
that conqueror. However, notwithstanding the 
powers and privileges of these Beys, the people^ 
both Cophts and Arabs, are extremely indigent 
and oppressed, and plunged in ignorance and 
barbarism. It is necessary to read the travels of 
Mr. Irwin and others, in order to see how little 
the state of society in modern Egypt is favour- 
able to the freedom of commerce. 

From the mixed scene of oppression, indi- 
gence, and barbarism, which this country af 
present displays, it evidently appears that, .not- 
withstanding its advantageous situation, it can= 
not in its present state be reckoned of any in- 
fluence in the European system of commerce, or 
of any political consideration, excepting the 
case of its becoming an appendage to some Eu= 
ropean state. It has here been considered solely 
in this point of view ; and from a consideration 
of its geographical position and local circum» 
stances, will result the most convincing proofs 
that the British government 'acted in the most 
judicious manner, and on the principles of sound 
policy, in effecting the expulsion of the French 
from Egypt in the last war. The measures taken 
for preventing its falling again into their hands, 
originate from the same principles, and merit 
the applause of every Briton. 



355 



An attempt was made about thirty years ago^ 
by Ali Bey, to erect Egypt once more into an 
independent monarchy. This adventurer was 
the son of a priest of the Greek church, al- 
though hie himself had embraced Mahomedan° 
ism, and being a man of great abilities, as well 
as of an engaging deportment, had acquired 
very great popularity. The original cause which 
impelled him to revolt Was a false accusation 
brought forward against him at the Porte, in 
consequence of which his head was ordered to 
be sent to Constantinople ; but being apprized 
6( the design formed against him, and not in 
the least incHned to part with his head so rea-* 
dily as had perhaps been expected, he seized 
and put to death the messengers who brought 
the mandate, and soon found means to appear 
at the head of an army. Finding the opportu- 
nity favourable, by reason of the ernbarrassed 
and dangerous situation of the Turkish empire^ 
at that time engaged in an unsuccessful war 
With Russia, he boldly assumed the sovereignty 
of Egypt. He immediately attacked the neigh- 
bouring countries of Syria arid Arabia, and sub-^ 
dued most of the provinces borderihg on Egypt 
and the Red Sea. While he was engaged in 
these military enterprizes, his attention Was 
equally directed to the establishment of a regu- 
lar system of government, and the introduction 
6f order into a country which had so long been 

A A ^ 



' 350 



the theatre of ana^ch3^ His views were exteu- 
sive, and indicated a mind equal to' the forming 
of an empire. They were not only directed to 
political and military affairs, but also extended 
to the interests of commerce, which seemed to 
be one of his principal objects. He gave extra- 
ordinary encouragement to Christian traders, 
removed many diagreeable and illiberal restraints 
which had been imposed on them, and endea- 
%'oured to renew the ancient commercial inter- 
course between Egypt and Venice. The great 
design of Ali Bey is said to have been that of 
making himself entirely master of the Red Sea, 
and renderiiig Egypt once more the centre of 
commerce. He assumed the titles and state of 
the former Sultans of Egypt, and was supported 
by Shiek Daher, and other Arabian chiefs. In 
almost every enterprize against the Asiatic Ba* 
shaws and governors he was successful, and 
seemed on the point not only of establishing an 
extensive and potent empire, but also of re- 
ducing that of the Ottomans within very narrow 
limits ; but in the midst of his successes he was 
deprived of the kingdom of Egypt by the trea- 
chery and ingratitude of Mahomed Bey Abuda- 
hab, his brother-in-law. His troops being de* 
feated on the 7th of IMarch, 1 773, he was him- 
self wounded aixl taken prisoner, and dying of 
his wounds was honourably buried at Cairo. 
Abudahab afterwards governed Egypt, and 



357 

rnarcliing into Palestine against Shiek Daher, 
was found dead in his bed, supposed to have 
been strangled ; and Shiek Daher was taken and 
beheaded in the Both year of his age. 

A civil war afterwards commenced between 
the adherents of AH Bey and others, who had 
risen upon his ruins. Of these the principal 
were Murad and Ibraliim, wlio, having dri\Tn 
their enemies into exile, commenced a war be- 
tween themselves. After a variety of successes 
and defeats, and after liavi ng alternately ex- 
pelled each other from Cairo, these two Beys at 
last came to a kind of compromise, and tran- 
quillity was again restored. 

It has been, to many who liave attentively 
jobseryed those circumstances, a subject of no 
little astonishment, that Russia did not at that 
juncture support Ali Bey in his pretensions. No 
opportunity could have been more favourable ; 
^and an attentive observer would be inclined to 
think, that nothing could have been, at that 
time, more conducive to the interests of the 
Russian empire. The Russians were at that mo- 
ment carrying on the war both by land and sea 
with eqaal success. Their fleets were riding tri- 
iimphant in the Mediterranean and Levant seas, 
in the neighbourhood of All's dominions, and a 
junction of their forces with his would have 
been irresistible. If that adventurer had been 
furnished with a very smidl body of Russian 



358 



troops he must have carried his point without 
much difiSculty, and have established a new 
empire in the closest political and commercial 
alliance with Russiao Indeed, this appears to 
have been so favourable an opportunity of de- 
pressing, dismembering, and enfeebling the Ot^ 
tonian emph^e, that the Coyrt of Petersburgh's 
omission of making use of it has excited the 
astonishment, as its reasons for such a conduct 
have b^fflpd the researches, of pohtical specvi? 
lators. 

That Court h^cl undoubtedly its reasons for 
the liii^ of conductv^vhich it pursued in this af«? 
fair, and these reasons, we are to suppose, were 
well-founded. Wrong measures ^lay, it is truC;^ 
hp adopted in the cabinets of princes, as well as 
in the closets of inferior persons, as all are men, 
and consequently have no pretensions to infalh- 
bihty. This, however, was seldom the case in 
the councils 'of the gr^at Catharine II. whose 
measures were generally well-concerted, audi 
whose views were just and extensive. Some 
important considerations must therefore have 
determined the conduct of the Court of Peters- 
burgh respecting the affair in question. It is 
asserted by some, that Ali Bey actually solicited 
the assistance of Russia, and received a refusal ; 
while others, on the contrary, say, that his con- 
fidence in his own resources prevented him fron\ 
seeking any foreign support. If this was the 



35Q 

case, Russia might, for the same reason, think 
it unnecessary to offer her assistance, or to cm- 
ploy her forces in an affair which would, ac- 
cording to all appearances, be accomplished 
without her interference, as indeed it would un- 
doubtedly ha^e been, if the successful career of 
that revolter had jiot been unexpectedly termi- 
nated by the treachery of his brother-in-law. 
Had this reverse of fortune not happened, no- 
thing could, according to every ground of pro- 
bable conjecture, have prevented Ali Bey from 
establishing his empire in Egypt, Syria, and 
Arabia. Another cause might also prevent the 
active interference of Russia in that quarter. 
The rebellion of Pugatscheff had risen to such 
an alarming height as even to threaten the Im- 
perial Throne, but it fortunately happened that 
Pugatscheff neglected the favourable opportu- 
nity of marching to Moscow, as King Charles I. 
unhappily did that of marching to London, or 
else it would have been difhcult to calculate the 
consequences, if that rebel had entered the an- 
cient capital of Russia, as it was then circum- 
stanced. This state of things in the bosom of 
the empire might possibly induce the Cabinet of 
St. Petersburgh wisely to turn its attention to» 
w^ards home ; as appears to have been the case, 
from its] agreeing readily, in the midst of its 
successes, to a pacification with the Porte. Per- 



4 



36o 



haps that court might consider the too great 
aggrandizement of Ali as hostile to its own in- 
terests, and apprehend that his new empire 
might prove a more formidable enemy and rival 
than that of the Ottomans, although, from the 
circumstances of situation, and the interposition 
of the Ottoman dominions between Egypt and 
the Russian empire, there scarcely seems to have 
existed any ground for such an apprehension. 
It is often impossible to discover the secret 
springs of political affairs; but we must suppose 
that the Imperial Court had prudential reasons 
for its mode of acting. The conduct of the 
great Catharine was never determined by in- 
significant motives, nor directed to trifling 
ends. 

Had Ali Bey succeeded in establishing his new 
kingdom, it is not possible to ascertain the ef- 
fects which that revolution might have produced 
on the Indian trade ; for as the event did not 
take place, its consequences have not been ex- 
perienced. Consequences cannot, indeed, exist 
without the existence of a cause ; and therefore 
all that could be said on the subject would 
amount to no more than mere supposition. The 
independence of Egypt w^ould, however, be less 
clisastrous to Great Britain than its subjection 
to France. In the former case, her commerce 
2^nd her wealth might be diminished; but ift 



§61 



tlie latter, that wealth would be turned into tli6 
colFers of an enemy and rival. 

Although a country, which during many ages 
lias had so little connexion with the political 
system of Europe, as hardly ever to have at- 
tracted the public attention, until brought into 
notice by the French expedition, may seem 
scarcely to merit a place in a speculative deline- 
ation of the scenes of the great political drama, 
of which we have, perhaps, seen no more than 
the commencement; it is, notwithstanding, 
hiore than probable, that future contingencies 
inay render the fate of Egypt highly interesting 
to Europeans, especially to Englishmen. The 
Turkish empire has, during the greatest part of 
the last century, exhibited symptoms of decay, 
"Which of late have become every day more vi- 
sible. That unwieldy state is evidently unable 
to resist the arms of Russia, Austria, or France, 
and nothing but the jarring interests of those 
powers seem to ensure the prolongation of its 
existence. The system of the Ottoman empire 
has for some time appeared weak and relaxed, 
and seems to want the energy necessary for 
great and successful exertion. Its armies do 
not want courage, but they are deficient in dis- 
cipline as well as tactical skill, a circumstance 
which renders them, in almost every encounter, 
Inferior to European troops. Pohtical as well 



36 2 

as military energy seems also to be wanting, as 
the empire frequently exhibits scenes of revolt 
and anarchy. The decided superiority and sig- 
nal successes of its great neighbour have been 
ah-eady noticed ; but nothing so clearly evinces 
the feeble and relaxed state of the Ottoman sys- 
tem, as the weakness and inefficacy of its eiForts 
against the French during the last war, and the 
rapid progress the latter were making when they 
received so fatal, and probably so unexpected, 
a check from the British troops at Acre. Had 
not British valour interposed on this occasion, 
nothing could have prevented the arm.y of the 
republic from taking possession of Syria, if not 
of Asia Minor; both these countries being at 
that time, and indeed always, exceedingly ill 
prepared for resistance against an European in- 
vader. 

From a view of the political circumstances, 
and apparent interests of the continental powers, 
it appears extremely probable that great events 
are destined to take place, perhaps at no very 
distant period, in the eastern parts of Europe, 
and that the countries obnoxious to their effects 
will be the theatre of important revolutions. 
These, however, like all political transactions^ 
must depend on the opposition or coincidence 
of interests, and consequently, like all future 
contingencies, however probable, are uncertain. 



B6a 

and, until the moment of tlieir arrival, no more 
than conjectural. If, however, conjecture, 
v/hen formed on rational principles, on the ana-' 
logics of historical experience, and on prohabi- 
lities resulting from the visible tendency of ex- 
isting circumstances, be excluded from political 
science, little besides vvilt remain. Such, indeed, 
is the nature of human affairs, that in private 
as well as pubhc concerns, projects must be 
formed, measures adopted, and their success 
calculated for the most part according to con- 
jectural views, founded on various degrees of 
probability. Men have seldom the opportunity 
of acting upon this ground of absolute cer- 
tainty, 

How little soever the importance of Egypt, in 
the political system of the world, may at pre- 
sent appear, we must extend our views to fu- 
ture prospects, and contemplate the effects of 
future revolutions, when the probabilities of 
their arrival are so strong and imposing as to 
rush almost irresistibly upon the mind, and for- 
cibly to attract the attention. It is not difficult 
to perceive, that if any revolution in the East 
of Europe should cause the subversion, or only 
the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire, 
Egypt would become an important object of 
contest between England and France. The re- 
pent conduct of the latter leaves no room to 



364 

doubt of her eagerness to seize on that country, 
ivhenevTr a favourable opportunity may offer ; 
and it is evident that Great Britain could not, 
consistently with her commercial interests, 
tamely suffer its annexation to the dominions 
of the enemy. If no revolution of the kind 
here supposed should take place, it is not im- 
probable that France may make a second at^ 
tempt for the acquisition of Egypt, which will 
undoubtedly terminate as disastrously as that of 
which the issue has already been so unfavour- 
able to her designs, and so contrary to her e^;^ 
p^ctations. 

It is not improbable that France may have 
designs upon Syria as well as Egypt, as both ar^ 
convenient channels for the oriental commerce. 
The distance, however, over land, from the Le- 
vant Sea to the Euphrates, is much greater than 
from the Nile to the Red Sea, and in every 
commercial respect Syria must be considered 
f'ciY inferior to Egypt, although much surpassing- 
it in the agreeableness and salubrity of climate. 
It is evident* however, that Great Britain, by 
tlie superiority of her naval force, will be able 
to frustrate all the projects tliat can be formed 
for the anihilation of her Asiatic commerce. 

I shall conclude these epistolary dissertations, 
with leaving you to contemplate so grand and 
bo pleasing a prospect, which exhibits Gre^t 



365 



Britain like a rock in the midst of the ocean, 
braving the revolutionary tempests that have 
so long and so violently agitated the world. 
Convinced that you. will contemplate with plea* 
sure the agreeable scene, 

I anij 

Dear Sir, 

Tour's, kc. 



I 



367 



app:Enbix 

TO 

Political Aspect of Europe. 



The fluctuating state of continental affairs> at the time 
when the second edition of this work went to the press^ 
induced us to promise an Appendix, in order to illustrate 
such features as were then concealed under an impene- 
trable veil of olDscurity, At the present moment, how- 
ever, we cannot but lament that the same uncertain and 
changeable state of things must render this addition less 
perfect than might have been wished or expected. 

But although this must inevitably be the case, in the 
midst of those political convulsions which have lately 
agitated Europe in a manner beyond all former precedent^ 
and of military events which have had no example, some 
important particulars of the new continental arrangement 
have burst from the mysterious gloom of speculation into 
the broad day-light of action, and changed probable con- 
jecture into absolute certainty. Effects are at length de- 
veloped, of which the causes have long been operating in 
secret and the explosion v ill not only elucidate the train 



36s 



of past events^ but afford some grounds for future calcil- 
iations. 

' The most important feature of the pohtical picture^ 
which^ since the unfortunate battle of Austerhtz, has 
taken a new colourings is the alliance of Prussia with 
France^ and the seizure of Hanover by the former^ in 
consequence of an arrangement with the latter ppwer ^ a 
mode of political traffic of which Europe has afforded too 
many examples^ although no precedents whatever can 
establish its moral justice. It must be observed_, that in 
our view of the politica! system^ although it was requisite 
to exhibit a statement of the strength atid resources of 
the continental powers_, and of the importance which each 
might assume in a contest for the general independence 
of Europe ; we never expressed any sanguine expectation 
that Prussia wouid^ in the present state of affairs, be veiy 
forward in declaring herself the enemy of France i Thd 
ancient jealousies of Prussia and Austria had long ex-^ 
Isted* The seizure of Silesia by the former power had 
raised them to a degree of national enmity, equal to any 
examples of the kind recorded in histoiy. Almost every 
circumstance of the reigns of Frederick the Great and of 
Maria Theresa^ had contributed to establish a perpetual 
rivalship between these two great powers, who divided 
between them the effective streno-th of Germanv, In noi 
subsequent period have they ever been able to act in con- 
cert, except In the dismemberment of Poland, when they 
had every thing to gain and no risk of loss ; when a weak 
and defenceless territor\^ offered an easy conquest and 
ample gratification, while Russia was the central link 
v;hich connected their interests and operations. Even at 
the commencement of the revolutionary war, it is evident 
that Austria and Pmssia never acted on a plan of mutual 
confidence. The first ol^ ect of Prussia^ when her armies 



369 



unctcr the Dake of Brunswick attempted to ad\^ance to 
Paris^ seems to have been to restore the French monarchy 
by her own exertions, and by that means firmly to cement 
her alliance with that power. But when the monarchy 
was completely subverted, and the republic eveiy where 
victorious, she immediately withdrew from the coalition, 
and her conduct and views have ever since appeared fa- 
vourable to the aggrandizement of France. The whole 
conduct of Prussia, w^hich has to some appeared so m^^s- 
terious, seems easy to develope : whether attempting to 
march to Paris, or^*expelling the republicans from Mentz, 
she considered herself not as making war against the 
French nation, but only against the insurgent party. The 
transactions of the indemnities, subsequent to the treaties 
of Campo Formio and Luneville, were not calculated to 
conciliate Prussia and Austria, nor to eradicate that sys- 
tem of policy which, during so great a length of timc^, 
had preponderated at Berlin. 

From this view of the interests and rival ship of the 
two great German powers, it has been already observed^ 
that no such union could take place between them, as 
might enable them to make an effectual opposition to the 
encroachments of France, unless Russia should form the 
connecting link of the chain. This expedient has been 
tried, and, from a fatal combination of mistakes, a strange 
intermixture of precipitancy and delay, has proved unsuc- 
cessful. The ill success of the first operations deter- 
mined the conduct of Prussia^ which before appeared fluc- 
tuating, and would probably have taken a different turn 
if the battle of Austerlitz had been more favourable in its 
issue. Previous to that affair, indeed, she might by a 
vigorous, conduct, in all probability, have decidedly cast 
the balance in favour of the confederacy ; and even after 
that event, her active interference might, perhaps^ have in 



S70 



some measure restored its affairs. Prussia, situated be- 
tween the three great empires of Russia, Austria, and 
France, perhaps, equally dreads the aggrandizement of 
each. France, however, by the terror of her immense 
military force, and the lure of Hanover, appears at last to 
have overcome her irresolution, and to have involved her 
in a war, from which it is difficult to conceive in what 
manner she can derive any advantage. The united forces 
of France and Prussia will find themselves unable to block 
up the Sound, should they ever make such an attempt. 
The junction of their power may prevent the entrance of 
British manufactures into the North of Germany, and 
compel them to take so circuitous a tour into the interior, 
as must certainly enhance their price to the consumer, and 
diminish the consumption. But in thus partially injuring 
the British commerce, she will annihilate her own, which, 
from the advantage of the carrying trade during the war, 
has been more considerable of late than at any former pe- 
riod. She will now lose all the advantages which she has 
hitherto derived from her neutrality j and in case of a 
continuance of hostilities with England, a Prussian vessel 
will soon be a phaenomenon on the ocean. For this ex- 
tinction of her commerce, and the other risks and disad* 
vantages inseparable from her present measures, it will be 
difficult to find any adequate compensation. And it is 
equally difficult to reconcile the cession of Hanover to 
Prussia, with the ostensible inclinations of France towards 
peace, as that measure was one of the most likely to en- 
sure a prolongation of the war. The real motives of the 
conduct of the Gallic cabinet, however, is evidently that 
of securing, by the Prussian alliance, her influence over 
the North of Germany, in order to facilitate her measures 
in the South of Italy and on the confines of Turkey. 
The result of the late unfortvmate contest between 



371 



France and x\ustria is now made known by the treaty of 
Pfcsburg ; and we cannot but lament that our best ally 
has suffered so great a defalcation of power. In conse- 
quence of the arrangements which have now taken place^ 
the whole loss of Austria in territor)^, population, and 
revenue, has by some been estimated at 1297 square geo- 
graphical miles, more than two millions and a half of 
subjects, and 1,600,000Z. sterling of annual revenue. Of 
this spoliation of Austria, about three-fourths have been 
ceded to the kingdom of Italy, and the remainder to 
powers equally connected with France. The nature and 
situation of some of the ceded countries are also such, as 
to add great weight to the maritime power of the Italian 
kingdom, particularly in any future attempt upon Turkey, 
In the body of this work we had noticed the vast im- 
portance of Venice and its territory to Austria, not only 
by the intrinsic value of a rich and fertile country, with 
perhaps near two millions of inhabitants, and a consider- 
able revenue, but by the acquisition of an extensive line 
of sea coast, excellently situated for facilitating the com- 
merce of such of her provinces as abound the most in 
materials. Venice possesses an excellent commercial si- 
tuation, and for ages was famous for maritime power. 
Venetian Dalmatia was also extremely valuable in case of 
any projects being formed against Turkey* Its coast is 
inferior to none in the world, in regard to fine ports, com- 
manding every commercial advantage, and so situated as 
easily to be rendered impregnable to attack. These ad- 
vantages, which, in the opinion of many, rendered the 
territories of Venice a tolerable compensation for the loss 
of the Netherlands, are now all transferred to the Italian 
kingdom, and, together with the possession of Naples, 
must give to the maritime power of France a decided su- 
periority in the Mediterranean, and facilitate the execution 
B £ 2 



of any fiiture project that she may forna against Sicily oy 
Fg)^pt^ or indeed against any part whatever of the Turkish 
dominions. The Tyro]_, ceded to the new kingdom of 
Ba^^aria^ which is not less than that of Italy dependent on 
France, is, although in wealth and commercial importance 
far inferior to the Venetian territories, a grand acquisition 
to the French influence, and an incalculable loss to Austria, 
by laying open her interior to invasion, for v»'ant of that 
important southern barrier. Such are the losses which Aus- 
tria has sustained from the fatal issue of the battle of Aua- 
terlitz ; and such the preponderancy which France has ac- 
quired on the continent, through the ill success of a con- 
federacy, from w hich effects of a far different nature had 
been exnected. From Dalmatia to Strasburo; France has 
now drawn: an almost impregnable line of iirontier, by 
wbieb she now completely encloses Italy, and cuts off its 
communication with Germany. From the Gulph of 
Genoa to that of Istria, and from the Alps to the Straits 
of Messina, she has now^ extended an imlimited control 
over a country which, from its position, conmaands the 
Mediterranean. The immense resources of Italy, her 
numerous bays, rivers, and harbours, and her abundant 
materials for furnishing the means of carr^dng on an ex- 
tensive commerce, and of acquiring maritime strength, 
are all now^ in, the hands of France, the pow er best qua- 
lified to turn them to advantage. Every one knows what 
Italy once was. Ever}' one is acquainted with the martial 
genius of her ancient inhabitants. If the modern Italians 
have in this respect so amazingly degenerated from both 
their Roman and Gothic ancestors ; if they have lately 
exhibited none of those characteristics, by w hich the in- 
habitants of this extensive region w^ere for many ages dis- 
tinguishec, he causes already assigned in the body of 
(his v/ork wil readily enable us to account for this rcvo* 



S75 



lution In moral habits and national cliaracter'^. Italy, In 
the hands of France^ will soon be frenchified ; a new na-* 
tional character will be formed, and a new order of things 
established. The Gallic kingdom of Italy, formed by its 
position, and enabled by its resources, to domineer over 
the Mediterranean^ presents a formidable and menacing 
front towards Austria and Turkey* 

Such is the present portentous aspect of affairs on the 
continent of Europe. But let us, however, console our- 
selves with the reflection, that the picture is here exhi- 
bited in its most gloomy colouring ; and events beyond 
the reach of political foresight may diversify its shades* 
Every extension of empire must have its limits, and eveiy 
aggrandizement of power its ultimate degree* Italy is to 
be erected into a separate kingdom. Its crown will un- 
doubtedly be placed on the head of one of the Bonapartean 
family of France 5 but history shews that family compacts 
are not always durable. Of this, the division of empire, 
among the descendants of Constantine, Theodosius and 
Charlemagne, exhibits incontcstible and memorable 
proofs ; and the present imperial family of France pos- 
sesses no charter of exemption from the ordinary opera- 
tion of human circumstances. The sons of Constantine, 
in a few years, became enemies ; and the descendants of 
Theodosius, although not avowedly hostile to each other^ 
found in the division of power a separation of interests. 
The eastern and western branches of the Roman empire 
soon became totally alienated from each other; and Con- 
stantinople beheld, with cool indifference, the downfal of 
Rome. The conduct and fate of the descendants of the 
great Charlemagne, exhibit a similar scene ; and, indeed, 
its repetition is frequently found in the pages of history. 



* See Observations on Italy in the body of this \vork. Letter VlH. 



374 



The family compact between Spain and France has been 
supported^ not by the remembrance of consanguinity^ but 
by influence^ and views of political interest. This famous 
famliy compact has been lately dissolved in the most vio- 
lent maimer ; but yet;, through the preponderating influ- 
ence of France^ her alliance with Spain was soon renewed, 
and^ through the operation of the same cause^ it still 
continues . 

In admitting the full confirmation of the present order 
of things^ as established by the treaty of Presburg, it is 
not to be supposed that the interests of the French and Ita- 
lian empires will always coincide. France will always be 
apprehensive of Great Britain^ and her attention will be 
turned towards the Atlantic » She must also watch the 
movements of the North of Germany. Italy, in her se- 
parate capacity, will have little to apprehend from Great 
Britain, and will even find it her interest to cultivate a 
good understanding and commercial intercourse with this 
country. Her system of defence will be planned against 
Austria, and her views of aggrandizement directed to- 
wards Turkey. The different positions and political cir- 
cumstances of France and Italy, however closely con- 
nected at present, must in process of time produce a con- 
siderable disunion of interests; and the different mea- 
sures of talents and ambition which their fLiture rulers 
may possess, must be taken into the account in calculat- 
ing the possibility of a dissolution of their political 
union. 

If we take a view of the situation of Germany, we can- 
not but acknowledge that the whole of its vast extent is 
virtually brought under the dominion of France, whose 
emperor is spreading over its surface a new creation of 
kings, and parcelling out its territory among his allies. Th^ 
dominion of France over Germany will, however, in all 



575 



probability^ be more difficult to presence than her sove- 
reignty over Italy. It is more exposed to the attacks of 
powerful neighbours ; and some measures must be kept 
with Austria 'and Prussia_, who^ notwithstanding their 
mutual jealousies, might, by oppression, be compelled to 
unite, and either jointly or separately might, besides their 
internal strength, require a powerful support from foreign 
alliances. At present, however, it cannot be denied, that 
France, directly or indirectly, rules over the whole of Ger- 
many. Her sway over the kingdoms of her own creation, 
and over the principalities which she new models, is ab- 
solute and certain ; and, for some time to come, they 
must be as subservient to her designs as if they were in- 
tegral parts of her empire. In a word, it must be ac- 
knowledged that France now possesses an uncontrolable 
sway over Germany, Italy, and Spain. 

Such is at present the exorbitant power of France, such 
the formidable aspect that she wears ; but we cannot 
conceive that her federal empire, consisting of an hetero- 
geneous assemblage of nations of different languages, mo- 
ral habits^ and political interests, is fixed on a peraianent 
basis. The difference of national interests, the discord- 
ancy of national character, and the ambition of rulers, 
will all have a natural tendency to dissolve the pohtical 
union. Future events are yet concealed in the womb 
of time; but if we may hazard a political conjecture, 
founded on the natural course of things, as developed by 
history and experience, we cannot but consider it as ex- 
tremely probable, that the overgrown empire of France, 
like most others of a similar construction, must, perhaps 
at no very distant period, break into fragments through 
the discordancy of its heterogeneous members. This im- 
mense fabric was founded, and is still supported, by great 
jnilitary talents, directing vast resources amidst a train 



376 



of favourable circumstances ; and nnlform experience has 
hitherto shewn, that such systems^ so founded and so 
supported, sometimes depend on the abihties or fotUine 
of a single man, and are seldom oi long duration . 

In consequence of the disastrous issue of the late con- 
tinental war^ some have been lavish in their censures on 
Mr. Pitt's administration, under whose auspices it was 
planned. It has been laid to the charge of the late mi- 
nistry, that the confederacy was ill-timed ; that a pru- 
dent delay would have given such a respite to the conti- 
nental powers, as might have enabled them to repair the 
losses which they had suffered in population and revenue, 
to adjust their differences, and divest themselves ©f their 
jealousies. But it must be observed, that a coalition of 
the continent could never be more seasonably formed 
than when it was likely to be serviceable, in causing so 
powerful a diversion of the enemy's forces, at so small an 
expence on our part, at the very moment when they 
were concentrated on the coasts opposite to this kingdom, 
and holding forth menaces of invasion. Austria, not- 
withstanding the losses she ha,d suffered in the preceding 
contest, still possessed ample resources in men, and could 
muster numerous armies. Russia had experienced no 
loss of territory, nor any defalcation of revenue ; and 
Pmssia, could she have been prevailed on to join the coa- 
lition, was in full possession of her unimpaired strength. 
The continent was not, at that crisis, in so debilitated a 
state as to extinguish all hopes of success. Delay might, 
instead of diminishing^ have heightened mutual jealousy. 
The remembrance of recent injuries from France might 
in time have subsided, and the animosity of those powers 
against the common enemy have been considerably di- 
minished. From the whole aggregate of circumstances it 
appears, that many inconveniences, as well as advantages^, 

4 



577 

attended delay ; and if Britain expected any benefit from 
a continental confederacy, it is difficult to conceive the 
propriety of deferring the measure for a serifes of years, 
wnile this, country was alone sustaining the continued 
weight of a burdensome war. When the subject is ex- 
amined in every light^ it must be confessed^ that to bring 
into the field nve hundred thousand^ or at least four 
hundred thousand m.en, at the comparatively small ex- 
pense of l,250^000Z. for every hundred thousandf, a 
number which Great Britain herself could no,t have levied 
and supported, without the expenditure of a far greater 
sum_5 was a grand and decisive plan, Vv'hich, had it proved 
successful, would have met with general applause ; but 
statesmen, like others, can act only on the principles of 
probabihty ; and cannot acquire an absolute control over 
events. If when the coalition was formed, and its forces 
brought into the field, a vv-ant of skill in the arrangement 
of the military machine and of harmony in its move- 
ments were visible, it was certainly the fault of the allies 
themselves, and not of the British ministers, who could 
not be supposed to direct "with an absolute sway the coun- 
cils of foreign cabinets, nor the operations of foreign ar- 
mies. If the military arrangements had been left vvholly 
to tbe brave Archduke, it is probable that the event, if 
not completely successful, would have been much less di% 
astrous ; but P^ngland could not dictate to Austria the 
nomination of her commanders, nor model the whole 
plan of the campaign. She could only give the first im- 
pulse to the machine : it was necessarily left to the aUies 
themselves to direct its movements. 

Strictures on the late ministry may, by some, be thought 

• Article 3d, Treaty of St. Pctersburgh, nth April, iSoj". 
■J- Fourth separate Article of ditto. 

C C 



37S 



a compliment to those now in of^ce ; but the just esti- 
mator of men and measures will have too exalted an opi- 
nion of our present ministers^ to hnagine thai their inte- 
grity or talents want any foil to heighten them by the 
contrast. Their abilities^ while they shew the wisdom of 
his Majesty's choice^ are too well knowTi to derive any 
additional lustre from the ill success of their predecessors. 
The late administration had long stood in a predicament 
difficult beyond all example; and the present ministers 
have succeeded to a burden, rendered still more heavy by 
the failure of the late continental measures. Their 
transcendant abilities, however, are equal to the difficul- 
ties of their situation, and promise every thing that can 
be expected from finite beings, placed in so critical cir- 
cumstances. 

i'rom the whole view of affairs since the battle of Aus^ 
terlitz, it is evident that Great Britain is now left to her 
own exertions ; and it would be an insult to the under- 
standing of readers to hold out the expectation of any 
" advantage from another continental confederacy, if such 
could be formed. The preceding observations demon- 
strate the existence of a probability, nearly approaching to 
certainty, that the overgrown empire of France, which is 
now held together by the military genius of its emperor, 
tlie tactical skill of its generals, and the enthusiasm of its 
armies, cannot be durable. But it must at the same time 
be acknowledged, that, for the present moment, Germany 
is completely at the disposal of France, and for some years 
must remain subject to her control ; while Russia, with 
all her power and magnanimity, is too remote from the 
scene of action, singly to cast the balance on the con- 
tinent. 

Amidst the general disaster, Britain, possessing immense 
resources, joined to the advantages of her insular situa> 



379 

tion_, and under the directions of an able ministry, ha$ 
nothing to apprehend from the aggrandizement of her 
enemy_, and the general debihty of Europe. Her invin- 
cible marine^ under the management of her gallant com* 
manderSj will maintain her superiority on the ocean, pro* 
tect her commerce from spoliation and her shores from 
invasion, until the wisdom of her government shall he 
able to put an end to a burdensome war, from which 
neither of the contending powers can hope for any further 
advantage, . 



THE END, 



C. Stov^er, Printer, 
Paternoster- Row, ^^;^on.. 



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